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Structures, (κ-) Type Spaces, and (Conditional) Possibility Structures. One of
the central questions of this thesis is as to whether, for a class of beliefs structures,
there exists a “largest” structure in this class that “contains” all the structures
of that class. Such a structure is said to be “universal”. Formulated in category
theoretic terms, we are looking for a terminal object in a category (of beliefs
structures). Apart from the introduction, the chapters are quite independent of
each other, hence they can be read in any order the reader might find convenient.
The work contained in this thesis owes much to the pioneering work of John
C. Harsanyi (1967/68) and Robert J. Aumann (1976, 1995, 1999a, 1999b), as well
as to the work of Mertens and Zamir (1985), Brandenburger and Dekel (1993),
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Chapter 0
Introduction
Consider a group of players facing uncertainty about a set S, called the space of
states of nature, each element of which can be thought of as a complete list of
the players’ strategy sets and payoff functions1 (i.e. a complete specification of
the “rules” of the game that depend on the state of nature). In such a situation,
following a Bayesian approach, each player will base his choice of a strategy on his
subjective beliefs (i.e. probability measure) on S. Since a player’s payoff depends
also on the choices of the other players, and these are based on their beliefs as
well, each player must also have beliefs on the other players’ beliefs on S. But
he must, by the same argument, also have beliefs on other players’ beliefs on his
beliefs on S, beliefs on other players’ beliefs on his beliefs on their beliefs on S,
and so on. So, in analyzing such a situation, it seems to be unavoidable to work
with infinite hierarchies of beliefs. Thus, the resulting model is complicated and
cumbersome to handle. In fact, this was the reason that prevented for a long
time the analysis of games of incomplete information.
A major breakthrough took place with three articles of Harsanyi (1967/68),
where he succeeded in finding another, more workable model to describe inter-
active uncertainty. He invented the notions of type2 and type space: With each
point in a type space, called a state of the world, are associated a state of nature
and, for each player, a probability measure on the type space itself (i.e. that
player’s type in this state of the world). Usually it is assumed that the players
“know their own type”, that is, a type of a player in a state assigns probability
one to the set of those states where this player is of this type. This is the for-
malization of the idea that the players should be self conscious. Since each state
of the world is associated with a state of nature, each player’s type in a state
1Other interpretations are possible, for example, if a game of complete information is given,
s could be the strategy profile that the players are actually going to chose (see the analysis of
epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)).
2This notion of ‘type’ should not be confused with the notion of ‘type’ used in the model
theory of first-order logic, where a type is a (maximal) consistent set of first-order formulas
with one free variable.
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of the world induces a probability measure on S. But also, since with each state
of the world there is associated a type for each player (and hence indirectly a
probability measure on S for this player), the type of a player in a state of the
world induces a probability measure on the other players’ probability measures
on S. Proceeding like this, one obtains in each state of the world a hierarchy of
beliefs for each player, in the sense described above.
The advantages of Harsanyi’s model are obvious: Since we have in each state
of the world just one probability measure for each player, contrary to the hierar-
chical description of beliefs, this model fits in the classical Bayesian framework
of describing beliefs by one probability measure, and provides therefore all its
advantages (for example, it allows for integration with respect to beliefs).
However, there are also several serious questions that arise with the use of this
model: Although each state of the world in a type space induces a hierarchy of
beliefs for each player, the converse is not obvious: Does each profile of hierarchies
of beliefs arise from a state of the world in some type space, and if so, is there
a type space such that every profile of belief hierarchies is generated by some
state in this type space? What “are” the states of the world, and what justifies
using one particular type space and not another? In particular, contrary to the
case of the hierarchical description of beliefs, it is not clear what “all possible
types” (resp. “all possible states of the world”) are? More precisely, given a
game of incomplete information, working in one fixed type space to analyze that
game could be restrictive in the sense that we might miss some possible types
(resp. possible states of the world) that are just present in a bigger type space
that contains the one we use. If this were the case for every type space, then
the use of type spaces would be problematic from a theoretical point of view,
because of the restrictive character of this concept, but it would be problematic
also from a more practical point of view: In their contributions to the recent
debate on epistemic conditions for backward induction in perfect information
games, Stalnaker (1998) and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999b) have pointed out
that the players do “their best” to rationalize their opponents’ behavior if the
backward-induction outcome is to obtain. This translates into using a type space
where a player can find the needed types he has to attribute to the other players,
if he has to explain (i.e. rationalize) the others’ behavior.
The question concerning “all possible types” can be answered and the related
problems can be solved if there is a type space to which every type space (on
the same space of states of nature and for the same set of players, of course)
can be mapped, preferably always in a unique way, by a map that preserves the
structure of the type space, i.e. the manner in which types and states of nature
are associated with states of the world, so-called type morphisms. Such a type
space would be called a universal type space. If such a space always exists, one
could, in principle, carry out the analysis of a game of incomplete information
in the corresponding universal type space without any risk of missing a relevant
state of the world. On a technical level, the type spaces - on a fixed set of
3states of nature and for a fixed player set - as objects and the type morphisms
as morphisms form a category. If we always require the map from a type space
to the universal type space to be unique, then, if it exists, such a universal type
space is a terminal object of this category. By the Yoneda Lemma, a terminal
object of a category is known to be unique up to isomorphism. Hence, we are
justified to talk about the universal type space.
The existence of a universal type space was proved by Mertens and Zamir
(1985) under the assumption that the underlying space of states of nature is a
compact Hausdorff space and all involved functions are continuous. Moreover it
turned out that in this case the universal type space consists of all hierarchies
of beliefs in the above sense, that satisfy some prespecified coherency conditions.
That topological assumption was relaxed by Brandenburger and Dekel (1993),
Heifetz (1993), Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994/2000) to more general topological
assumptions, but the general idea of the proof was always the same: To use
this assumption to show, by the Kolmogorov extension theorem, say, that each
hierarchy of beliefs induces in a unique way a σ-additive probability measure on
the whole space of (profiles of) belief hierarchies.
The general measure theoretic case was solved by Heifetz and Samet (1998b).
They showed that there also exists a universal type space in this case, except
that it is not the space of all coherent hierarchies in the above sense, but rather
a subspace of that space. In another article (1999) they showed that in the
general measure theoretic case there are coherent hierarchies that give rise just
to a finitely additive but not σ-additive measure on the whole space of coherent
hierarchies (although every measure that makes up some level of such a hierarchy
is σ-additive!).
Heifetz and Samet constructed the universal type space by collecting all those
coherent hierarchies that are generated by some state of the world in some type
space. (They offered also another proof, where they collected the “descriptions”
of all the states by means of some kind of modal language the formulas of which
they called expressions.) Their method is nice in the sense that it leads to a very
clear and relatively short proof. But unlike the proofs in the other cases, this
method has the disadvantage that the universal type space is not characterized
in an independent way (for example, it cannot be characterized as the space of
all coherent hierarchies of beliefs).
Most of the authors consider just those type spaces that we will call here
product type spaces. For each player i ∈ I, there is a measurable space (Mi,Σi) ,
i’s component space, such that with each point mi ∈ Mi there is associated a
probability measure (i’s type in mi) on the space S × Πi∈IMi endowed with the
product σ-field. The players’ self consciousness is expressed in the following way:
The marginal of the type of player i in state mi ∈ Mi on Mi is δmi , the delta
measure at mi.
Given such a product type space, one can define the notion of “all possible
types in that space”, namely the requirement that each probability measure on
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S × Πj∈I\{i}Mj is the marginal of a type of player i in some state mi ∈ Mi.
We call this property beliefs completeness. Although just applicable to product
type spaces, this notion of “all possible types (in a space)” has the advantage
that no notion of “structure preserving maps” is needed to define it. Intuitively,
it should be the case that a universal type space, as a space of “all possible
types”, should be beliefs complete, i.e. contain in particular “all possible types
in the universal type space”. However, since the mathematical formalization of
“all possible types” and “all possible types in a given space” are quite different,
this is far from being straightforward and has to be proved. In fact, in all the
above mentioned type space literature, the universal type space is a product
space. (This follows either from the authors’ a priori restriction to product type
spaces, or as an outcome of the construction of the universal type space). In all
the topological cases the universal type space has the following property (which,
of course, implies beliefs completeness): The component space of each player is
homeomorphic to the space of probability measures on the product of the space of
states of nature and the other players’ component spaces (endowed with the weak∗
topology). The converse is not in general true: Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (2000,
Comment 1.5 Ch. III) gave an example of a beliefs complete type space that is
not the universal type space. In the general measure theoretic case, Heifetz and
Samet, although working exclusively with product type spaces, did not consider
beliefs completeness. So, up to now, it remained open whether in this case the
universal type space is beliefs complete.
Another approach to uncertainty in a group of players (or agents) used in
game-theory, economics, and also computer science, are purely set theoretic mod-
els. A player’s beliefs are not described by probability measures, but rather by
the set of those states that he considers possible. Again, the hierarchical approach
is conceptually straightforward, but the resulting models are quite impractical to
use, while the use of the “state of the world models” - they are in fact Kripke
structures known from modal logic - raises similar questions as in the case of type
spaces.
Knowledge (see, for example, Aumann (1976, 1995 and 1999a), or Heifetz
(1997)) is usually described by partition spaces, or equivalently by Kripke struc-
tures, where all the relations are equivalence relations. For each player, there is
a partition of the underlying space of states of the world. In each state of the
world, a player knows exactly those events which contain the partition member
that contains that state. For an event, one can define the event that a player
knows this event as the set of those states in which he knows this event. Defined
in that way, knowledge has the following properties: What is known by a player
is true, a player knows what he knows and he knows what he does not know.
So, in these models the assumptions on the epistemic attitudes of the players are
rather strong.
Heifetz and Samet (1998a) showed that - unfortunately - for at least two
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players and at least two states of nature there is no universal knowledge space.
What happens if we consider other (weaker) epistemic attitudes?
In the remaining part of this introduction, we give a summary of - and a
motivation for - each of the chapters of this thesis.
0.1 On the Nonexistence of Universal
Kripke Structures
Kripke structures can be seen as generalizations of partition spaces to describe
other, in particular weaker, epistemic attitudes. Instead of a partition, a binary
relation over the underlying space of states of the world is ascribed to each player.
In a state of the world, a player considers all the states that are in relation with the
actual state as being possible. He knows, in a state of the world, all those events
which contain all states that he considers to be possible there. If the relation is
not reflexive, it no longer holds that what is known is true and we should rather
talk about belief than knowledge. Imposing different restrictions on the relations
of the players leads to different epistemic attitudes of the players (see Fagin et
al. (1995) for more on this issue). For example, if the relations are equivalence
relations, we are, in fact, in the case of knowledge spaces (it is perfectly equivalent
to work either with equivalence relations or with the equivalence classes of the
relations).
We mentioned above that there is a universal type space for probabilistic
beliefs but no universal knowledge space. Where does this difference come from?
Does it come from the strong assumptions on the epistemic behavior of the players
in a knowledge space, especially from the truth axiom (“what a player knows in
a state is true there”)? Note that in a type space it is possible that the type of a
player in state of the world assigns probability one to an event, and yet this event
is not true in that state of the world. If this difference were the reason why there
is no universal knowledge space, one might hope that there is a universal Kripke
structure, at least for classes with weak conditions on the epistemic attitudes of
the players (especially abandoning the truth axiom).
We show in Chapter 1 that this is - unfortunately - not true: Given at least two
players and at least two states of nature, for every class of Kripke structures that
contains all knowledge spaces, there is no universal Kripke structure (Corollary
1.1), even if we do not require the morphisms from the Kripke structures to the
universal Kripke structure to be unique (Theorem 1.1).
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0.2 Finitely Additive Beliefs and Universal
Type Spaces
σ-additivity, though desirable, is quite a strong assumption on the players’ beliefs.
“Savage’s (1954, 1972) framework for modelling choice under uncertainty provides
a theory of subjective probability, and has been called the ‘crowning glory of
choice theory.’ (Kreps (1988))... Savage chose to work in a framework that implies
that the subjective probabilities fail to be countably additive.” (Stinchcombe
(1997)).
Now, game theory can be viewed as multi-agent decision theory, and in this
view, one is naturally led to consider type spaces where the players’ beliefs are
described by finitely additive probability measures on the space of states of the
world.
We show in Chapter 2, for a variety of measurability conditions (κ-measur-
ability, for every regular cardinal κ) that include usual measurability as a special
case, that universal type spaces exist even if the players beliefs are finitely addi-
tive. If we require that all subsets of the type spaces should always be measurable
(called here ∗-measurability), then, for at least two states of nature and at least
two players, there is no universal type space. This means that in the case of
finitely additive beliefs, the existence of a universal type space depends crucially
on the measurability conditions that we require.
We provide also a characterization of the universal type space (for finitely
additive beliefs). In the case of κ-measurability, the universal type space is the
space of coherent hierarchies (Theorem 2.5), but, for κ > ℵ0, all the finite levels of
the hierarchies do not suffice, one has to take the hierarchies up to (but excluding)
level κ. This is so because for every α < κ there are coherent hierarchies of (κ-
measurable) beliefs up to (but excluding) level α that have at least two different
extensions to level α. (This follows from our Theorem 2.2, where we formulate
this fact for sets of κ-expressions and not for hierarchies of measures, but it is
straightforward to see that the structure constructed there generates coherent
hierarchies with these properties.)
Furthermore, the space of (finitely additive) coherent hierarchies (and hence
the universal type space (for finitely additive beliefs)) is a product type space
(Theorem 2.4) and it is beliefs complete (Theorem 2.6). In the case of κ = ℵ0,
the component space of each player is - up to isomorphism of measurable spaces
- the space of finitely additive probability measures on the product of the space
of states of nature and the other players’ component spaces.
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0.3 Infinitary Probability Logic for Type Spaces
As mentioned above, there is no universal knowledge space (and no universal
Kripke structure). But still, in order to justify using knowledge spaces, we would
like to have a meaningful notion of “all (knowledge) types” (resp. “all states of the
world”) and a knowledge space that contains “all (knowledge) types” (resp. “all
states of the world”) in that sense. If we restricted our attention to “important
events” (just as one does in the probabilistic context, where one considers just
measurable events and not all subsets of the structure), maybe then there would
be such a space of “all types” (resp. of “all states of the world”).
This is where another idea comes into the picture, namely that of a language.
The basic “philosophy” behind this idea is that a player cannot think about events
he cannot “describe”. And to formalize what “describe” means, a mathematical
language is defined. The language of (propositional) modal logic is considered
to be the appropriate language (i.e. the syntax) for Kripke structures. One
starts with a set of atomic formulas or primitive propositions, that we interpret
as statements about nature, and forms more complicated formulas by closing
off under negation, conjunction and, for each player, a modal operator, that
expresses that player’s knowledge. The language is then just the set of these
formulas. Then, one adds axioms, i.e. some of these formulas that we require to
be always true, and inference rules, i.e. rules that allow to infer true formulas
from other true formulas. This leads to the notions of theorem as a formula
that follows from the axioms by applying some of the inference rules, and of
consistent set of formulas as a set of formulas such that there is no formula such
that this formula and its negation follow from that set of formulas (by means of
the inference rules). In fact, the importance of the idea of using a language is
illustrated by the fact that the language of modal logic was there before Kripke
invented Kripke structures as the semantics for modal logic.
Since we have syntax and semantics, we would like to relate the two ap-
proaches. This is done by the model relation “|=”, that tells us, given a Kripke
structure and a state in this structure, if a formula holds in that state. An axiom
system (together with inference rules) is sound with respect to a class of (Kripke)
structures if every theorem is valid with respect to that class (i.e. true in every
state in every structure of that class) and it is complete with respect to a class
if every valid formula is a theorem. But there are also the stronger notions of
strong soundness and strong completeness. Although they are usually defined
differently, these properties are equivalent to the following: An axiom system is
strongly sound with respect to a class of structures iff every set of formulas that
has a model (i.e. a structure in this class and a state in this structure such that
every formula of that set is true in this state) is consistent, and it is strongly
complete with respect to a class of structures iff every consistent set of formulas
has a model.
Following several predecessors (Kripke (1959,1963), Hintikka (1962), and Fa-
8 CHAPTER 0. INTRODUCTION
gin et al. (1995)), Aumann (1995, 1999a) for the finitary version and Heifetz
(1997) for infinitary versions, showed that the multiplayer S5 axiom system of
modal logic is strongly sound and strongly complete with respect to knowledge
spaces. Moreover, to prove that theorem they were able to construct a canonical
knowledge space, the states of which consist of the maximal consistent sets of
formulas in that language such that a formula is true in a state iff it is in the set
of formulas that constitute that state. So, this gives a well-defined notion of “all
states” as the set of all maximal consistent sets of formulas, and a space of “all
types”, i.e. the canonical space. Also, in the case that we have strong soundness
and strong completeness, the axioms and inference rules give a deeper insight
in our assumptions on the structure of the spaces in the corresponding class. If
we reject these axioms and inference rules, then, since they reflect the structural
properties of the corresponding class of structures, we should consequently also
work with a different class of structures at the semantic level.
However, as Heifetz (1997) has shown, the canonical knowledge space depends
on the language chosen: If we allow for infinitary formulas of larger size (with-
out changing anything essential), then the canonical space is also larger (i.e. it
contains more states).
Now, type spaces in the sense of Harsanyi can be viewed as the probabilistic
analog of Kripke structures: It is not just specified what - in a state - each player
believes, but also the intensity of these beliefs. Hence, one wonders if such a
strong soundness and strong completeness theorem also holds for type spaces
and, if so, how the corresponding axioms and inference rules, and - if it can be
constructed - the corresponding canonical space would look like.
Heifetz and Mongin (2001) and before Fagin, Halpern and Meggido (1990),
for a richer syntax than the one used by Heifetz and Mongin, axiomatized the
class of type spaces in a finitary logic similar to the modal logic mentioned above,
where the modal operators expressing knowledge are replaced by operators of the
form pαi , read as “player i assigns probability at least α to”, for each player i
and each rational α ∈ [0, 1]. They were able to show that their axioms and
inference rules are sound and complete with respect to the class of type spaces.
But a finitary axiom system cannot be used to get strong soundness and strong
completeness, and hence it is also not possible to construct a canonical type
space using such an axiom system. To see that, consider the set of formulas{
p
n
n+1
i (x) : n ∈ N
}
∪ {¬ (p1i (x))}, where x is some primitive proposition. It is
easy to see that each finite subset has a model in the class of type spaces, while
the whole set has no model. Since in a finitary logic a set of formulas is consistent
iff each finite subset is consistent, strong soundness and completeness would imply
that this set of formulas would have a model, which is impossible.
In Chapter 3, we consider an infinitary extension of the language of Heifetz
and Mongin (2001) and invent an infinitary axiom system as well as inference
rules which we prove to be strongly sound and strongly complete with respect to
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type spaces (Theorem 3.1). To the best of our knowledge this is the first strong
completeness theorem for a probability logic of this kind. In fact, we prove
this theorem by constructing the canonical type space - in the sense explained
above - (Proposition 3.3 and Corollary 3.1). It is worth remarking that, like
Heifetz and Samet (1998b), we need no topological assumptions on the spaces,
just measurability. Furthermore, it turns out that our canonical type space is a
product type space (Proposition 3.4 and Theorem 3.3).
As already mentioned, there is a space of “all types” defined in purely semantic
terms, namely the universal type space, in the measure-theoretic case constructed
by Heifetz and Samet (1998b). In a fortunate coincidence, our canonical type
space is the universal type space (Theorem 3.2). Therefore we provide a novel
characterization of the universal type space in the general measure theoretic case
- as the space of maximal consistent (with respect to our axioms and inference
rules) sets of formulas.
Heifetz and Mongin (2001) are the only ones that considered also type spaces
where the players are allowed to be ignorant of their own type.3 We construct our
canonical type space with the introspection property, i.e. the property that the
players “know their own types”, as well as without the introspection property.
Therefore, we provide the first proof of the existence of a universal type space
without the introspection property.
We mentioned above that Heifetz and Samet (1998b) did not consider beliefs
completeness. We show that, in the introspective case, the component space of
each player is - up to isomorphism of measurable spaces - the space of probability
measures on the product of the space of states of nature and the other players’
component spaces, and in the non-introspective case, each player’s component
space is - up to isomorphism of measurable spaces - the space of probability
measures on the whole space of states of the world (Theorem 3.4).
0.4 Conditional Possibility Structures
Brandenburger and Keisler (1999) invented possibility structures as a set-theoretic
analog of product type spaces. Given a nonempty space of states of nature4 S
and a nonempty player set I, for each player i ∈ I there is a nonempty compo-
nent space Mi (the set of “i’s types”) and a relation Ri (i’s possibility relation)
on Mi × S × Πj∈I\{i}Mj such that Ri (mi) , the mi-section of Ri, is nonempty
for each mi ∈ Mi. Ri (mi), the possibility set of mi, is the set of those nature-
others’ types pairs considered possible by the type mi of player i. Another way
of describing the possibility structure is to replace each Ri by a function ρi from
3Though Heifetz and Samet (1998b) mentioned it in their discussion.
4In fact, Brandenburger and Keisler (1999) allow for different spaces of states of nature for
the different players.
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Mi to Pow∅
(
S × Πj∈I\{i}Mj) , the set of nonempty subsets of S ×Πj∈I\{i}Mj. It
is easy to see that a possibility structure “is” (i.e. can easily be turned into) a
Kripke structure.
The initial motivation of Brandenburger and Keisler (1999) was to provide a
framework for analyzing the epistemic conditions for the backward-induction al-
gorithm. They wrote on the issue of the recent debate on the backward-induction
algorithm: “In significant contributions to this debate, Stalnaker (1998) and Bat-
tigalli and Siniscalchi (1999b) have pointed out that the use of the BI algorithm
implicitly assumes that players do their ‘best’ to rationalize the moves they see
other players make. They further observe that in an epistemic analysis, this
translates into the need to work in a ‘rich’ probability structure, in which player
a, say, can find the beliefs he needs to attribute to player b, if he is to explain
player b’s behavior. Indeed, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999b) work in a complete
probability structure, where they are able to establish epistemic conditions for
extensive-form rationalizability (Pearce 1984), a solution concept for extensive
games that reduces to the BI algorithm in the special case of perfect-information
(PI) games.”
They proceeded: “Now, there has been a long-standing intuition that prob-
abilities play an inessential role in PI games. Recall, for example, that every
two-person zero-sum PI is strictly determined (Zermelo 1913, von Neumann and
Morgenstern 1944) and that every n-person PI game possesses a pure-strategy
equilibrium (Kuhn 1950, 1953). Thus, the particular context of PI games in-
vites a non-probabilistic epistemic analysis. Paralleling Battigalli and Siniscalchi
(1999b), the key to a set-theoretic epistemic analysis of the BI algorithm will be
finding a sufficiently rich possibility structure.”
Unlike most of the above mentioned literature, they use the formalization of
the notion of “all types” (resp. “all states”) in the sense of beliefs completeness
and not in the sense of universality. A straightforward cardinality-argument
shows that - with at least two states of nature and at least two players - there
is no beliefs complete possibility structure in the purely set-theoretic sense. I.e.
there is no possibility structure such that for each player i and every nonempty
subset Y ⊆ S × Πj∈I\{i}Mj there is a mi ∈Mi with Ri (mi) = Y.
So, to have a chance at all to get some kind of beliefs completeness one has
to restrict attention to “interesting” or “important” events, as one does in the
probabilistic context, where one considers just measurable events and not all
subsets of the structure or in the case of Kripke structures (resp. knowledge
spaces) where one restricts attention to events described (i.e. defined) by (sets
of) formulas. (Above, we gave some justification for doing so.) As one does
in the case of Kripke structures, Brandenburger and Keisler (1999) went on to
use a mathematical language to get another notion of “all possible types” (resp.
“all states”) relative to that language, but as said above, in the sense of beliefs
completeness and not in the sense of universality.
From a game theoretic point of view, the main conceptual invention of Bran-
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denburger and Keisler (1999) was the use of another language than the (modal)
languages mentioned above: They considered possibility structures as models
of a (many-sorted) first-order logic. They defined the “language induced by”
a possibility structure, which is, in model-theoretic terms, the language of the
elementary diagram of the structure.
Their motivation to do so was as follows (Brandenburger 2001): “The lan-
guage Brandenburger-Keisler set up is a first-order logic, with symbols for ele-
ments of the belief system. This seems like the natural choice, given that first-
order logic is widely considered to be the basic language of mathematics (see e.g.
Barwise 1977). A game is a mathematical structure, so a player uses first-order
logic to reason about it.”
The new notion of beliefs completeness they were defining is that of first-
order definably beliefs completeness: A possibility structure is definably beliefs
complete if for each player i and every nonempty subset Y ⊆ S×Πj∈I\{i}Mj that
is defined by a formula of the language induced by the possibility structure there
is a mi ∈Mi with Ri (mi) = Y.
Now, does a cardinality-argument still work to show that such a possibility
structure cannot exist? Assume that I is finite, S is finite or countable and Mi
is countable, for i ∈ I. Then it is easy to see that the language of the elementary
diagram of the possibility structure is countable, hence there are at most count-
ably many definable subsets of S × Πj∈I\{i}Mj, for i ∈ I. Therefore it seems to
be possible to have definably beliefs completeness. However, Brandenburger and
Keisler (1999) showed that - unfortunately - it is still not possible, with at least
two states of nature and at least two players, to have a (now: definably) beliefs
complete possibility structure. The reason is that the language allows for too
much self-reference. To see that, consider the following configuration of beliefs
(Brandenburger and Keisler (1999) and Brandenburger (2001)):
“Ann believes that Bob believes that Ann believes that
Bob has a false belief about (the beliefs of ) Ann.”
Given this configuration, Ann believes that Bob has a false belief (about the
beliefs of Ann) if and only if Ann does not believe that Bob has a false belief
(about the beliefs of Ann). Of course, this argument is somewhat ambiguous
and just meant to provide some intuition of what was going on in Brandenburger
and Keisler (1999) on the precise mathematical level. Brandenburger and Keisler
(1999) developed not just this verbal argument, but also the precise formal coun-
terpart. For example (and this is the essence of their proof), they showed that
(the formal counterparts of) all the beliefs of the above configuration are definable
in the language induced by the structure. A definably beliefs complete possibility
structure would have to contain this configuration, but this is impossible, hence
a definably beliefs complete possibility structure cannot exist.
Although interesting in its own right (and illuminating a lack of our under-
standing of the players’ reasoning), this result is not as desired. What was wished
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was a (positive) beliefs completeness result in order to get a non-probabilistic
framework to analyze backward induction. Given the result of Brandenburger
and Keisler (1999), there are two ways how this could be done. One possibility
is to make topological assumptions on the space of states of nature as well as on
the component spaces of the players and to require the possibility relations of
the players to respect this structure in an appropriate way to produce a positive
beliefs completeness result. Mariotti and Piccione (2000) followed this direction.
Another possibility is to use another language than the one used by Branden-
burger and Keisler (1999): “Completeness of a belief system is defined relative
to a language. (We have to say how the players think, before we can say whether
everything they can think of is present.) If we choose a different language from
the one we just looked at, perhaps we can get a belief system that is complete
relative to that language.” (Brandenburger (2001)).
Another ingredient, not mentioned yet, is conditionality. We have to take into
account how players would revise their beliefs should they observe new informa-
tion. For example, by observing the previous actions taken by the other players
during the play of a multistage game (with observed actions), a player learns
something about their strategies. True, the traditional Harsanyi-like framework
suffices to describe what a player would believe should he observe an event to
which he ascribed a positive probability before (one could work then with the
conditional probability distribution). But should he observe an event he assigned
probability 0 before, the traditional framework does not specify his beliefs there-
after. Among others, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999a) and Brandenburger and
Keisler (2000) developed extensions of Harsanyi type spaces to deal with this
problem by using conditional probability systems in the sense of Reˆnyi (1955),
resp. lexicographic probability systems developed by Blume, Brandenburger and
Dekel (1991).
In Chapter 4, we follow both of the above mentioned avenues, the topolog-
ical approach, as well as the definition of a language other than the one used
by Brandenburger and Keisler to produce (positive) existence results of (defin-
ably) beliefs complete (respectively: universal) conditional possibility structures.
Like Brandenburger and Keisler (1999), we allow for different spaces of states of
nature Si for the different players i ∈ I. For the application we have in mind,
i.e. backward induction, since we assume a player knows his own strategy and
is uncertain of the strategy-profile played by the other players, Si would be the
product of the strategy spaces of the other players. For each i ∈ I, we add a
collection of nonempty subsets Bi ⊆ Si, “observable events”, which would reflect
the knowledge of i about the others’ strategies at the different stages of the game,
such that Si ∈ Bi (reflecting i’s information before he makes any observation (ex
ante)).
We define a conditional possibility structure on (Si,Bi)i∈I as a tuple〈
(U i)i∈I , (ρi)i∈I
〉
, where each U i is a nonempty set and each ρi is a function from
U i to
∏
Bi∈Bi Pow∅ (Bi × Πj 6=iU j) , where we impose some restrictions on how the
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players update their beliefs, given some new information. The set PowBi∅ (Si×
Πj 6=iU j) is the subset that satisfies these restrictions. Hence, each ρi is actually a
function from U i to PowBi∅ (Si × Πj 6=iU j). An element of PowBi∅ (Si × Πj 6=iU j) is
called a conditional i-event, or a (nonempty) conditional subset of Si × Πj 6=iU j.
A conditional i-event that is the image of a ui ∈ U i under the mapping ρi is
called a conditional possibility set for i, resp. the conditional possibility set of
ui.
In Section 4.3 of Chapter 4 we define topological conditional possibility struc-
tures, where we assume in addition that all the U i and Si are compact Hausdorff,
all the Bi ∈ Bi are clopen and we replace each of the Pow∅ (Bi × Πj 6=iU j) by
V (Bi × Πj 6=iU j) , the space of nonempty compact subsets of Bi ×Πj 6=iU j, which
we endow with the Vietoris topology,5 and accordingly we replace PowBi∅ (Si×
Πj 6=iU j) by a topological space denoted by VBi (Si × Πj 6=iU j). We also require all
the ρi to be continuous. Then, we define structure preserving maps (morphisms)
between topological conditional possibility structures. By using a projective limit
construction, we are able to construct a universal topological conditional possibil-
ity structure 〈(T i)i∈I , (δi)i∈I〉 such that every topological conditional possibility
structure (for the same set of players and on the same sets of states of nature, of
course) can be mapped to it by a unique morphism (Theorem 4.1 and Corollary
4.1). In addition, each δi is a homeomorphism. Hence the universal topologi-
cal conditional possibility structure is beliefs complete (again Theorem 4.1 and
Corollary 4.1). We note here that in the special unconditional (i.e. Bi = {Si} ,
for i ∈ I) two player (i.e. I = {a, b}) case, where both players are uncertain
about the same space of states of nature (i.e. Sa = Sb), Mariotti and Piccione
(2000) obtained the results of Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.1.
In the last section of Chapter 4 we restrict ourselves to a finite player set and
a finite set of states of nature for each player. In a similar construction than
the one used in the topological approach, we define inductively structures An,
for n ∈ N∪{−1} , and projections from the component spaces of each player in
An onto those in Am, for −1 ≤ m < n, such that for each player i and every
−1 ≤ m < n the inverse image of every nonempty conditional subset of the
product of i’s space of states of nature and the other players’ component spaces
in Am is the conditional possibility set of some type of player i in An. The
An’s contain also the inverse images of the possibility relations of the Am’s, for
−1 ≤ m < n, as well as sorts, the elements of which interpret the inverse images
of the elements of the sorts of the Am’s, for −1 ≤ m < n. So, the structures An,
for n ∈ N, are “extended” possibility structures that “contain” also the inverse
images of the structures of lower index.
The many-sorted language Ln is the language induced by the structure An.
The language Ln+1 contains the language Ln and is a kind of mixture between
first-order and second-order logic, where the Ln- part of Ln+1 is the “second-order
5Some authors call this topology the Hausdorff topology.
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logic part” of Ln+1. The Ln- part of Ln+1 “talks” about the inverse image of An
in An+1. The definition of Ln and the construction of An are done in such a
way that for each player i all nonempty Ln−1-definable conditional subsets of the
product of i’s space of states of nature and the other players’ component spaces
in An are possibility sets for player i.
We construct the structure A as the “projective limit” of the structures An,
for n ∈ N∪{−1}. In particular, the possibility relation of each player in A
is the projective limit of the finite-step possibility relations of that player. As
above, A contains also the inverse images of the possibility relations of the An’s,
for n ∈ N∪{−1} , as well as sorts, the elements of which interpret the inverse
images (and are therefore subsets) of the elements of the sorts of the An’s, for
n ∈ N∪{−1} . So, the structure A is also an “extended” possibility structure
that “contains” also the inverse images of the structures of finite index.
The syntactic counterpart of A is the limit language L, which is defined in
the spirit of the neocompact language invented by Keisler (1998), but as the Ln,
and unlike Keisler’s original definition, it is a kind of mixture between first and
second-order logic. The definition of L is done in such a way that the union of all
the Ln’s is the “second-order part” of L. Again, the Ln- part of L “talks” about
the inverse image of An in A.
Finally, we are able to prove that the possibility correspondence posi, that
sends ti ∈ T i to the ti-section of Ri, where Ri is the possibility relation of player
i in A, is a bijection from T i to DefBiL (Si × Πj 6=iT j) , the space of nonempty L-
definable conditional i-events. It follows that A is L-definably beliefs complete
(Theorem 4.2, Corollary 4.2 and Corollary 4.3).
Chapter 1
On the Nonexistence of Universal
Kripke Structures
1.1 Introduction
Nonprobabilistic beliefs in a group of players or agents are usually modeled by
Kripke structures. Each player’s beliefs are described by a binary relation on
the set of states of the world. In a state of the world, a player believes an event
if the event contains all those states of the world that are in relation with that
state of the world. As in the case of type spaces, with each state of the world
there is associated a state of nature1 which specifies the values of all the relevant
objective parameters of the players’ interaction, for example the payoff functions,
signals, or initial endowments. In this manner, one has described what each
player believes about nature: In a state of the world, a player believes an event
(i.e. a subset) in the space of states of nature if every state of nature that is
associated with some state of the world that is in relation with the given state of
the world, is an element of that event. Thus, it is possible to describe the event
that a player believes some event in the space of states of nature, and hence the
event that another player believes that player to believe this, and so on. In this
way, all levels of mutual beliefs of the players can be described.
We pointed already out that, as in the case of type spaces, to justify the use of
Kripke structures, it would be desirable to establish the existence of a universal
Kripke structure to which every Kripke structure (on the same space of states of
nature and for the same set of players) could be mapped in a beliefs-preserving
manner. We also mentioned that in the special case of knowledge spaces, which
are Kripke structures where for every player the relation ascribed to that player
is an equivalence relation, there is - given at least two states of nature and two
players - no universal knowledge space, while for type spaces there is a universal
1When a Kripke structure is used as semantics for modal logic, we have a valuation function
instead, that describes which primitive propositions are true in a state of the world.
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type space.
The question arises whether this difference comes from the different mathe-
matical frameworks - sets and binary relations (respectively partitions) on one
side, and measurable spaces and probability measures on the other side - or from
the strong assumptions on the players’ epistemic attitudes in the case of knowl-
edge - especially the truth axiom (“what a player knows in a state of the world is
true there”, corresponding on a technical level to reflexivity of the players’ binary
relations), in contrary to the possibility that a player’s type in some state of the
world in a type space might be sure of (i.e. ascribing probability 1 to) some wrong
event.
In the latter case, it would be possible that there is a universal Kripke struc-
ture for classes of Kripke structures with relaxed assumptions (in comparison to
the case of knowledge) on the epistemic behavior of the players. Of course, “re-
laxed” here means also that knowledge spaces would satisfy these assumptions.
In fact, almost all classes of Kripke structures considered in the literature contain
the class of knowledge spaces.
To treat the question of the existence of a universal Kripke structure rigor-
ously, we define structure preserving maps between Kripke structures, so-called
morphisms. Then we show that, unfortunately, we have to abandon the hope
of having a universal Kripke structure: For every class of Kripke structures that
contains all knowledge spaces - given at least two players and two states of nature
- there is no universal Kripke structure (Corollary 1.1), even if we do not require
the morphisms from the Kripke structures to the universal Kripke structure to
be unique (Theorem 1.1).
The result is not proved by adapting the methods of the proof of Heifetz
and Samet (1998a). Instead, we use their result. The underlying idea is simple:
Assuming the existence of a universal Kripke structure for a class of Kripke
structures that contains all knowledge spaces, we “collect” all those states lying
in the images of knowledge spaces under morphisms, thus constructing a universal
knowledge space, which, by the result of Heifetz and Samet, cannot exist.
1.2 The Nonexistence Theorem
In all what follows in this chapter, let S be a nonempty set of states of nature
and I a nonempty set of players.
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Definition 1.1 A Kripke structure on S for player set I (“Kripke structure”,
for short) is a triplet
M := 〈M, (Ki)i∈I , θ〉
where
• M is a nonempty set,
• for i ∈ I : Ki ⊆M ×M ,
• θ is function from M to S.
θ relates the states of M , the so-called states of the world, to the states of
nature. θ(m) is the state of nature that corresponds to the state of the world m.
Ki is the possibility relation of player i. (m,n) ∈ Ki means that in the state m
player i considers the state n to be possible.
Definition 1.2 A Kripke structureM on S for player set I is called a knowledge
space if for every i ∈ I : Ki is an equivalence relation.
The following definition captures the idea of mapping one Kripke structure
to another in a way that preserves the structure of the spaces.
Definition 1.3 Let M and M ′ be Kripke structures on S for player set I. A
morphism from M to M ′ is a function f :M →M ′ such that:
1. for all m ∈M :
θ′(f(m)) = θ(m),
2. for all i ∈ I and m ∈M :
f(Ki(m)) = K′i(f(m)),
where
Ki(m) := {n ∈M | (m,n) ∈ Ki} and
f(N) := {f(n) | n ∈ N}, for N ⊆M.
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Definition 1.4 Let M be a Kripke structure on S for player set I. For an event
E ⊆M define
Ki(E) := {m ∈M | Ki(m) ⊆ E}.
Ki : Pow(M)→ Pow(M)
is called i’s belief operator.
The following proposition, which is analogous to Proposition 2.1. of Heifetz
and Samet (1998a), shows that Condition 2 of Definition 1.3 is equivalent to the
preservation of beliefs in terms of the belief operators:
Proposition 1.1 Let M and M ′ be Kripke structures on S for player set I. For
a function f :M →M ′ the following are equivalent:
1. For all i ∈ I and m ∈M : f(Ki(m)) = K′i(f(m)).
2. For all i ∈ I and E ′ ⊆M ′ : f−1(K ′i(E ′)) = Ki(f−1(E ′)).
This shows in particular that the morphisms defined by Heifetz and Samet
(1998a), although defined for partition spaces, are the same as the ones defined
here in the special case of knowledge spaces.
Proof The proposition is implied by the following facts, which follow from the
definitions:
m ∈ Ki(f−1(E ′)) iff Ki(m) ⊆ f−1(E ′)
iff f(Ki(m)) ⊆ E ′,
and
m ∈ f−1(K ′i(E ′)) iff f(m) ∈ K ′i(E ′)
iff K′i(f(m)) ⊆ E ′.
Definition 1.5 Let C be a nonempty class of Kripke structures on S for player
set I. A Kripke structure on S for player set I
ΩC := 〈Ω, (KΩi )i∈I , θΩ〉
is
• weak-universal for C if for every Kripke structureM ∈ C there is a morphism
from M to ΩC,
• universal for C if ΩC ∈ C and for every Kripke structure M ∈ C there is a
unique morphism from M to ΩC.
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Definition 1.6 Let M be a nonempty set. A binary relation K on M is
• serial if for every m ∈M there is a n ∈M such that (m,n) ∈ K,
• Euclidean if for all m1,m2,m3 ∈M : (m1,m2) ∈ K and (m1,m3) ∈ K imply
(m2,m3) ∈ K.
Definition 1.7 Let MI (resp., MrI ; MrtI ; MestI ; PI) be the class of all Kripke
structures on S for player set I (resp. the class of Kripke structures on S for player
set I where all the relations are reflexive; reflexive and transitive; Euclidean, serial
and transitive; reflexive, symmetric and transitive (i.e. knowledge spaces)).
These classes correspond to different axiom systems of modal logic, namely
the systems KI (resp., TI ; S4I ; KD45I ; S5I), see Fagin et al. (1995) for the
definitions of these axiom systems. It is easy to see that all the above classes
contain the class PI (i.e. the class of knowledge spaces).
Theorem 1.1 Let C be a class of Kripke structures on S for player set I that
contains all knowledge spaces. If S and I have each at least two elements, then
there is no weak-universal Kripke structure for C.
Of course, a universal Kripke structure for C is also a weak-universal Kripke
structure for C, hence:
Corollary 1.1 Let C be a class of Kripke structures on S for player set I that
contains all knowledge spaces. If S and I have each at least two elements, then
there is no universal Kripke structure for C.
Corollary 1.2 There is no weak-universal Kripke structure for the class of all
Kripke structures on S for player set I, the class MrI , the class MrtI , the classMestI , and the class PI .
Proof As already remarked, every knowledge space on S for player set I belongs
to each of these classes.
Corollary 1.3 There is no universal Kripke structure for the class of all Kripke
structures on S for player set I, the class MrI , the class MrtI , the class MestI ,
and the class PI .
20 CHAPTER 1. UNIVERSAL KRIPKE STRUCTURES
1.3 The Proof
Proof We use the nonexistence result of Heifetz and Samet, where it was shown
that for the class of knowledge spaces there is no weak-universal Kripke structure
which is itself a knowledge space.2 Now, let us assume on the contrary that there
is a weak-universal Kripke structure ΩC = 〈Ω, (KΩi )i∈I , θΩ〉 for C. According to
the assumptions of the theorem, PI is contained in C. Let
ΩP :=
{
ω ∈ Ω | ∃M ∈ PI ∃ morphism h :M → ΩC such that ω ∈ h(M)} .
Now define
ΩP :=
〈
ΩP , (KΩi ∩ (ΩP × ΩP))i∈I , θΩdΩP
〉
.
We have to show:
1. ΩP is a knowledge space,
2. ΩP is weak-universal for PI .
This implies the desired contradiction.
1. ΩP is nonempty, because PI is nonempty. That θdΩP is a function from
ΩP to S is clear. Fix a player i ∈ I.
Let ω1 ∈ ΩP . Then, there is a knowledge space M in PI , m1 ∈ M , and a
morphism h from M to ΩC such that h(m1) = ω1. But then, (m1,m1) ∈
KMi , hence (h(m1), h(m1)) ∈ KΩi , so (h(m1), h(m1)) ∈ KΩi ∩ (ΩP ×ΩP), i.e.KΩi ∩ (ΩP × ΩP) is reflexive.
Let ω1, ω2 ∈ ΩP and (ω1, ω2) ∈ KΩi ∩(ΩP×ΩP). Then, there is a knowledge
space M in PI , m1 ∈ M, and a morphism h from M to ΩC such that
h(m1) = ω1. We have ω2 ∈ KΩi (h(m1)) = h(KMi (m1)). So there is a m2 ∈
M such that ω2 = h(m2) and (m1,m2) ∈ KMi . But then (m2,m1) ∈ KMi
and therefore (ω2, ω1) ∈ KΩi ∩ (ΩP ×ΩP), so KΩi ∩ (ΩP ×ΩP) is symmetric.
Let ω1, ω2, ω3 ∈ ΩP and (ω1, ω2), (ω2, ω3) ∈ KΩi ∩ (ΩP × ΩP). Then, as
above, there is a knowledge space M in PI , m1,m2 ∈ M, and a morphism
h from M to ΩC such that (m1,m2) ∈ KMi , h(m1) = ω1, and h(m2) = ω2.
We have ω3 ∈ KΩi (h(m2)) = h(KMi (m2)). So there is a m3 ∈ M such that
ω3 = h(m3) and (m2,m3) ∈ KMi . Then, (m1,m3) ∈ KMi , so it follows that
ω3 ∈ h(KMi (m1)) = KΩi (ω1). Therefore (ω1, ω3) ∈ KΩi ∩ (ΩP × ΩP), soKΩi ∩ (ΩP × ΩP) is transitive.
2Heifetz and Samet (1998a) state just that there is no universal knowledge space. However,
in that paper their use of “universal” is identical with our use of “weak-universal” here.
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2. Let M ∈ PI . Then there is a morphism h from M to ΩC. For m ∈ M is
h(m) ∈ ΩP and
θΩdΩP(h(m)) = θΩ(h(m)) = θM(m).
We have h(KMi (m)) ⊆ ΩP and h(m) ∈ ΩP , so
h(KMi (m)) = KΩi (h(m)) = KΩi ∩ (ΩP × ΩP)(h(m)).
Hence h is a morphism from M to ΩP .

Chapter 2
Finitely Additive Beliefs and
Universal Type Spaces
2.1 Introduction
The seminal result of Mertens and Zamir (1985), namely the existence of a uni-
versal type space in the sense of Haransyi (1967/68) under the assumption that
the underlying space of states of nature is compact and Hausdorff, has been gen-
eralized in various ways (mainly by relaxing the topological assumptions made
there) by Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), Heifetz (1993), Mertens, Sorin and
Zamir (1994), and finally to the general measure-theoretic case by Heifetz and
Samet (1998)1. However, it has always been assumed that the players’ beliefs
are σ-additive. This seems to be a rather strong assumption on the epistemic
attitudes of the players.
As we mentioned in the general introduction, Savage’s Postulates (1954, 1972)
imply subjective probabilities that are finitely but not countably additive. Given
the importance of Savage’s theory within decision theory (i.e. “one-player game
theory”), it is natural to ask - and desirable to know - what happens if we
describe the beliefs of players accordingly in an interactive context (games) by
finitely additive probability measures? Does there still exist a universal type
space? And if so, what does it look like? Is it, for example, the space of coherent
hierarchies?
Still, we are dealing with (now finitely additive) measures, so we have to
define a field of events. The question arises as to which measurability condition
is the right one. Should the field of events be just a field, a σ-field or should
we assume that all subsets of the space of states of the world are events, i.e.
that the field is simply the power set? As this question does not seem to have a
clear-cut answer, we analyze the existence/nonexistence of a universal type space
1Relevant are also Vassilakis (1992), Battigalli-Siniscalchi (1999) and the preference-based
approach of Epstein and Wang (1996).
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for finitely additive beliefs for a whole class of different measurability conditions
that include the three above-mentioned cases.
We introduce the κ-fields, where κ is an (often regular) infinite cardinal num-
ber, as fields that are closed under the intersection of every set of events (i.e.
subset of the field) that has cardinality strictly less than κ. It follows that ℵ0-
fields are fields in the usual sense and ℵ1-fields are σ-fields in the usual sense.
Then, we define ∞-fields as fields that are closed under the intersection of every
set of events (of cardinality whatsoever). (∞-fields were also defined in Aumann
(1999a) as “universal fields”.)
We define κ-type spaces as type spaces where the set of measurable events
in the set of states of the world, as well as the set of measurable events in the
set of states of nature, is a κ-field, and ∞-type spaces as type spaces where the
set of measurable events in the set of states of nature is the full power set and
the set of measurable events in the set of states of the world is a ∞-field. Also,
we define ∗-type spaces as type spaces where the set of measurable events in the
set of states of the world as well as the set of measurable events in the set of
states of nature is the full power set. Furthermore, we define type morphisms,
i.e. structure preserving maps from one κ-type space (resp. ∞-type space or
∗-type space) to another (not necessarily different) one.
Given a nonempty set of players I, a nonempty set of states of nature S, and a
κ-field ΣS on S, we define, similar to Heifetz and Samet (1998b), a kind of modal
language, the formulas of which we call κ-expressions. But if κ is uncountable,
contrary to Heifetz and Samet (1998b), we allow also for formulas of infinite
length (but strictly less than κ). Then, we collect the κ-descriptions (by means
of κ-expressions) of all states of the world in all κ-type spaces on S for player
set I. In this way, we construct in Section 2.3 a universal κ-type space on S for
player set I to which every κ-type space on S for player set I can be mapped
by a unique type morphism (Theorem 2.1). However, since we use all the κ-type
spaces (on the same space of states of nature and for the same player set) to
construct the universal κ-type space, this construction tells us little about the
structure of the universal κ-type space. (As for example, in the Mertens-Zamir
(1985) case, where we know in addition that the universal type space is the space
of coherent hierarchies.)
As Heifetz (2001) has shown, there are coherent hierarchies of finitely additive
(in fact even σ-additive) beliefs up to - but excluding - level ω (i.e. the first infinite
level), that have at least two different finitely additive extensions to level ω.
Does a similar phenomenon holds also on the higher transfinite levels of coherent
hierarchies? Or, put differently in terms of expressions rather than hierarchies,
is there, on the contrary, a regular cardinal κ̂ such that for all (regular) cardinals
κ > κ̂, the κ̂-description of a state in a κ-type space determines already the
κ-description? If this were the case, it would be unnecessary to consider κ-type
spaces for κ > κ̂ and we could restrict ourselves to κ-type spaces for κ ≤ κ̂. We
show in Theorem 2.2, by using a probabilistic adaptation of the “sober-drunk”-
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example of Heifetz and Samet (1998a), that - with at least two players and two
states of nature - this is not the case. Hence, it makes sense to consider κ-type
spaces for every (regular) infinite cardinal κ.
Also, this example implies that - again, with at least two players and two states
of nature - there is no (weak) universal ∞-type space and no (weak) universal
∗-type space (Theorem 2.3 and Corollary 2.1).
In section 2.5, given a regular cardinal κ, a nonempty set of players I, a
nonempty set of states of nature S, and a κ-field ΣS on S, we construct the space
of coherent hierarchies up to (but excluding) level κ and show that this space
constitutes a product κ-type space (Theorem 2.4). On top of that, this space
turns out to be the universal κ-type space (Theorem 2.5). Therefore we provide
a characterization of the universal κ-type space that we were missing in section
2.3, which is independent of the property of being universal.
In section 2.6, we show that the universal κ-type space is beliefs complete.
In addition, in the case κ = ℵ0, the component space of each player is - up
to isomorphism of measurable spaces - the space of finitely additive probability
measures on the product of the space of states of nature and the other players’
component spaces.
2.2 Preliminaries
First, we will define κ-measurable spaces, where κ-denotes here an (often regular)
infinite cardinal number. For an introduction to ordinal and cardinal numbers,
see Devlin (1993) or any other textbook on set theory. Then, we will develop
parts of the theory of κ-measurable spaces needed in the sequel, collect some
known facts about finitely additive (probability) measures and define the main
objects of our study in this chapter, the κ-, ∞- and ∗-type spaces.
An infinite cardinal number κ is called regular, if it is not the supremum of
a set of less than κ-many ordinal numbers which are all strictly smaller than κ.
For example, ℵ0 and all the ℵα+1 are regular, while ℵω is singular (i.e. infinite
and not regular) ( ℵω = sup{ℵn | n < ω}), where ω denotes here the first infinite
ordinal number. For a set M, denote by |M | the cardinality of M .
In this chapter, unless otherwise stated, α, β, γ, ζ, η, ξ denote ordinal numbers,
δ delta-measures, θ functions from the set of states of the world to the set of
states of nature, κ cardinal numbers, λ limit ordinal numbers, µ and ν measures,
pi projections, ϕ, χ, ψ expressions, and ω, apart form above, sets of expressions.
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Definition 2.1 Let κ be an infinite cardinal number and M a nonempty set.
A κ-field on M is a set Σ ⊆ Pow(M) such that:
1. M ∈ Σ,
2. A ∈ Σ implies M \ A ∈ Σ,
3. E ⊆ Σ and |E| < κ imply ⋂ E := ⋂E∈E E ∈ Σ.
It follows that E ⊆ Σ and |E| < κ imply ⋃ E := ⋃E∈E E ∈ Σ.
Remark 2.1 According to our definition, a set of subsets of a nonempty set is
a ℵ0-field iff it is a field (in the usual sense) and a ℵ1-field iff it is a σ-field (in
the usual sense). If κ′ < κ, then every κ-field is a κ′-field.
Definition 2.2 Let M be a nonempty set.
A ∞-field2 on M is a set Σ ⊆ Pow(M) such that:
1. M ∈ Σ,
2. A ∈ Σ implies M \ A ∈ Σ,
3. E ⊆ Σ implies ⋂ E ∈ Σ.
It follows that E ⊆ Σ implies ⋃ E ∈ Σ.
Definition 2.3 A κ-measurable space is a pair (M,Σ) , where M is a nonempty
set and Σ is a κ-field on M.
Remark 2.2 Let κ be a singular cardinal number and (M,Σ) be a κ-measurable
space. Then Σ is already a κ+-field, where κ+ denotes the successor cardinal of
κ.
Proof Let E ⊆ Σ such that |E|≤ κ. So, E has the form {Eα | α < κ} . Let
κ̂ < κ be the cofinality of κ. Then there is a function f : κ̂ → κ, such that⋃
β<bκ f (β) = κ. Note that |f (β) | < κ, for β < κ̂. It follows that ⋂α<κEα =⋂
β<bκ (⋂α<f(β)Eα) ∈ Σ. Since Σ is a field, it follows that it is a κ+-field.
Since κ+ is always regular, the above remark shows that it is redundant to
consider κ-fields (κ-measurable spaces, respectively) if κ is a singular cardinal.
2What we call here “∞-field”, is called “universal field” in Aumann (1999a).
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Definition 2.4 A∞-measurable space is a pair (M,Σ) , whereM is a nonempty
set and Σ is a ∞-field on M.
Definition 2.5 A ∗-measurable space is a pair (M,Pow (M)) , where M is a
nonempty set and Pow (M) is the power set (i.e. the set of all subsets) of M.
Note that every ∗-measurable space is a ∞-measurable space and every ∞-
measurable space is a κ-measurable space for every infinite ordinal κ. A ∞-
measurable space (M,Σ) is a ∗-measurable space iff for all m 6= m′ ∈M there is
a E ∈ Σ such that m ∈ E and m′ /∈ E.
Example 2.1 Let M = {0, 1} , Σ = {∅,M} . (M,Σ) is ∞-measurable, but not
∗-measurable.
Remark 2.3 If M is a nonempty set and E ⊆ Pow(M), then the intersection of
all κ-fields that contain E (as a subset) is a κ-field and it is the smallest one that
contains E. We denote this κ-field by κ(E) and call it the κ-field generated by E.
Note that if κ is greater than κ′, then κ(E) ⊇ κ′ (E) and κ(E) might strictly
contain κ′ (E) . If Σ is a κ-field and E ⊆ Σ such that Σ = κ′ (E) , then also
Σ = κ (E) , but there might be E ′ ⊆ Σ such that κ (E ′) = Σ and κ′ (E ′) is strictly
contained in Σ.
The following lemma shows that to prove the measurability of a function
between two κ-measurable spaces, it is enough to proof the measurability for a
generating set of the κ-field of the image space.
Lemma 2.1 Let (M ′,Σ′) and (M,Σ) be κ-measurable spaces, where κ is a regular
cardinal number. Let E ⊆ Σ such that κ(E) = Σ. Then f : M ′ → M is Σ′ − Σ
measurable iff for all E ∈ E : f−1 (E) ∈ Σ′.
Proof Define E0 := E ∪ {M} . If 0 < α < κ and if Eβ is already defined for all
β < α, then define
Eα :=
{⋂
A∈Λ
A | Λ ⊆ ⋃
β<α
Eβ s.t. |Λ| < κ
}
∪
{
M\A | A ∈ ⋃
β<α
Eβ
}
∪ ⋃
β<α
Eβ.
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By transfinite induction, it is obvious that
⋃
β<κ Eβ ⊆ Σ. We show that
⋃
β<κ Eβ
is a κ-field, which implies that
⋃
β<κ Eβ = Σ. We have to show that
⋃
β<κ Eβ is
closed under the intersection of less than κ-many elements. The other properties
are clear. So, let κ̂ be a cardinal number with κ̂ < κ and Eγ ∈ ⋃β<κ Eβ for
γ < κ̂. Let f (γ) := min {β < κ | Eγ ∈ Eβ} . By the regularity of κ, we have ζ :=
sup {f (β) | β < κ̂} < κ, hence ⋂γ<bκEγ ∈ Eζ+1 ⊆ ⋃β<κ Eβ.
Having now established that form of Σ, the lemma follows from the fact that
inverse images of maps commute with arbitrary intersections and complements.
Definition 2.6 Let (Mj,Σj)j∈J be a family of κ-measurable spaces. Let E be
the set of sets of the form Πj∈JEj, such that Ej ∈ Σj, for j ∈ J, and Ej = Mj
for all but finitely many3 j ∈ J .
We define the product κ-field of the Σj, j ∈ J, on Πj∈JMj as the κ-field κ(E).
Convention 2.1 Let κ be a (regular) infinite cardinal number, let J and L be
nonempty disjoint sets and let (Mi,Σi) be a κ-measurable space, for i ∈ J ∪ L.
Let the product space MJ := Πj∈JMj be endowed with the product κ-field ΣJ
of the Σj, j ∈ J , let the product space ML := Πl∈LMl be endowed with the
product κ-field ΣL of the Σl, l ∈ L, and let the product space MJ × ML be
endowed with the product κ-field Σ{J,L} of ΣJ and ΣL. Consider the product
space MJ∪L := Πi∈J∪LMi and let MJ∪L be endowed with the product κ-field
ΣJ∪L of the Σi, i ∈ J ∪ L. Now, let
h :MJ ×ML →MJ∪L
be defined by
h((mj)j∈J , (ml)l∈L) := (mi)i∈J∪L.
Then, h is clearly one-to-one and onto, but also, by looking at the generators of
the product κ-fields (and applying Lemma 2.1 to h and h−1), one sees that h and
h−1 are measurable. Hence h is an isomorphism of measurable spaces and we
are justified to identify these two κ-measurable spaces, in all what follows (with
some abuse of notation).
Lemma 2.2 Let M be a nonempty set, let κ be a regular cardinal number and,
for α < κ, let Σα be a κ-field on M such that α < β < κ implies Σα ⊆ Σβ.
Then Σ :=
⋃
α<κΣα is a κ -field on M.
3It is easily seen that if we would change the definition, also “for j ∈ J : Ej ∈ Σj and
Ej = Mj for all but one j ∈ J” and “for j ∈ J : Ej ∈ Σj and Ej = Mj for all but less than
κ-many j ∈ J” would yield the same product κ-field as the one defined above.
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Proof We have just to show that the intersection of less than κ-many Σ-measurable
sets is a Σ-measurable set, the other properties are clear. So, let κ̂ < κ and
Eβ ∈ Σ, for β < κ̂. Let f (β) := min {α < κ | Eβ ∈ Σα} . By the regularity of κ,
it follows that γ := sup{f (β) | β < κ̂} < κ, hence ⋂β<bκEβ ∈ Σγ ⊆ Σ.
Definition 2.7 Let M be a nonempty set and F a field on M .
A finitely additive measure on (M,F) is a function µ : F → R ∪ {+∞} , such
that
• 0 ≤ µ (F ) , for all F ∈ F ,
• µ (E ∪ F ) = µ (E) + µ (F ) , for all disjoint E,F ∈ F .
µ is a finitely additive probability measure on (M,F) , if in addition
• µ (M) = 1.
Definition 2.8 Let M be a nonempty set, F a field on M , µ a finitely additive
measure on (M,F) , and E ⊆M.
We define the outer measure of E induced by µ as
µ∗ (E) := inf {µ (F ) | F ∈ F such that E ⊆ F} ,
and the inner measure of E induced by µ as
µ∗ (E) := sup {µ (F ) | F ∈ F such that F ⊆ E} .
If not stated otherwise, we keep in this chapter the following
Convention 2.2 • Products of κ-measurable spaces are endowed with the
product κ-field.
• If (M,Σ) is a κ-measurable space, then ∆κ(M,Σ) denotes the space of
finitely additive probability measures on (M,Σ). We consider this space
itself as a κ-measurable space endowed with the κ-field Σ∆κ generated by
all the sets {µ ∈ ∆κ(M,Σ) | µ(E) ≥ p}, where E ∈ Σ and p ∈ [0, 1].
Of course, this convention depends on the particular κ chosen.
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Remark 2.4 Let (M ′,Σ′) and (M,Σ) be κ-measurable spaces and let
f :M ′ →M be measurable.
1. If µ′ is a finitely additive probability measure on (M ′,Σ′), then µ′ (f−1 (·))
(that is µ′ (f−1 (E)) , for E ∈ Σ) is a finitely additive probability measure
on (M,Σ).
2. If ∆κf : ∆
κ(M ′,Σ′) → ∆κ(M,Σ) is defined by ∆κf (µ′) := µ′ (f−1 (·)) , for
µ′ ∈ ∆κ(M ′,Σ′), then ∆κf is measurable, since we have ∆κf (µ′) (E) ≥ p iff
µ′ (f−1 (E)) ≥ p, for E ∈ Σ.
Remark 2.5 Let (M ′,Σ′) and (M,Σ) be κ-measurable spaces and let
f :M ′ →M be measurable and onto.
Then:
1. f−1(Σ) := {f−1(E) | E ∈ Σ} is a κ -field on M ′ and a subset of Σ′.
2. If µ is a finitely additive measure on (M,Σ), then µ induces a finitely ad-
ditive measure µ′ on (M ′, f−1(Σ)) defined by µ′(f−1(E)) := µ(E). Fur-
thermore, if µ is a finitely additive probability measure, then µ′ is a finitely
additive probability measure.
Lemma 2.3 Let γ < α be ordinal numbers. For γ ≤ β < α let (Mβ,Fβ) be a
ℵ0-measurable space (i.e. Mβ is a nonempty set and Fβ is a field on Mβ) and
µβ a finitely additive probability measure on
(
Mβ,Fβ) , let Mα be a nonempty
set, and for γ ≤ ξ < ζ ≤ α let fξ,ζ : M ζ → M ξ be onto and, if ζ < α, let fξ,ζ be
F ζ-F ξ-measurable, such that:
1. fξ,β ◦ fβ,ζ = fξ,ζ, for all ξ < β < ζ such that γ ≤ ξ < β < ζ ≤ α,
2. µβ
(
f−1ξ,β
(
Eξ
))
= µξ
(
Eξ
)
, for all ξ < β such that γ ≤ ξ < β < α and all
Eξ ∈ F ξ.
Then:
• ⋃γ≤β<α f−1β,α (Fβ) is a field on Mα,
• (µβ)γ≤β<α induces a well-defined finitely additive probability measure µ<α
on
(
Mα,
⋃
γ≤β<α f
−1
β,α
(Fβ)) , defined by µ<α (f−1β,α (Eβ)) := µβ (Eβ) , for
Eβ ∈ Fβ.
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Proof That µ<α is well-defined follows from the above conditions 1 and 2 and
the fact that the fβ,α’s are onto. In light of the preceding remark, the rest is
clear.
Notation 2.1 Let M be a nonempty set, F a field on M, and E ⊆ M. Then
denote by [F , E] the set of all subsets ofM of the form (L ∩ E)∪(N ∩ (M \ E)) ,
where L,N ∈ F . It is easy to check that [F , E] is the smallest field that extends
F and contains E as an element.
For further reference, we cite the following two lemmas (in a somewhat dif-
ferent form), which are theorems by  Los´ and Marczewski (1949) and Horn and
Tarski (1948).
Lemma 2.4 Let M be a nonempty set, F a field on M, E ⊆ M, µ a finitely
additive probability measure on (M,F) , µ∗ (E) the inner measure of E, µ∗ (E)
the outer measure of E, and p a real number such that µ∗ (E) ≤ p ≤ µ∗ (E) .
Then there exists a finitely additive probability measure ν that extends µ to the
field [F , E] such that ν (E) = p.
Proof Follows directly from Theorem 2 of  Los´ and Marczewski (1949).
Sometimes, we will refer to the above lemma as the “ Los´-Marczewski Theo-
rem”.
Lemma 2.5 Let F1 ⊆ F2 be fields on the nonempty set M and let µ be a finitely
additive probability measure on (M,F1) . Then there exists an extension of µ to
a finitely additive probability measure ν on (M,F2) .
Proof Follows from 4 (i) of  Los´ and Marczewski (1949) and also from Horn and
Tarski (1948), p. 477, Theorem 1.21.
For the rest of this section, unless otherwise stated, we fix a regular cardinal
κ. Furthermore we fix a nonempty set of players I, a nonempty set of states
of nature S, and, unless otherwise stated, a κ-field ΣS on S, such that for all
s, s′ ∈ S with s 6= s′ there is a E ∈ ΣS such that s ∈ E and s′ /∈ E. Without loss
of generality, we assume that 0 /∈ I and set I0 := I ∪ {0} .
We define now κ-type spaces, ∞-type spaces and ∗-type spaces, i.e. the
objects which we will study in the rest of this chapter.
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Definition 2.9 A κ-type space on S for player set I is a 4-tuple
M :=
〈
M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ
〉
,
where
• M is a nonempty set,
• Σ is a κ-field on M ,
• for i ∈ I : Ti is a Σ − Σ∆κ-measurable function form M to ∆κ (M,Σ) ,
the space of finitely additive probability measures on (M,Σ) , such that
for all m ∈ M and A ∈ Σ : [Ti (m)] ⊆ A implies Ti (m) (A) = 1, where
[Ti (m)] := {m′ ∈M | Ti (m′) = Ti (m)} ,
• θ is a Σ-ΣS-measurable function from M to S.
We will refer to the property that for all i ∈ I, m ∈M and A ∈ Σ : [Ti (m)] ⊆
A implies Ti (m) (A) = 1, as the “introspection property” of κ-type spaces (∞-
type spaces and ∗-type spaces, resp., see below). Doing obvious changes, proofs
(of the theorems in this chapter) would went through, if we were to abandon this
property, in fact, things would be easier then.
Definition 2.10 A ∞-type space on S for player set I is a 4-tuple
M :=
〈
M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ
〉
,
where
• M is a nonempty set,
• Σ is a ∞-field on M ,
• for i ∈ I : Ti is a measurable function form (M,Σ) to ∆∞ (M,Σ) , the space
of finitely additive probability measures on (M,Σ), endowed with the ∞-
field generated by all the sets {µ ∈ ∆∞ (M,Σ) | µ (E) ≥ p} , where E ∈ Σ
and p ∈ [0, 1] , such that for all m ∈ M and A ∈ Σ : [Ti (m)] ⊆ A implies
Ti (m) (A) = 1, where [Ti (m)] := {m′ ∈M | Ti (m′) = Ti (m)} ,
• θ is a Σ-Pow (S)-measurable function from M to S.
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Note that for µ 6= ν ∈ ∆∞ (M,Σ) there is a E ∈ Σ and a p ∈ [0, 1] such that
µ (E) ≥ p and ν (E) < p. This implies that the ∞-field of ∆∞ (M,Σ) is in fact
Pow (∆∞ (M,Σ)) , the full power set. Hence, by the measurability of Ti, we have
[Ti (m)] ∈ Σ. So, in fact, the condition that [Ti (m)] ⊆ A implies Ti (m) (A) = 1
reduces to Ti (m) ([Ti (m)]) = 1.
By the definitions, it is obvious that every ∞-type space on S is a κ-type
space on S, for every regular κ. (Set ΣS := Pow (S) in the κ-type space.)
Definition 2.11 A ∗-type space on S for player set I is a 3-tuple
M :=
〈
M, (Ti)i∈I , θ
〉
,
where
• M is a nonempty set,
• for i ∈ I : Ti is a function form M to ∆ (M,Pow (M)) , the space of finitely
additive probability measures on (M,Pow (M)) , such that for all m ∈M :
Ti (m) ([Ti (m)]) = 1, where [Ti (m)] := {m′ ∈M | Ti (m′) = Ti (m)}
• θ is a function from M to S.
It is obvious from the definitions, that every ∗-type space on S is a ∞-type
space on S. (Set Σ := Pow (M) in the ∞-type space.) And hence, it is also a
κ-type space on S.
We define now the beliefs preserving maps between type spaces.
Definition 2.12 Let M ′ =
〈
M ′,Σ′, (T ′i )i∈I , θ
′〉 and M = 〈M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉 be
κ-type spaces (∞-type spaces, ∗-type spaces, respectively) on S for player set I.
A function f : M ′ → M is a type morphism if it satisfies the following
conditions:
1. f is Σ′ − Σ-measurable,
2. for all m′ ∈M ′ :
θ′ (m′) = θ (f (m′)) ,
3. for all m′ ∈M ′, E ∈ Σ, and i ∈ I :
Ti (f (m′)) (E) = T ′i (m′)
(
f−1 (E)
)
.
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Note that the above definition of a type morphism does not depend on κ, that
is, if κ < κ′, and M and M ′ are κ′-type spaces (∞-type spaces, ∗-type spaces,
respectively), then f :M ′ →M is a type morphism from M ′ to M viewed as κ′-
type spaces (∞-type spaces, ∗-type spaces, respectively) iff it is a type morphism
fromM ′ toM viewed as κ-type spaces. Similarly, ifM ′ andM are ∗-type spaces,
then f : M ′ → M is a type morphism from M ′ to M viewed as ∗-type spaces iff
it is a type morphism from M ′ to M viewed as∞-type spaces. (Note that in the
case of ∗-type spaces, every function f :M ′ →M is measurable.)
Definition 2.13 A type morphism is a type isomorphism, if it is one-to-one,
onto, and the inverse function is also a type morphism.
It is easy to see that a function f :M ′ →M is a type isomorphism iff it is a type
morphism and isomorphism of the measurable spaces (M ′,Σ′) and (M,Σ) .
Definition 2.14 A product κ-type space on S for player set I is a 4-tuple
M := 〈M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉
such that there are κ-measurable spaces (Mj,Σj) , for j ∈ I0, such that (up to
type isomorphism):
• M0 = S,
• Σ0 = ΣS,
• M = Πj∈I0Mj,
• Σ is the product κ-field on M which is generated by the Σj, j ∈ I0,
• for i ∈ I: Ti is a Σi − Σ∆κ-measurable function from Mi to ∆κ(M,Σ), the
space of finitely additive probability measures on (M,Σ), such that for all
mi ∈Mi : margMi (Ti (mi)) = δmi ,
• θ :M0 → S is the identity on S.
Obviously, Ti, for i ∈ I, can be viewed as a Σ − Σ∆κ-measurable function from
M, to ∆κ(M,Σ) and θ can be viewed as a Σ − ΣS-measurable function θ from
M to S. (Take first the projection to Mi, for i ∈ I, (resp. to M0) and then the
original function.) So, every product κ-type space on S is a κ-type space on S.
Note that if i ∈ I and if mi is the ith coordinate of m, then we have by the fifth
point of the definition that [Ti (m)] = {mi} × Πj∈I0\{i}Mj.
An easy check shows:
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Remark 2.6 κ-type spaces on S for player set I (∞-type spaces, ∗-type spaces,
respectively), as objects, and type morphisms, as morphisms, form a category.
Definition 2.15 • A κ-type space Ω on S for player set I (∞-type space,
∗-type space, respectively) is weak-universal if for every κ-type spaceM on
S for player set I (∞-type space, ∗-type space, respectively) there is a type
morphism from M to Ω.
• A κ-type space Ω on S for player set I (∞-type space, ∗-type space, re-
spectively) is universal4 if for every κ-type space M on S for player set I
(∞-type space, ∗-type space, respectively) there is a unique type morphism
from M to Ω.
Remark 2.7 Universal κ-type spaces on S for player set I (∞-type spaces, ∗-
type spaces, respectively) are unique up to type isomorphism.
Proof If Ω and U are universal κ-type spaces (∞-type spaces, ∗-type spaces,
respectively) (on the same space of states of nature and for the same player set,
of course), then there are type morphisms f : U → Ω and g : Ω → U. It is easy
to check, that the composite of two type morphisms is also a type morphism
and that the identity is always a type morphism form a κ-type space Ω (∞-type
space, ∗-type space, respectively) to itself. By the uniqueness , it follows that
g ◦ f = idU and therefore f is one-to-one and g is onto, and f ◦ g = idΩ and
therefore g is one-to-one and f is onto. f and g are type morphisms and f = g−1
and g = f−1.
2.3 The Universal κ-Type Space in Terms of Ex-
pressions
Again, for this section, unless otherwise stated, we fix a regular cardinal κ, a
nonempty player set I, and a κ-measurable space of states of nature (S,ΣS) such
that for all s, s′ ∈ S with s 6= s′ there is a E ∈ ΣS such that s ∈ E and s′ /∈ E.
Given these data, we define κ-expressions (allowing also for infinite conjunc-
tions) which are natural generalizations of the expressions defined by Heifetz and
4We use here the term “universal type space” although, in terms of category theory the term
“terminal type space” would be the adequate one, since the universal type space is a terminal
object in the category of type spaces. However, we take the former notion to keep the terms of
the already existing type space literature.
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Samet (1998b). Expressions are defined in a similar fashion as, for example, the
formulas of the probability logic of Heifetz and Mongin (2001) (or ours in the
next chapter). Analogous to Heifetz and Samet (1998b), given a κ-type space
on S for player set I and a state of the world in this type space, we define the
κ-description of this state as the set of those κ-expressions that are true in this
state of the world. Then, we show that the set of all κ-descriptions constitutes a
κ-type space (Proposition 2.3) and that this κ-type space is the universal κ-type
space (Theorem 2.1).
Definition 2.16 For a κ-type space
〈
M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ
〉
on S for player set I, i ∈ I,
E ∈ Σ, and p ∈ [0, 1] define
B
p
i (E) := {m ∈M | Ti (m) (E) ≥ p} .
Note that B
p
i (E) = T
−1
i ({µ ∈ ∆κ (M,Σ) | µ (E) ≥ p}) and that Bpi (E) ∈ Σ,
if E ∈ Σ.
Definition 2.17 Given a κ-measurable space of states of nature (S,ΣS) and a
nonempty player set I, the set Φκ of κ-expressions is the least set such that:
1. every E ∈ ΣS is a κ-expression,
2. if ϕ is a κ-expression, then ¬ϕ is a κ-expression,
3. if ϕ is a κ-expression, then Bpi (ϕ) is a κ-expression, for i ∈ I and p ∈ [0, 1] ,
4. if Ψ is a nonempty set of κ-expressions with |Ψ| < κ, then ∧ϕ∈Ψ ϕ is a
κ-expression.
If Ψ is a nonempty set of κ-expressions with |Ψ| < κ, then we set ∨ϕ∈Ψ ϕ :=¬∧ϕ∈Ψ ¬ϕ.
Since we work here with a fixed regular κ, we omit sometimes, in this section,
the superscript κ.
Definition 2.18 Let M :=
〈
M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ
〉
be a κ-type space on S for player
set I. Define
1. EM := θ−1 (E) , for E ∈ ΣS,
2. (¬ϕ)M :=M \ ϕM , for ϕ ∈ Φκ,
3. (Bpi (ϕ))
M := B
p
i
(
ϕM
)
, for ϕ ∈ Φκ, i ∈ I and p ∈ [0, 1] ,
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4.
(∧
ϕ∈Ψ ϕ
)M
:=
⋂
ϕ∈Ψ ϕM , for Ψ such that ∅ 6= Ψ ⊆ Φκ and |Ψ| < κ.
So, defined as above, κ-expressions define measurable subsets of M. It is easy to
check that
(∨
ϕ∈Ψ ϕ
)M
:=
⋃
ϕ∈Ψ ϕM , for Ψ such that ∅ 6= Ψ ⊆ Φκ and |Ψ| < κ.
If no confusion may arise, we omit - with some abuse of notation - the super-
script M.
Definition 2.19 For a κ-type space M :=
〈
M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ
〉
on S for player set
I and m ∈M define Dκ (m) , the κ-description of m, as
Dκ (m) :=
{
ϕ ∈ Φκ | m ∈ ϕM} .
Again, we omit sometimes, in this section, the superscript κ.
Proposition 2.1 Let
〈
M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ
〉
and 〈N,ΣN , (TNi )i∈I , θN〉 be κ-type spaces
on S for player set I and let f :M → N be a type morphism.
Then, for all m ∈M :
Dκ (f (m)) = Dκ (m) .
Proof We show by induction on the formation of the expressions that m ∈ ϕM
iff f (m) ∈ ϕN :
• Let E ∈ ΣS. We have θN (f (m)) = θ (m) , so f (m) ∈ EN iff m ∈ EM .
• We have
f (m) ∈ (¬ϕ)N iff f (m) /∈ ϕN iff m /∈ ϕM iff m ∈ (¬ϕ)M .
• Let Ψ be a nonempty set of expressions with |Ψ| < κ. Then:
f (m) ∈ (∧
ϕ∈Ψ
ϕ)N iff for all ϕ ∈ Ψ : f (m) ∈ ϕN ,
which is by induction hypothesis the case iff for all ϕ ∈ Ψ : m ∈ ϕM , which
is the case iff m ∈ (∧ϕ∈Ψ ϕ)M .
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• We have
f (m) ∈ (Bpi (ϕ))N iff TNi (f (m))
(
ϕN
) ≥ p iff Ti (m) (f−1 (ϕN)) ≥ p.
By the induction hypothesis: f−1
(
ϕN
)
= ϕM . Hence Ti (m)
(
f−1
(
ϕN
))
=
Ti (m)
(
ϕM
)
. We have Ti (m)
(
ϕM
) ≥ p iff m ∈ (Bpi (ϕ))M . It follows that
f (m) ∈ (Bpi (ϕ))N iff m ∈ (Bpi (ϕ))M .
Definition 2.20 Define Ωκ to be the set of all κ-descriptions of states of the
world in κ-type spaces on S for player set I. For ϕ ∈ Φκ define
[ϕ] := {ω ∈ Ωκ | ϕ ∈ ω} .
Again, we omit sometimes, in this section, the superscript κ.
Obviously, we have Ω \ [ϕ] = [¬ϕ] and ⋂ψ∈Ψ [ψ] = [∧ψ∈Ψ ψ] , where ϕ is an
κ-expression and Ψ is a nonempty set of κ-expressions with |Ψ| < κ. It follows
that:
Remark 2.8 The set
ΣΩ := {[ϕ] | ϕ ∈ Φκ}
is a κ-field on Ω.
Lemma 2.6 For every κ-type space M on S for player set I and for every ϕ ∈
Φκ, the κ-description map D :M → Ω satisfies
D−1 ([ϕ]) = ϕM .
Proof Clear by the definition of [ϕ].
Note that Lemma 2.6 implies that D is measurable.
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Proposition 2.2 For every i ∈ I there exists a function
T ∗i : Ω→ ∆κ (Ω,ΣΩ)
such that for every κ-type space M on S for player set I with κ-description map
D and every m ∈M :
T ∗i (D (m)) = Ti (m) ◦D−1.
Proof For ω ∈ Ω chose a κ-type space M on S for player set I and m ∈M such
that D (m) = ω. For [ϕ] ∈ ΣΩ define
T ∗i (ω) ([ϕ]) := Ti (m) ◦D−1 ([ϕ]) .
We have
Ti (m) ◦D−1 ([ϕ]) = Ti (m) (ϕM) = sup {p | Bpi (ϕ) ∈ D (m)} ,
so T ∗i (ω) ([ϕ]) depends just on D (m) and is well-defined. By Remark 2.4, we
have
Ti (m) ◦D−1 ∈ ∆κ (Ω,ΣΩ) .
Lemma 2.7 There is a measurable function θ∗ : Ω → S such that for every
κ-type space M on S for player set I and every m ∈M :
θ∗ (D (m)) = θ (m) .
Proof Let
d0 (m) :=
{
E ∈ ΣS | m ∈ θ−1 (E)} .
Obviously, d0 (m) = D (m) ∩ ΣS. By the properties of (S,ΣS) , we have for all
s ∈ S : {s} = ⋂s∈E∈ΣS E. It follows for every κ-type space M ′ on S for player
set I and m′ ∈M ′ that
θ (m′) = s iff d0 (m′) = {E | s ∈ E} .
For ω ∈ Ω chose a κ-type space M on S for player set I and m ∈ M, such that
D (m) = ω. Define now θ∗ (ω) := θ (m) . Since θ (m) just depends on D (m) ,
θ∗ (ω) is well-defined.
It remains to show that θ∗ is measurable: Let E ∈ ΣS. We have
θ∗ (D (m)) ∈ E iff m ∈ θ−1 (E) iff E ∈ D (m) iff D (m) ∈ [E] .
It follows that θ∗−1 (E) = [E] .
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Proposition 2.3 〈
Ω,ΣΩ, (T ∗i )i∈I , θ
∗〉
is a κ-type space on S for player set I.
Proof It remains to show:
1. Ω is nonempty.
2. For every i ∈ I : T ∗i is measurable as a function from Ω to ∆κ (Ω,ΣΩ) .
3. For every i ∈ I, ω ∈ Ω and A ∈ ΣΩ : If
{ω′ ∈ Ω | T ∗i (ω′) = T ∗i (ω)} ⊆ A,
then T ∗i (ω) (A) = 1.
To:
1. LetM := {m} and chose s ∈ S. Set Σ := Pow (M) , Ti (m) := δm, for i ∈ I,
and θ (m) := s. Then 〈
M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ
〉
is a κ-type space (even a ∗-type space) on S for player set I.
2. Since inverse images commute with unions, intersections and complements,
it is enough to show that T ∗−1i (bp (E)) ∈ ΣΩ, for
bp (E) := {µ ∈ ∆κ (Ω,ΣΩ) | µ (E) ≥ p} ,
where E ∈ ΣΩ and p ∈ [0, 1] . We have
T ∗−1i (bp (E)) = {ω ∈ Ω | T ∗i (ω) (E) ≥ p} .
Since E ∈ ΣΩ, there is a κ-expression ϕ such that E = [ϕ] . Note that if
p ∈ [0, 1] and p = sup {q | Bqi (ϕ) ∈ ω} , then Bpi (ϕ) ∈ ω. This implies that
ω ∈ T ∗−1i (bp ([ϕ])) iff Bpi (ϕ) ∈ ω.
It follows that T ∗−1i (bp (E)) = [B
p
i (ϕ)] .
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3. Let ϕ be a κ-expression and
{ω′ ∈ Ω | T ∗i (ω′) = T ∗i (ω)} ⊆ [ϕ] .
Chose a κ-type space M on S for player set I and m ∈ M such that
D (m) = ω. Let m′ ∈ M. If T ∗i (D (m′)) 6= T ∗i (D (m)) , then there is a
κ-expression ψ such that Ti (m′)
(
ψM
) 6= Ti (m) (ψM) . It follows that
D ({m′ ∈M | Ti (m′) = Ti (m)}) ⊆ {ω′ ∈ Ω | T ∗i (ω′) = T ∗i (ω)} ,
which implies
{m′ ∈M | Ti (m′) = Ti (m)} ⊆ D−1 ([ϕ]) = ϕM .
So we have
1 = Ti (m)
(
ϕM
)
= Ti (m) ◦D−1 ([ϕ]) = T ∗i (ω) ([ϕ]) .
Lemma 2.8 The κ-description map
D : Ω→ Ω
is the identity.
Proof For ω ∈ Ω, we have
ω = {ϕ ∈ Φ | ω ∈ [ϕ]} .
We have to show that for every κ-expression ϕ and every ω ∈ Ω : ω ∈ ϕΩ iff
ω ∈ [ϕ] . We know this already if ϕ = E, where E ∈ ΣS. It is obvious that
Ω \ [ϕ] = [¬ϕ] , and that if Ψ is a nonempty set of κ-expressions of cardinality
< κ, then ⋂
ϕ∈Ψ
[ϕ] =
[∧
ϕ∈Ψ
ϕ
]
.
So it remains to show that [ϕ] = ϕΩ implies [Bpi (ϕ)] = B
p
i ([ϕ]) . For ω ∈ Ω, chose
a κ-type space M on S for player set I and m ∈ M such that D (m) = ω. We
have
D (m) ∈ [Bpi (ϕ)] iff Bpi (ϕ) ∈ D (m) iff Ti (m)
(
ϕM
) ≥ p.
But we have
T ∗i (ω) ([ϕ]) = Ti (m) ◦D−1 ([ϕ]) = Ti (m)
(
ϕM
)
.
This implies that [Bpi (ϕ)] = B
p
i ([ϕ]) .
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Theorem 2.1 The space 〈
Ω,ΣΩ, (T ∗i )i∈I , θ
∗〉
is a universal κ-type space on S for player set I.
Proof According to Lemma 2.6, for every κ-type space M on S for player set I,
the κ-description map D : M → Ω is measurable, and according to Proposition
2.2 and Lemma 2.7, D is a type morphism. It remains to show that it is the unique
type morphism from M to Ω. But this clear by Proposition 2.1 and Lemma 2.8.
2.4 Spaces of Arbitrary Complexity
Is there a cardinal κ, such that the κ-descriptions determine already the κ′-
descriptions, for all cardinal numbers κ′ > κ? In the sequel, using a probabilistic
adaptation of the elegant “sober-drunk” example of Heifetz and Samet (1998a)
(see that paper also for the “story” interpreting the mathematical structure), we
construct, for every regular cardinal κ′, a κ′-type space (in fact even a ∗-type
space), such that for every ordinal α < κ′ there are at least two states of the
world such that for every κ′-expression of depth ≤ α this κ′-expression is true
either in both states or in none of the two, and yet there is a κ′-expression of
depth α + 1 that is true in one state and not in the other. Thus, we answer the
above question in the negative. Hence, it makes sense to consider κ-type spaces
for every regular cardinality κ whatsoever.
In addition, this example will imply that, for at least two players and two
states of nature, there is no universal ∗-type space and no universal ∞-type
space (Theorem 2.3 and Corollary 2.1).
For this section, let I := {a, b} be the set of players (the following analysis can
be trivially extended to more than two players). We fix a set of states of nature
S = {h, t} , consisting of the two possible outcomes of tossing a coin, h(ead) and
t(ail).
To simplify the notation let us make the following
Convention 2.3 {i, j} := {a, b} , that is j =
{
a, if i = b,
b, if i = a.
The following three definitions of are taken form Heifetz and Samet (1998a).
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Definition 2.21 Let α be an ordinal. A record of length α is a sequence
rα = (r (β))β<α of numbers “0” and “1” such that for every limit ordinal λ ≤ α
there is an ordinal γ < λ such that r (β) = 0 for all ordinals β that satisfy
γ ≤ β < λ.
For every infinite ordinal γ there are a unique natural number n and a unique
limit ordinal λ̂ such that γ = λ̂+n. We say γ is even or odd according to wether
n is even or odd. If γ is a finite ordinal, i.e. a natural number, we take the usual
notion of being even or odd.
Definition 2.22 Let α be an ordinal, rα a record of length α, and λ a limit
ordinal ≤ α. By the definition of a record, there is a minimal ordinal oλ (rα) < λ
such that rα (β) = 0, for all β with oλ (rα) ≤ β < λ.
Define λ-par (rα) , the λ-parity of rα, as
λ− par (rα) :=
{
even, if oλ (rα) is even,
odd, if oλ (rα) is odd.
Note that by the definition of a record, oλ (rα) must be either 0 or a successor
ordinal (i.e. oλ (rα) = γ + 1, for some ordinal γ).
Definition 2.23 Let α be an ordinal. Define the spaces Wα by
•
W 0 := {h, t} ,
•
Wα := {(w0, wαa , wαb ) | w0 ∈ {h, t} , wαa and wαb are records of length α} ,
if α ≥ 1.
Definition 2.24 • If 0 < β ≤ α and rα = (r (ξ))ξ<α is a record of length α,
then denote by rαdβ the record (r (ξ))ξ<β of length β.
• If 0 ≤ α and wα ∈W α, then define wαd0 := w0.
• If 0 < β ≤ α and wα ∈Wα, then define wαdβ := (w0, wαa dβ, wαb dβ) .
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By the definition, it is obvious that wαdβ ∈W β, for every β < α.
Definition 2.25 Let 0 ≤ β ≤ α. Define
piβ,α : Wα → W β
by piβ,α (wα) := wαdβ.
It is obvious that piξ,β (piβ,α (wα)) = piξ,α (wα) , for 0 ≤ ξ ≤ β ≤ α.
Remark 2.9 Let 0 ≤ β < α, wβ ∈ W β, and i ∈ {a, b} . Then there are wα, uα ∈
Wα such that
wαdβ = uαdβ = wβ and 0 = wαi (β) 6= uαi (β) = 1.
And in particular, it follows that piβ,α : Wα →W β is onto.
Let wα = (w0, wαa , w
α
b ) be a state inW
α.We define the element of i’s partition
that contains this element:
Definition 2.26 Let α be an ordinal > 0, and wα ∈W α. We define:
Pi (wα) :=
{ (v0, vαa , vαb ) ∈ Wα | vαi = wαi ,
wαi (0) = 1 implies v0 = w0,
for all β such that β + 1 < α :
wαi (β + 1) = 1 implies v
α
j (β) = w
α
j (β) ,
for every limit ordinal λ < α :
wαi (λ) = 1 implies λ− par
(
vαj
)
= λ− par (wαj ) .}.
Remark 2.10 • Let α be an ordinal > 0. The set {Pi (wα) | wα ∈Wα} is a
partition of Wα and wα ∈ Pi (wα) .
• Let 0 < β < α and uα ∈ Pi (wα) . Then uαdβ ∈ Pi (wαdβ) , and hence
pi−1β,α (Pi (wαdβ)) ⊇ Pi (wα) .
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It is easy to see that if α is an infinite ordinal number, then the cardinality
of Wα is the same as the cardinality of α. (To see that, in the case of an infinite
α, the cardinality of Wα does not exceed that of α, note that the definition of
a record implies that there are only finitely many β < α such that rα (β) = 1.
(Consider, assuming the contrary, the minimal γ ≤ α such that there are infinitely
many β < γ with rα (β) = 1.))
Lemma 2.9 Let γ be an ordinal > 0, α = γ + 1, wα ∈Wα, and
E ∈
[[⋃
β<γ
pi−1β,α
(
Pow
(
W β
))
, pi−1γ,α (Pi (wαdγ))
]
, Pi (wα)
]
.
Then there are a β < γ and Aβ,Cβ, Dβ ∈ Pow (W β) such that
E =
(
pi−1β,α (Aβ) ∩ Pi (wα)
) ∪ (pi−1β,α (Cβ) ∩ pi−1γ,α (Pi (wαdγ)) ∩ (W α \ Pi (wα)))
∪ (pi−1β,α (Dβ) ∩ (Wα \ pi−1γ,α (Pi (wαdγ)))) .
Proof By the definition of[[⋃
β<γ
pi−1β,α
(
Pow
(
W β
))
, pi−1γ,α (Pi (wαdγ))
]
, Pi (wα)
]
,
E has the form
E = (( (pi−1β,α (Aβ) ∩ pi−1γ,α (Pi (wαdγ))) ∪ (pi−1η,α (Bη) ∩ (pi−1γ,α (W γ \ Pi (wαdγ)))))
∩ Pi (wα))∪
(( (pi−1ξ,α (Cξ) ∩ pi−1γ,α (Pi (wαdγ))) ∪ (pi−1ζ,α (Dζ) ∩ (pi−1γ,α (W γ \ Pi (wαdγ)))))
∩ (Wα \ Pi (wα))),
where β, η, ξ, ζ < γ and Aβ ⊆ W β, Bη ⊆ W η, Cξ ⊆ W ξ, Dζ ⊆W ζ .
The lemma follows from the following facts: If η < β, then pi−1η,β (Bη) ⊆ W β and
pi−1η,α (Bη) = pi−1β,α
(
pi−1η,β (Bη)
)
, so we can assume without loss of generality that
β = η = ξ = ζ. We have
pi−1γ,α (W γ \ Pi (wαdγ)) = Wα \ pi−1γ,α (Pi (wαdγ))
and Pi (wα) ⊆ pi−1γ,α (Pi (wαdγ)) .
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Notation 2.2 • For 0 ≤ α and w0 ∈ {h, t} , we denote by
[Xα0 = w0] the set {uα ∈Wα | u0 = w0} .
• For β < α, i ∈ {a, b} and wαi (β) ∈ {0, 1} , we denote by
[Xαi (β) = w
α
i (β)] the set {uα ∈Wα | uαi (β) = wαi (β)} .
• For a limit ordinal λ ≤ α and λ-par (wαi ) ∈ {even, odd} , we denote by
[λ-par (Xαi ) = λ-par (w
α
i )] the set {uα ∈Wα | λ-par (uαi ) = λ-par (wαi )} .
Remark 2.11 Let 0 ≤ α ≤ γ and w0 ∈ {h, t} .
Then:
•
pi−1α,γ ([Xα0 = w0]) = [X
γ
0 = w0] .
• If β < α, i ∈ {a, b} , and wγ ∈W γ , then
wγi (β) = (w
γ
i dα) (β) and
pi−1α,γ ([Xαi (β) = (w
γ
i dα) (β)]) = [Xγi (β) = wγi (β)] .
• If i ∈ {a, b} , wγ ∈W γ, and if λ is a limit ordinal such that λ ≤ α, then
λ− par (wγi ) = λ− par (wγi dα) and
pi−1α,γ ([λ-par (Xαi ) = λ-par (w
γ
i dα)]) = [λ-par (Xγi ) = λ-par (wγi )] .
For further reference, we cite here (in a slightly changed formulation and in
our notation) Lemma 3.2. of Heifetz and Samet (1998a):
Lemma 2.10 Let vα, wα ∈ Wα, where vαdγ+1 ∈ Pi (wαi dγ + 1) , for some γ < α.
Then there is a uα ∈ Pi (wα) such that uαdγ = vαdγ.
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Lemma 2.11 Let λ be a limit ordinal, α = λ + 1, wα ∈ Wα, wαi (λ) = 0, and
E = pi−1β,α (Eβ) , where Eβ ⊆ W β for a β < λ.
Then:
• If vα ∈ E ∩ Pi (wα) , then there is a uα ∈ E ∩ Pi (wα) such that
λ− par (uαj ) 6= λ− par (vαj ) .
• If
vα ∈ E ∩ pi−1λ,α (Pi (wαdλ)) ∩ (Wα \ Pi (wα)) ,
then there is a
uα ∈ E ∩ pi−1λ,α (Pi (wαdλ)) ∩ (Wα \ Pi (wα))
such that λ-par
(
uαj
) 6= λ-par (vαj ) .
• If
vα ∈ E ∩ (Wα \ pi−1λ,α (Pi (wαdλ))) ,
then there is a
uα ∈ E ∩ (W α \ pi−1λ,α (Pi (wαdλ)))
such that λ-par
(
uαj
) 6= λ-par (vαj ) .
Proof Let vα ∈ E. Since β, oλ (vαi ) , oλ
(
vαj
)
< λ, there is an ordinal ξ such that
max
{
β, oλ (vαi ) , o
λ
(
vαj
)} ≤ ξ < λ and such that the parity of ξ + 1 is different
from λ-par
(
vαj
)
. Define now uα ∈ Wα by
u0 := v0,
uαi := v
α
i ,
uαj (γ) := v
α
j (γ) , for all γ < α with γ 6= ξ,
uαj (ξ) := 1.
It follows that λ-par
(
uαj
) 6= λ-par (vαj ) and uαdβ = vαdβ, which implies uα ∈ E.
• If vα ∈ Pi (wα) , then it is easy to check that uα ∈ Pi (vα) = Pi (wα) .
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• If
vα ∈ pi−1λ,α (Pi (wαdλ)) ∩ (Wα \ Pi (wα)) ,
then it follows that vα ∈ pi−1λ,α (Pi (wαdλ)) and vαi (λ) = 1. It is again easy
to check that
uα ∈ pi−1λ,α (Pi (vαdλ)) = pi−1λ,α (Pi (wαdλ))
and since uαi (λ) = 1, we have u
α ∈ (Wα \ Pi (wα)) .
• If vα /∈ pi−1λ,α (Pi (wαdλ)) , then there are four cases:
1. vαi dλ 6= wαi dλ :
From uαi dλ = vαi dλ it follows that uα /∈ pi−1λ,α (Pi (wαdλ)) .
2. There is a γ < λ such that
(vαi dλ) (γ + 1) = (wαi dλ) (γ + 1) = 1 and
(
vαj dλ
)
(γ) 6= (wαj dλ) (γ) :
Since γ + 1 < λ and max
{
β, oλ (vαi ) , o
λ
(
vαj
)}
> γ + 1, it follows that
uαdγ + 2 = vαdγ + 2 and therefore uα /∈ pi−1λ,α (Pi (wαdλ)) .
3. There is a limit ordinal λ̂ < λ such that
(vαi dλ) (λ̂) = (wαi dλ) (λ̂) = 1 and λ̂− par
(
vαj
) 6= λ̂− par (wαj ) :
We have ξ > λ̂, and therefore
(uαi dλ) (λ̂) = (vαi dλ) (λ̂) and λ̂− par
(
uαj
)
= λ̂− par (vαj ) .
It follows that uα /∈ pi−1λ,α (Pi (wαdλ)) .
4. (vαi dλ) (0) = (wαi dλ) (0) = 1 and v0 6= w0 :
We have
(uαi dλ) (0) = (vαi dλ) (0) = 1 and u0 = v0.
It follows that uα /∈ pi−1λ,α (Pi (wαdλ)) .
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Lemma 2.12 Let β be an ordinal, α = (β + 1) + 1, wα ∈ Wα, wαi (β + 1) = 0,
and E = pi−1β,α (Eβ) , such that Eβ ⊆W β.
Then:
• If vα ∈ E ∩ Pi (wα) , then there is a uα ∈ E ∩ Pi (wα) such that
uαj (β) 6= vαj (β) .
• If
vα ∈ E ∩ pi−1β+1,α (Pi (wαdβ + 1)) ∩ (Wα \ Pi (wα)) ,
then there is a
uα ∈ E ∩ pi−1β+1,α (Pi (wαdβ + 1)) ∩ (Wα \ Pi (wα))
such that uαj (β) 6= vαj (β) .
• If
vα ∈ E ∩ (Wα \ pi−1β+1,α (Pi (wαdβ + 1))) ,
then there is a
uα ∈ E ∩ (Wα \ pi−1β+1,α (Pi (wαdβ + 1)))
such that uαj (β) 6= vαj (β) .
Proof Let vα ∈ E. Define uα ∈W α by
u0 := v0,
uαi := v
α
i ,
uαj (γ) := v
α
j (γ) , for all γ < α with γ 6= β,
uαj (β) := 1− vαj (β) .
It follows that uαj (β) 6= vαj (β) and uαdβ = vαdβ, which implies uα ∈ E.
• If vα ∈ Pi (wα) , then it is easy to check that uα ∈ Pi (vα) = Pi (wα) .
• If
vα ∈ pi−1β+1,α (Pi (wαdβ + 1)) ∩ (Wα \ Pi (wα)) ,
then it follows that vα ∈ pi−1β+1,α (Pi (wαdβ + 1)) and vαi (β + 1) = 1. It is
again easy to check that
uα ∈ pi−1β+1,α (Pi (vαdβ + 1)) = pi−1β+1,α (Pi (wαdβ + 1))
and since uαi (β + 1) = 1, we have u
α ∈ (Wα \ Pi (wα)) .
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• If vα /∈ pi−1β+1,α (Pi (wαdβ + 1)) , then there are four cases:
1. vαi dβ + 1 6= wαi dβ + 1 :
From uαi dβ + 1 = vαi dβ + 1, it follows that uα /∈ pi−1β+1,α (Pi (wαdβ + 1)) .
2. There is a γ < β such that
(vαi dβ + 1) (γ + 1) = (wαi dβ + 1) (γ + 1) = 1 and(
vαj dβ + 1
)
(γ) 6= (wαj dβ + 1) (γ) :
By the definition of uα, (uαi dβ + 1) (γ + 1) = 1 and, since γ < β,(
vαj dβ + 1
)
(γ) =
(
uαj dβ + 1
)
(γ) ,
hence uα /∈ pi−1β+1,α (Pi (wαdβ + 1)) .
3. There is a limit ordinal λ < β + 1 such that
(vαi dβ + 1) (λ) = (wαi dβ + 1) (λ) = 1 and λ− par
(
vαj
) 6= λ− par (wαj ) :
We have (uαi dβ + 1) (λ) = 1 and, since λ ≤ β, λ-par
(
uαj
)
= λ-par
(
vαj
)
. It
follows that uα /∈ pi−1β+1,α (Pi (wαdβ + 1)) .
4. (vαi dβ + 1) (0) = (wαi dβ + 1) (0) = 1 and v0 6= w0 :
We have
(uαi dβ + 1) (0) = (vαi dβ + 1) (0) = 1 and u0 = v0.
It follows that uα /∈ pi−1β+1,α (Pi (wαdβ + 1)) .
Lemma 2.13 Let λ be a limit ordinal, α = λ+ 1, wα ∈ Wα, wαi (λ) = 0, and
E ∈
[[⋃
β<λ
pi−1β,α
(
Pow
(
W β
))
, pi−1λ,α (Pi (w
αdλ))
]
, Pi (wα)
]
.
Then:
• If vα ∈ E, then there is a uα ∈ E such that λ-par (uαj ) 6= λ-par (vαj ) .
• If vα ∈ Wα \ E, then there is a uα ∈ Wα \ E such that λ-par (uαj ) 6= λ-
par
(
vαj
)
.
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• If
E ⊇ [λ-par (Xαj ) = λ-par (wαj )] ,
then E = W α.
• If
E ⊆ [λ-par (Xαj ) = λ-par (wαj )] ,
then E = ∅.
Proof The first point of the Lemma follows from Lemma 2.9 and Lemma 2.11.
The second point follows from the first and the fact that[[⋃
β<λ
pi−1β,α
(
Pow
(
W β
))
, pi−1λ,α (Pi (w
αdλ))
]
, Pi (wα)
]
is a field on Wα (and therefore it is closed under complements).
The last two points of the Lemma follow directly from the first two points.
Lemma 2.14 Let β be an ordinal, α = (β + 1) + 1, wα ∈ W α, wαi (β + 1) = 0,
and
E ∈ [[pi−1β,α (Pow (W β)) , pi−1β+1,α (Pi (wαdβ + 1))] , Pi (wα)] .
Then:
• If vα ∈ E, then there is a uα ∈ E such that uαj (β) 6= vαj (β) .
• If vα ∈Wα \ E, then there is a uα ∈ Wα \ E such that uαj (β) 6= vαj (β) .
• If
E ⊇ [Xαj (β) = wαj (β)] ,
then E = W α.
• If
E ⊆ [Xαj (β) = wαj (β)] ,
then E = ∅.
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Proof Note that if α = β + 1, then⋃
ξ<β+1
pi−1ξ,α
(
Pow
(
W ξ
))
= pi−1β,α
(
Pow
(
W β
))
.
The proof is now analogous to the proof of Lemma 2.13, just replace λ by β + 1
and Lemma 2.11 by Lemma 2.12.
Lemma 2.15 Let γ be an ordinal > 0, α = γ + 1, wα ∈Wα, and
E ∈
[⋃
β<γ
pi−1β,α
(
Pow
(
W β
))
, pi−1γ,α (Pi (wαdγ))
]
such that E ⊇ Pi (wα) .
Then
E ⊇ pi−1γ,α (Pi (wαdγ)) .
Proof Since Pi (wα) ⊆ pi−1γ,α (Pi (wαdγ)) , it follows from the definition of[⋃
β<γ
pi−1β,α
(
Pow
(
W β
))
, pi−1γ,α (Pi (wαdγ))
]
,
that there is a β < γ and a Eβ ⊆ W β such that
E ∩ pi−1γ,α (Pi (wαdγ)) = pi−1β,α
(
Eβ
) ∩ pi−1γ,α (Pi (wαdγ)) ⊇ Pi (wα) .
Claim: pi−1β,α
(
Eβ
) ⊇ pi−1γ,α (Pi (wαdγ)) .
Assume to the contrary, that there is a
vα ∈ pi−1γ,α (Pi (wαdγ)) \ pi−1β,α
(
Eβ
)
.
Since β + 1 ≤ γ, we have vαdβ + 1 ∈ Pi (wαdβ + 1) . By Lemma 2.10, there is
a uα ∈ Pi (wα) such that uαdβ = vαdβ. Since Eβ ⊆ W β and vα /∈ pi−1β,α
(
Eβ
)
, it
follows that uα /∈ pi−1β,α
(
Eβ
)
, a contradiction to pi−1β,α
(
Eβ
) ⊇ Pi (wα) .
Lemma 2.16 Let λ be a limit ordinal, wλ ∈ W λ, β < λ, and Eβ ⊆ W β such
that pi−1β,λ
(
Eβ
) ⊇ Pi (wλ).
Then
pi−1β,λ
(
Eβ
) ⊇ pi−1β+1,λ (Pi (wλdβ + 1)) .
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Proof Assume that there is a
vλ ∈ pi−1β+1,λ
(
Pi
(
wλdβ + 1)) \ pi−1β,λ (Eβ) .
By Lemma 2.10, there is a uλ ∈ Pi (wλ) such that uλdβ = vλdβ. Therefore
uλ /∈ pi−1β,λ
(
Eβ
)
, a contradiction to pi−1β,λ
(
Eβ
) ⊇ Pi (wλ) .
2.4.1 The Construction
Now, let κ be a fixed regular cardinal.
For every wκ ∈W κ and i ∈ {a, b} , we will define finitely additive probability
measures Ti (wκ) on (W κ,Pow (W κ)) such that:
• Ti (uκ) = Ti (wκ) , for uκ ∈ Pi (wκ) ,
• Ti (wκ) (Pi (wκ)) = 1,
• Ti (wκ) ([Xκ0 = w0]) =
{
1, if wκi (0) = 1,
1
2 , if w
κ
i (0) = 0,
• for β < κ :
Ti (wκ)
([
Xκj (β) = w
κ
j (β)
])
=
{
1, if wκi (β + 1) = 1,
1
2 , if w
κ
i (β + 1) = 0,
• for λ < κ such that λ is a limit ordinal :
Ti (wκ)
([
λ-par
(
Xκj
)
= λ-par
(
wκj
)])
=
{
1, if wκi (λ) = 1,
1
2 , if w
κ
i (λ) = 0.
If we define
θ (wκ) := w0,
it follows from the first two points and the fact that Ti (wκ) will be defined on
(W κ,Pow (W κ)) , that 〈
W κ, (Ti)i∈{a,b} , θ
〉
will be a ∗-type space on S = {h, t} for player set {a, b} .
The construction will not be carried out at once. By a transfinite induction
on 1 ≤ α ≤ κ, we will endow Wα with fields F (i, wα) and finitely additive
probability measures Tαi (w
α) on (Wα,F (i, wα)) such that:
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Induction Hypothesis
1. F (i, wα) :=
[⋃
β<α
(
pi−1β,α
(
Pow
(
W β
)))
, Pi (wα)
]
,
2. for every β < α and Eβ ∈ F (i, wαdβ) :
Tαi (w
α)
(
pi−1β,α
(
Eβ
))
= T βi (w
αdβ) (Eβ) ,
that is marg(Wβ ,F(i,wαdβ))T
α
i (w
α) = T βi (w
αdβ) ,
3. Tαi (w
α) = T αi (u
α) , for uα ∈ Pi (wα) ,
4. Tαi (w
α) (Pi (wα)) = 1,
5. Tαi (w
α) ([Xα0 = w0]) =
{
1, if wαi (0) = 1,
1
2 , if w
α
i (0) = 0,
6. for β such that β + 1 < α :
Tαi (w
α)
([
Xαj (β) = w
α
j (β)
])
=
{
1, if wαi (β + 1) = 1,
1
2 , if w
α
i (β + 1) = 0,
7. for λ < α such that λ is a limit ordinal :
Tαi (w
α)
([
λ-par
(
Xαj
)
= λ-par
(
wαj
)])
=
{
1, if wαi (λ) = 1,
1
2 , if w
α
i (λ) = 0.
Since inverse images commute with complements, arbitrary unions and inter-
sections, it follows:
Remark 2.12 Let β + 1 ≤ α. Then:
pi−1β+1,α (F (i, wαdβ + 1)) =
[
pi−1β,α
(
Pow
(
W β
))
, pi−1β+1,α (Pi (w
αdβ + 1))] .
Remark 2.13 Let 1 ≤ β ≤ α ≤ κ and let uα, wα ∈ W α such that uα ∈ Pi (wα)
(and hence Pi (uα) = Pi (wα)). Then:
• We have
F (i, wα) = F (i, uα) and
F (i, wαdβ) = F (i, uαdβ) .
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• If
Tαi (w
α) = Tαi (u
α) ,
T βi (w
αdβ) = T βi (uαdβ) and
marg(Wβ ,F(i,wαdβ))T
α
i (w
α) = T βi (w
αdβ) ,
then we also have
marg(Wβ ,F(i,uαdβ))T
α
i (u
α) = T βi (u
αdβ) .
Definition and Construction
(By transfinite induction on 1 ≤ α ≤ κ.)
Step α = 1 :
We have W 0 = {h, t} . Let w1 ∈W 1.
Define
T<1i (w
1) ([X10 = w0]) :=
{
1, if w1i (0) = 1,
1
2 , if w
1
i (0) = 0,
T<1i (w
1) ([X10 6= w0]) := 1− T<1i (w1) ([X10 = w0]) ,
T<1i (w
1) (∅) := 0,
T<1i (w
1) (W 1) := 1.
It is clear, that by this definition, T<1i (w
1) is a probability measure on(
W 1, pi−10,1
(
Pow
(
W 0
)))
.
Let E0 ⊆W 0 such that Pi (w1) ⊆ pi−10,1 (E0) .
1. case: w1i (0) = 1: Then E
0 = W 0 or E0 = [X00 = w0] , hence the outer
measure T<1i (w
1)∗ (Pi (w1)) is equal to 1.
2. case: w1i (0) = 0: Then E
0 = W 0 and the outer measure T<1i (w
1)∗ (Pi (w1))
is equal to 1.
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For u1 ∈ Pi (w1) , we have in both cases that Pi (u1) = Pi (w1) and T<1i (u1) =
T<1i (w
1) . For each Pi (u1) such that u1 ∈ W 1, chose a representing element
w1 ∈ Pi (u1) = Pi (w1) . By the  Los´-Marczewski Theorem, we can extend T<1i (w1)
to a finitely additive probability measure T 1i (w
1) on the field
F (i, w1) = [pi−10,1 (Pow (W 0)) , Pi (w1)]
such that T 1i (w
1) (Pi (w1)) = 1. Define T 1i (u
1) := T 1i (w
1) , for all u1 ∈ Pi (w1) .
(Note that for u1 ∈ Pi (w1) , it is the case that F (i, u1) = F (i, w1) .) T 1i (u1) andF (i, u1) satisfy the conditions 1.-7. of the induction hypothesis.
Step α = (β + 1) + 1:
For each Pi (uα) such that uα ∈Wα, chose a representing element wα ∈ Pi (uα) =
Pi (wα) .
Let T<αi (w
α) be the finitely additive probability measure defined on the field
pi−1β+1,α (F (i, wαdβ + 1)) =
[
pi−1β,α
(
Pow
(
W β
))
, pi−1β+1,α (Pi (w
αdβ + 1))] ,
which is induced by T β+1i (w
αdβ + 1) (as defined in Lemma 2.3). According to
Lemma 2.15 and the induction hypothesis, we have for the outer measure of
Pi (wα): T<αi (w
α)∗ (Pi (wα)) = 1. So, by the  Los´-Marczewski Theorem, we can
extend T<αi (w
α) to a finitely additive probability measure T˜αi (w
α) defined on
the field
F˜ (i, wα) := [[pi−1β,α (Pow (W β)) , pi−1β+1,α (Pi (wαdβ + 1))] , Pi (wα)]
such that T˜αi (w
α) (Pi (wα)) = 1.
1. case: wαi (β + 1) = 1: Then
pi−1β+1,α
([
Xβ+1j (β) =
(
wαj dβ + 1
)
(β)
])
=
[
Xαj (β) = w
α
j (β)
] ⊇ Pi (wα) .
By Lemma 2.5, extend T˜αi (w
α) to a finitely additive probability measure
Tαi (w
α) on the field[
pi−1β+1,α
(
Pow
(
W β+1
))
, Pi (wα)
]
= F (i, wα) .
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By the above, we have
Tαi (w
α)
([
Xαj (β) = w
α
j (β)
])
= 1.
Define now T αi (u
α) := Tαi (w
α) , for all uα ∈ Pi (wα) . (Note that, for
uα ∈ Pi (wα) , we have F˜ (i, uα) = F˜ (i, wα) , F (i, uα) = F (i, wα) , and
uαi (β + 1) = w
α
i (β + 1) = 1 and hence, u
α
j (β) = w
α
j (β) .) It is now easy to
check that Tαi (u
α) and F (i, uα) satisfy the conditions 1.-7. of the induction
hypothesis.
2. case: wαi (β + 1) = 0: By Lemma 2.14 and the induction hypothesis, we
have for the outer measure of
[
Xαj (β) = w
α
j (β)
]
:
T˜αi (w
α)∗
([
Xαj (β) = w
α
j (β)
])
= 1,
and for the inner measure
T˜αi (w
α)∗
([
Xαj (β) = w
α
j (β)
])
= 0.
By the  Los´-Marczewski Theorem, we can extend T˜αi (w
α) to a finitely ad-
ditive probability measure T̂αi (w
α) on the field[
F˜ (i, wα) , [Xαj (β) = wαj (β)]]
such that
T̂αi (w
α)
([
Xαj (β) = w
α
j (β)
])
=
1
2
.
Finally, by Lemma 2.5, extend T̂αi (w
α) to a finitely additive probability
measure Tαi (w
α) on F (i, wα) . Define now Tαi (uα) := Tαi (wα) , for all uα ∈
Pi (wα) . It is easy to check that Tαi (u
α) and F (i, uα) satisfy the conditions
1.-7. of the induction hypothesis.
Step α = λ, λ limit ordinal.
For each Pi (uα) such that uα ∈ Wα, chose a representing element wα ∈ Pi (uα) =
Pi (wα) .
Let T<αi (w
α) be the finitely additive probability measure defined on the field⋃
β<α
pi−1β,α (F (i, wαdβ)) =
⋃
β<α
pi−1β,α
(
Pow
(
W β
))
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which is induced by (T βi (wαdβ))1≤β<α (as defined in Lemma 2.3 ).
Let β < α and Eβ ⊆ W β such that pi−1β,α
(
Eβ
) ⊇ Pi (wα) . By Lemma 2.16, we
have
pi−1β,α
(
Eβ
) ⊇ pi−1β+1,α (Pi (wαdβ + 1)) .
(Note that β < α implies β + 1 < α.) Since, by the definition of T<αi (w
α) ,
T<αi (w
α)
(
pi−1β+1,α (Pi (w
αdβ + 1))) = T β+1i (wαdβ + 1) (Pi (wαdβ + 1)) = 1,
the outer measure T<αi (w
α)∗ (Pi (wα)) is equal to 1. By the  Los´-Marczewski The-
orem, we can extend T<αi (w
α) to a finitely additive probability measure Tαi (w
α)
on the field
F (i, wα) =
[⋃
β<α
pi−1β,α
(
Pow
(
W β
))
, Pi (wα)
]
such that Tαi (w
α) (Pi (wα)) = 1. For uα ∈ Pi (wα) define Tαi (uα) := Tαi (wα) .
It is easy to check that Tαi (u
α) and F (i, uα) satisfy the conditions 1.-7. of the
induction hypothesis.
Step α = λ+ 1, λ limit ordinal:
For each Pi (uα) such that uα ∈Wα, chose a representing element wα ∈ Pi (uα) =
Pi (wα) .
Let T<αi (w
α) be the finitely additive probability measure defined on the field
pi−1λ,α (F (i, wαdλ)) =
[⋃
β<λ
pi−1β,α
(
Pow
(
W β
))
, pi−1λ,α (Pi (w
αdλ))
]
,
which is induced by T λi (w
αdλ) (as defined in Lemma 2.3 ). According to Lemma
2.15 and the induction hypothesis, we have for the outer measure of Pi (wα):
T<αi (w
α)∗ (Pi (wα)) = 1. So, by the  Los´-Marczewski Theorem, we can extend
T<αi (w
α) to a finitely additive probability measure T˜αi (w
α) defined on the field
F˜ (i, wα) :=
[[⋃
β<λ
pi−1β,α
(
Pow
(
W β
))
, pi−1λ,α (Pi (w
αdλ))
]
, Pi (wα)
]
,
such that T˜αi (w
α) (Pi (wα)) = 1.
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1. case: wαi (λ) = 1. Then
pi−1λ,α
([
λ-par
(
Xλj
)
= λ-par
(
wαj dλ
)])
=
[
λ-par
(
Xαj
)
= λ-par
(
wαj
)]
⊇ Pi (wα) .
By Lemma 2.5, extend T˜αi (w
α) to a finitely additive probability measure
Tαi (w
α) on the field[
pi−1λ,α
(
Pow
(
W λ
))
, Pi (wα)
]
= F (i, wα) .
By the above, we have
Tαi (w
α)
([
λ-par
(
Xαj
)
= λ-par
(
wαj
)])
= 1.
Define now Tαi (u
α) := Tαi (w
α) , for all uα ∈ Pi (wα) . (Note that F (i, uα) =
F (i, wα), uαi (λ) = wαi (λ) = 1 and hence, λ-par
(
wαj
)
= λ-par
(
uαj
)
.) It is
now easy to check that Tαi (u
α) and F (i, uα) satisfy the conditions 1.-7. of
the induction hypothesis.
2. case: wαi (λ) = 0. By Lemma 2.13, we have for the outer measure of[
λ-par
(
Xαj
)
= λ-par
(
wαj
)]
:
T˜αi (w
α)∗
([
λ-par
(
Xαj
)
= λ-par
(
wαj
)])
= 1,
and for the inner measure
T˜ αi (w
α)∗
([
λ-par
(
Xαj
)
= λ-par
(
wαj
)])
= 0.
By the  Los´-Marczewski Theorem, we can extend T˜αi (w
α) to a finitely ad-
ditive probability measure T̂αi (w
α) on the field[
F˜ (i, wα) , [λ-par (Xαj ) = λ-par (wαj )]]
such that
T̂αi (w
α)
([
λ-par
(
Xαj
)
= λ-par
(
wαj
)])
=
1
2
.
Finally, by Lemma 2.5, extend T̂αi (w
α) to a finitely additive probability
measure Tαi (w
α) on F (i, wα) . Define now Tαi (uα) := Tαi (wα) , for all uα ∈
Pi (wα) . It is easy to check that Tαi (u
α) and F (i, uα) satisfy the conditions
1.-7. of the induction hypothesis.
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Remaining Step:
We have to extend T κi (u
κ) to a finitely additive probability measure defined on
the field Pow (W κ):
By the inductive construction, T κi (u
κ) is defined on[⋃
β<κ
pi−1β,κ
(
Pow
(
W β
))
, Pi (wκ)
]
such that 1.-7. of the induction hypothesis are satisfied. For each Pi (uκ) such
that uκ ∈W κ, chose a representing element
wκ ∈ Pi (uκ) = Pi (wκ) .
Now, by Lemma 2.5, extend T κi (w
κ) to a finitely additive probability measure
Ti (wκ) on the field Pow (W κ) and define
Ti (uκ) := Ti (wκ) ,
for uκ ∈ Pi (wκ) .
Finally, let
θ (wκ) := w0 ∈ S,
for wκ ∈W κ.
W κ := 〈W κ, Ta, Tb, θ〉
has now all the desired properties.
Next, by induction on the formation of κ-expressions, we define the depth of
a κ-expression:
Definition 2.27 • If E ∈ ΣS, then
dp (E) := 0,
• if 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, i ∈ I and if ϕ is a κ-expression, then
dp (Bpi (ϕ)) := dp (ϕ) + 1,
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• if ϕ is a κ-expression, then
dp (¬ϕ) := dp (ϕ) ,
• if Ψ is a set of κ-expressions such that |Ψ| < κ, then
dp(
∧
ϕ∈Ψ
ϕ) := sup {dp (ϕ) | ϕ ∈ Ψ} .
It is easy to see that, since κ is regular, the depth of a κ-expression is always
strictly smaller than κ.
Lemma 2.17 Let α ≤ κ, wκ, uκ ∈W κ and wκdα = uκdα.
Then, for all κ-expressions ϕ such that dp (ϕ) ≤ α :
wκ ∈ ϕWκ iff uκ ∈ ϕWκ .
Proof We prove the Lemma by induction on the formation of κ-expressions.
• Let ϕ = E, where E ∈ Σ{h,t} = Pow ({h, t}), and let wκ, uκ ∈ W κ such
that wκd0 = uκd0. By definition, vκ ∈ EWκ iff θ (vκ) ∈ E, for vκ ∈ W κ.
But we have θ (vκ) = v0 = vκd0, for vκ ∈ W κ. It follows that uκ ∈ EWκ iff
wκ ∈ EWκ .
• Let ϕ = ¬ψ such that depth (ϕ) ≤ α and let wκ, uκ ∈ W κ such that
wκdα = uκdα. It follows that depth (ψ) ≤ α and uκ ∈ ϕWκ iff uκ /∈ ψWκ iff-
by the induction assumption - wκ /∈ ψWκ , which is the case iff wκ ∈ ϕWκ .
• Let p ∈ [0, 1] , i ∈ {a, b} , ϕ = Bpi (ψ) , dp (ψ) + 1 = β + 1 ≤ α, and
wκ, uκ ∈ W κ such that wκdα = uκdα. By the induction assumption, there
is a Eβ ⊆W β such that ψWκ = pi−1β,κ
(
Eβ
)
. By the definition,
Ti (uκ)
(
ψW
κ)
= Tαi (u
κdα) (pi−1β,α (Eβ))
= Tαi (w
κdα) (pi−1β,α (Eβ))
= Ti (wκ)
(
ψW
κ)
.
It follows that uκ ∈ (Bpi (ψ))Wκ iff wκ ∈ (Bpi (ψ))Wκ .
• Let |Ψ| < κ, ϕ = ∧ψ∈Ψ ψ such that depth (ϕ) ≤ α, and let wκ, uκ ∈ W κ
such that wκdα = uκdα. Then depth (ψ) ≤ α, for ψ ∈ Ψ. By the induction
assumption, uκ ∈ ψWκ iff wκ ∈ ψWκ , for ψ ∈ Ψ. It follows that uκ ∈ ϕWκ
iff wκ ∈ ϕWκ .
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Lemma 2.18 In the ∗-type space
〈
W κ, (Ti)i∈{a,b} , θ
〉
, we have:
[Xκi (0) = 1] = B
1
i ([X
κ
0 = h]) ∪B1i ([Xκ0 = t]) .
[Xκi (β + 1) = 1] = B
1
i
([
Xκj (β) = 1
]) ∪B1i ([Xκj (β) = 0]) ,
for all ordinals β < κ.
[Xκi (λ) = 1] = B
1
i
([
λ-par
(
Xκj
)
= even
]) ∪B1i ([λ-par (Xκj ) = odd]) ,
for all limit ordinals λ < κ.
Proof Follows directly from the construction of
〈
W κ, (Ti)i∈{a,b} , θ
〉
.
Lemma 2.19 In the ∗-type space
〈
W κ, (Ti)i∈{a,b} , θ
〉
, we have:
•
{h}Wκ = [Xκ0 = h] ,
{t}Wκ = [Xκ0 = t] ,
dp ({h}) = dp ({t}) = 0.
• For every i ∈ {a, b} and β such that 0 ≤ β < κ, there are κ-expressions
ϕ0i (β) and ϕ
1
i (β) with
dp (ϕ0i (β)) = dp (ϕ
1
i (β))
= β + 1 such that
(ϕ1i (β))
Wκ = [Xκi (β) = 1] and
(ϕ0i (β))
Wκ = [Xκi (β) = 0] .
• For every i ∈ {a, b} and limit ordinal λ < κ, there are κ-expressions
ϕeveni (λ) and ϕ
odd
i (λ) with
dp(ϕeveni (λ)) = dp(ϕ
odd
i (λ))
= λ such that
(ϕeveni (λ))
Wκ = [λ-par (Xκi ) = even] and
(ϕoddi (λ))
Wκ = [λ-par (Xκi ) = odd] .
Proof The first point is clear. We show the second and the third point by a
transfinite induction on 0 ≤ β < κ.
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• β = 0 : According to Lemma 2.18 and the first point of this Lemma, we
have [Xκi (0) = 1] = (B
1
i ({h}) ∨B1i ({t}))Wκ
and [Xκi (0) = 0] = (¬ (B1i ({h}) ∨B1i ({t})))Wκ .
• β = γ+1 : According to the induction assumption, there are κ-expressions
ϕ0j (γ) and ϕ
1
j (γ) such that(
ϕ0j (γ)
)Wκ = [Xκj (γ) = 0] ,(
ϕ1j (γ)
)Wκ = [Xκj (γ) = 1] and
dp
(
ϕ0j (γ)
)
= dp
(
ϕ1j (γ)
)
= β.
Define
ϕ1i (β) := B
1
i
(
ϕ0j (γ)
) ∨B1i (ϕ1j (γ))
and
ϕ0i (β) := ¬ϕ1i (β) .
ϕ1i (β) and ϕ
0
i (β) are κ-expressions of depth β + 1. We have
[Xκi (β) = 0] =W
κ \ [Xκi (β) = 1] .
By Lemma 2.18 and the induction assumption, it follows that
[Xκi (β) = 1] = (ϕ
1
i (β))
Wκ and
[Xκi (β) = 0] = (ϕ
0
i (β))
Wκ .
• Let λ < κ be a limit ordinal: For i ∈ {a, b} and β < λ define in W κ :[
Y λi (β)
]
:= [Xκi (β) = 1] ∩⋂β<α<λ [Xκi (α) = 0] ,[
Zλi
]
:=
⋂
0≤α<λ [Xκi (α) = 0] .
According to the induction assumption and the fact that |λ| < κ, it follows
that
ψλi (β) := ϕ
1
i (β) ∧∧β<α<λ ϕ0i (α) and
χλi :=
∧
0≤α<λ ϕ0i (α)
are κ-expressions such that
dp
(
ψλi (β)
)
= max {β + 1, sup {dp (ϕ0i (α)) | β < α < λ}}
= sup {α+ 1 | α < λ}
= λ,
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and, similarly,
dp
(
χλi
)
= λ.
It follows from the induction assumption that[
Y λi (β)
]
=
(
ψλi (β)
)Wκ
and
[
Zλi
]
=
(
χλi
)Wκ
.
Since oλ (wκi ) , for w
κ
i ∈ W κi , can never be a limit ordinal, we have
[λ-par (Xκi ) = even] =
[
Zλi
] ∪⋃β<λ, β odd [Y λi (β)] and
[λ-par (Xκi ) = odd] =
⋃
β<λ, βeven
[
Y λi (β)
]
.
Again, since |λ| < κ, it follows from the above that
ϕeveni (λ) := χ
λ
i ∨∨β<λ, βodd ψλi (β) and
ϕoddi (λ) :=
∨
β<λ, βeven ψ
λ
i (β)
are κ-expressions such that
dp(ϕeveni (λ)) = max
{
dp(χλi ), sup
{
dp
(
ψλi (β)
) | β < λ, β odd}} = λ,
and dp(ϕoddi (λ)) = λ.
By the definitions and the induction assumption, we have
(ϕeveni (λ))
Wκ = [λ-par (Xκi ) = even] and
(ϕoddi (λ))
Wκ = [λ-par (Xκi ) = odd] .
• β = λ, λ limit ordinal < κ : By Lemma 2.18, and the above we have(
B1i (ϕ
even
j (λ)) ∨B1i (ϕoddj (λ))
)Wκ = [Xκi (λ) = 1] ,(¬ (B1i (ϕevenj (λ)) ∨B1i (ϕoddj (λ))))Wκ = [Xκi (λ) = 0] ,
and
dp
(
B1i (ϕ
even
j (λ)) ∨B1i (ϕoddj (λ))
)Wκ =
dp
(¬ (B1i (ϕevenj (λ)) ∨B1i (ϕoddj (λ))))Wκ = λ+ 1.
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Theorem 2.2 For every ordinal α < κ there are uκ, wκ ∈W κ such that:
1. For all κ-expressions ϕ with dp (ϕ) ≤ α :
uκ ∈ ϕWκ iff wκ ∈ ϕWκ .
2. There is a κ-expression ψ with dp (ψ) = α+ 1 such that
uκ ∈ ψWκ and wκ ∈ (¬ψ)Wκ .
Proof Let α < κ and i ∈ {a, b} . By the definition of W κ, there are uκ, wκ ∈ W κ
such that uκdα = wκdα and 1 = uκi (α) 6= wκi (α) = 0. The first point follows
now by Lemma 2.17. By Lemma 2.19, it follows that uκ ∈ ϕ1i (α)Wκ , wκ ∈
(¬ϕ1i (α))Wκ , and dp (ϕ1i (α)) = α+ 1.
Note that Lemma 2.17 and the proof of Theorem 2.2 show that the α-th levels
of uκi and u
κ
j determine the κ-expressions of depth α+ 1.
Theorem 2.3 Let |I| ≥ 2 and |S| ≥ 2. Then, there is no weak-universal ∞-type
space on S for player set I and there is no weak-universal ∗-type space on S for
player set I.
Proof Assume there is a weak-universal ∞-type space (a weak-universal ∗-type
space, respectively)
U =
〈
U, (Ti)i∈I ,Σ, θ
U〉
on S for player set I. Then, the underlying set U has a cardinality |U | . There is
a regular cardinal number κ > |U | .
W κ =
〈
W κ, (Ti)i∈{a,b} ,Pow (W
κ) , θ
〉
is a ∗-type space on {h, t} (and therefore a ∞-type space). Since |{h, t}| = 2, we
can assume without loss of generality that {h, t} ⊆ S, and since ΣS = Pow (S) ,
that ΣS ⊇ Pow ({h, t}). Also, since |I| ≥ 2, we can assume without loss of
generality that {a, b} ⊆ I. For i ∈ I \ {a, b} define Ti (wκ) := δwκ , and view θ as
a function from W κ to S. Then
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W κI :=
〈
W κ, (Ti)i∈I ,Pow (W
κ) , θ
〉
is a ∗-type space on S (with player set I). Since every ∗-type space is a ∞-
type space, W κI is also a ∞-type space. According to the assumption, there is a
type morphism f : W κ → U . Since both spaces are in particular κ-type spaces,
this morphism preserves κ-descriptions. If ϕ is a κ -expression in the ‘language’
corresponding to the set of states of nature {h, t} and the player set {a, b} , then
ϕ is also a κ-expression in the ‘language’ corresponding to the set of states of
nature S and the player set I, and it is easy to check that for wκ ∈ W κ we have
wκ ∈ ϕWκI iff wκ ∈ ϕWκ . So, by Lemma 2.19, it is still the case that two different
states of W κI have different κ-descriptions. Hence, since by Proposition 2.1, f
preserves κ-descriptions, f is one-to-one. It follows that |U | ≥ |W κI | ≥ κ, which
is a contradiction to |U | < κ.
Corollary 2.1 Let |I| ≥ 2 and |S| ≥ 2. Then there is no universal ∞-type space
on S for player set I and there is no universal ∗-type space on S for player set I.
2.5 The Universal κ-Type Space as a Space of
Coherent Hierarchies
For the rest of this chapter, fix a nonempty player set I (of arbitrary cardinality),
a nonempty set of states of nature S, and a κ-field ΣS on S such that for all
s, s′ ∈ S with s 6= s′ there is a E ∈ ΣS such that s ∈ E and s′ /∈ E. We assume,
without loss of generality, that 0 /∈ I and define I0 := I ∪ {0} , where “0” stands
for nature. For i ∈ I, we define −i := I0 \ {i} .
Given the above data, we construct the space of coherent hierarchies up to
(but excluding) level κ.We show that the set of all such coherent hierarchies gen-
erates a product κ-type space (Theorem 2.4) and that this space is the universal
κ-type space (Theorem 2.5). It is easy to see that levels of the coherent hier-
archies correspond to depths of κ-expressions. So, Theorem 2.2 (together with
Proposition 2.1) shows that the hierarchies up to some lower level than κ would
not suffice to construct the universal κ-type space.
The remarkable fact of the construction in this chapter is that, unlike the
construction in section 2.3, it does not use other κ-type spaces. Therefore, it
provides an independent characterization of the universal κ-type space as the
space of coherent hierarchies. So, we learn here what the states of the world in
the universal κ-type space ‘are’.
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Definition 2.28 Define
• Cα0 := S, for κ ≥ α ≥ 0,
• Σα0 := ΣS, for κ ≥ α ≥ 0,
• C0i to be a singleton, for i ∈ I,
• Σ0i := {∅, C0i } , for i ∈ I,
• Cα :=∏ i∈I0Cαi , for κ ≥ α ≥ 0,
• Σα to be the product κ-field of the Σαi , i ∈ I0, on Cα, for κ ≥ α ≥ 0,
• Cα−i :=∏ j∈−iCαj , for κ ≥ α ≥ 0 and i ∈ I,
• Σα−i to be the product κ-field of the Σαj , j ∈ −i, on Cα−i, for κ ≥ α ≥ 0
and i ∈ I,
• Cαi :=
{ (tβi )β<α ∈∏β<α∆κ (Cβ) | ∀β < γ < α : margCβ (tγi ) = tβi and
∀0 < γ < α : margCγi (tγi ) = δ((tβi )β<γ)},
for κ ≥ α ≥ 1 and i ∈ I,
• Σαi to be the κ-field on Cαi inherited from the product κ-field of the Σ∆κ(Cβ),
β < α, on
∏
β<α∆
κ
(
Cβ
)
, for κ ≥ α ≥ 1 and i ∈ I,
• pi0γ,α : Cα0 → Cγ0 to be the identity on S, for κ ≥ α ≥ γ ≥ 0,
• pii0,α : Cαi → C0i to be the obvious map, for κ ≥ α ≥ 0 and i ∈ I,
• piiγ,α : Cαi → Cγi to be the canonical projection piiγ,α((tβi )β<α) := (tβi )β<γ, for
κ ≥ α ≥ γ ≥ 1 and i ∈ I,
• piγ,α := (piiγ,α)i∈I0 , for κ ≥ α ≥ γ ≥ 0,
• pi−iγ,α := (pijγ,α)j∈−i, for κ ≥ α ≥ γ ≥ 0 and i ∈ I.
Notation 2.3 Let 0 ≤ γ < α ≤ κ and cαi = (tβi )β<α ∈ Cαi . Then we define
cαi (γ) := t
γ
i ,
cαi d0 := c0i , where C0i = {c0i } ,
cαi dγ := (tβi )β<γ, for γ > 0.
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Lemma 2.20 1. For every i ∈ I0 and for every ordinal α such that
0 ≤ α ≤ κ :
Cαi is nonempty.
2. For every i ∈ I0 and for all ordinals α, β such that 0 ≤ β < α ≤ κ :
piiβ,α : C
α
i → Cβi
is onto and measurable.
Proof For i = 0, 1. and 2. are clear by the definitions.
For i ∈ I and every α ≤ κ, the measurability of pii0,α : Cαi → C0i is clear, since
C0i is a singleton. For i ∈ I and 1 ≤ γ < α ≤ κ, the measurability of piiγ,α follows
from the fact that the inverse images of the generators of the product κ-field of
the Σ∆κ(Cβ), β < γ, on Πβ<γ∆
κ
(
Cβ
)
are among the generators of the product
κ-field of the Σ∆κ(Cβ), β < α, on Πβ<α∆
κ
(
Cβ
)
. Note that by the nonemptyness
of C0i , for i ∈ I, 2. implies 1. Note furthermore that, if 0 ≤ β < γ ≤ κ and if
piiβ,γ : C
γ
i → Cβi , for i ∈ I0, is onto and measurable, then piβ,γ : Cγ → Cβ is onto
and measurable.
It remains to show by transfinite induction on α ≤ κ that piiβ,α : Cαi → Cβi is
onto, for i ∈ I and 0 ≤ β < α ≤ κ :
• α = 0 : Since there is no ordinal β < 0, there is nothing to show.
• α = 1 : Since S and the C0i , for i ∈ I, are nonempty, C0 is nonempty. It
follows that ∆κ (C0) is nonempty: Take for example c0 ∈ C0, and define for
E ∈ Σ0:
δc0(E) :=
{
1 if c0 ∈ E,
0 if c0 6∈ E.
δc0 is the so-called δ-measure at c0 and it is a (even σ-additive) proba-
bility measure on (C0,Σ0). Since C0i , for i ∈ I, is a singleton, we have
margC0i (δc0) = δc0i , for i ∈ I, where {c0i } = C0i . By definition, we have
C1i = ∆
κ (C0) , for i ∈ I. Since C0i , for i ∈ I, is a singleton, it follows that
pii0,1 is onto, for i ∈ I.
• Let i ∈ I and let α < κ be a successor ordinal, i.e. α = γ + 1, for an
ordinal γ > 0. Since for every ζ < γ and for every cζi ∈ Cζi there is, by the
induction assumption, a cγi ∈ Cγi with piiζ,γ (cγi ) = cζi , it is enough to show
that for every cγi ∈ Cγi there is a cαi ∈ Cαi with piiγ,α (cαi ) ∈ cγi .
So, let cγi = (t
β
i )β<γ ∈ Cγi . We have to find a tγi ∈ ∆κ (Cγ) such that
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margCβ (t
γ
i ) = t
β
i , for all β < γ and margCγi (t
γ
i ) = δ(tβi )β<γ. By the induc-
tion assumption, and in the case of j = 0, by the definition, pijβ,ξ : C
ξ
j → Cβj
is onto and measurable, for all j ∈ I0 and all ordinals β, ξ such that
0 ≤ β ≤ ξ ≤ γ. This and the fact that margCβ(tξi ) = tβi , for β < ξ < γ, im-
ply by Lemma 2.3 that cγi induces a well-defined finitely additive probability
measure t<γi on the field
F := {E ⊆ Cγ | ∃β < γ : E = pi−1β,γ (F ) for a F ∈ Σβ} ⊆ Σγ
by t<γi
(
pi−1β,γ (F )
)
:= tβi (F ) . We show now that the outer measure(
t<γi
)∗ ({cγi } × Cγ−i) of {cγi }×Cγ−i is equal to 1. Clearly, it cannot be greater,
since tβi
(
Cβ
)
= 1, for β < γ. Let now β < γ, Eβ ∈ Σβ and pi−1β,γ
(
Eβ
) ⊇
{cγi } × Cγ−i. Then Eβ ⊇
{
piiβ,γ (c
γ
i )
} × Cβ−i and therefore tβi (Eβ) = 1.
This implies that t<γi
(
pi−1β,γ
(
Eβ
))
= 1. By the  Los´-Marczewski Theorem,
we can extend t<γi to a finitely additive probability measure µ0 on the field[F , {cγi } × Cγ−i] on Cγ such that µ0 ({cγi } × Cγ−i) = 1. By Lemma 2.5, we
can extend µ0 to a finitely additive probability measure µ1 on the field[
Σγ , {cγi } × Cγ−i
]
. Define now tγi as the restriction of µ1 to Σ
γ. tγi has the
desired properties.
• Let i ∈ I, let α be a limit ordinal ≤ κ, let γ < α, and let cγi ∈ Cγi . Consider
the set
Y :=
{
aζi ∈
⋃
γ≤ζ≤α
Cζi | piiγ,ζ(aζi ) = cγi} .
Y is nonempty, because it contains cγi . Y is partially ordered by:
aζi v aηi iff η ≥ ζ and piiζ,η (aηi ) = aζi .
Note that aζi v aηi and aηi v aζi imply aζi = aηi . Now, let A be a nonempty
and totally v-ordered subset of Y . Define
α(A) := sup{ζ | ∃aζi ∈ A ∩ Cζi }.
Obviously, we have α(A) ≤ α. For every β < α(A) there is a ζ > β such
that there is a aζi ∈ A ∩ Cζi . Define
unionsqA := (tβi )β<α(A),
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such that tβi = a
ζ
i (β) for a a
ζ
i ∈ A ∩ Cζi with β < ζ. Note that if β < ζ
and β < η, and if aζi ∈ A ∩ Cζi and aηi ∈ A ∩ Cηi , then we have η ≤ ζ
and piiη,ζ(a
ζ
i ) = a
η
i or ζ ≤ η and piiζ,η (aηi ) = aζi . In both cases, we have
aηi (β) = a
ζ
i (β) , and hence unionsqA is well-defined. Note furthermore that, for
0 < β < α (A) and aζi ∈ A ∩ Cζi with β < ζ, we have
margCβi (unionsqA (β)) = margCβi (tβi ) = margCβi (aζi (β)) = δaζi dβ = δunionsqAdβ,
and for ξ < β < α (A) and aζi ∈ A ∩ Cζi with β < ζ, we have
margCξ (unionsqA (β)) = margCξ(tβi ) = margCξ(aζi (β)) = aζi (ξ) = unionsqA (ξ) .
Hence, unionsqA ∈ Cα(A)i , and by construction (since aζi dγ = cγi , for aζi ∈ A):
piiγ,α(A) (unionsqA) = cγi . Therefore, unionsqA ∈ Y and, by construction, unionsqA is an v-
upper bound of the set A in Y.
Therefore we can apply Zorn’s Lemma, hence there is a v-maximal element
a ∈ Y . Assume a ∈ Cζi , for a ζ < α. Since α is a limit number, there is a η
with ζ < η < α. The induction assumption implies that there is a aηi ∈ Cηi ,
such that piiζ,η (a
η
i ) = a. Since a ∈ Y , it follows that piiγ,η (aηi ) = piiγ,ζ (a) = cγi ,
and hence aηi ∈ Y . Therefore a is not maximal, which is a contradiction. It
follows that a ∈ Cαi and piiγ,α (a) = cγi , as desired.
Lemma 2.21
Σκ =
⋃
β<κ
pi−1β,κ
(
Σβ
)
.
Proof By Lemma 1 and Remark 2.5, it follows that pi−1β,κ
(
Σβ
)
is a κ-field on Cκ,
for β < κ. If γ < α < κ, then, by Lemma 1 it follows that Σκ ⊇ pi−1α,κ (Σα) ⊇
pi−1γ,κ (Σγ) and therefore Σκ ⊇ ⋃β<κ pi−1β,κ (Σβ) . By Lemma 2.2, ⋃β<κ pi−1β,κ (Σβ) is
a κ-field on Cκ.
Σκ is the product κ-field of the Σκi , i ∈ I0. By Lemma 1, Remark 2.5, and
Lemma 2.2, it follows that
⋃
β<κ
(
piiβ,κ
)−1 (Σβi ) = Σκi , since every generator of
Σκi is in
(
piiβ,κ
)−1 (Σβi ) for a β < κ, and since the left hand side is already a
κ-field. It follows that the sets of the form Πj∈I0Ej such that Ej = Cκj , for all
but one i ∈ I0, and Ei = (piiβ,κ)−1 (Eβi ) , for a β < κ and Eβi ∈ Σβi , are already
a generating set of Σκ. This implies that
⋃
β<κ pi
−1
β,κ
(
Σβ
) ⊇ Σκ.
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And in the same way, with obvious changes, one proves:
Lemma 2.22 Let i ∈ I. Then,
Σκ−i =
⋃
β<κ
(
pi−iβ,κ
)−1 (Σβ−i) .
Definition 2.29 • Define θκ to be the identity on Cκ0 = S.
• For i ∈ I, define T κi : Cκi → ∆κ (Cκ) by:
T κi ((t
β
i )β<κ) (E) := t
α
i (E
α) ,
for (tβi )β<κ ∈ Cκi and for E = pi−1α,κ (Eα), where Eα ∈ Σα, for a α < κ.
Since for β < γ < κ : margCβ (t
γ
i ) = t
β
i , and since piβ,α is onto, for β < α ≤ κ,
this definition is independent of the particular Eα chosen to define T κi (c
κ
i ) (E) .
Theorem 2.4
Cκ := 〈Cκ,Σκ, (T κi )i∈I , θκ〉
is a product κ-type space on S for player set I.
Proof By the definition, Lemma 1, and Lemma 2.3, T κi (c
κ
i ) is a finitely additive
probability measure on
⋃
β<κ pi
−1
β,κ
(
Σβ
)
= Σκ.
T κi : C
κ
i → ∆κ (Cκ) is measurable: Let cκi = (tβi )β<κ ∈ Cκi , E = pi−1α,κ (Eα) ,
for a α < κ and a Eα ∈ Σα, and let p ∈ [0, 1] . We have T κi (cκi ) (E) ≥ p iff
tαi (E
α) ≥ p. But {tαi ∈ ∆κ (Cα) | tαi (Eα) ≥ p} is measurable in ∆κ (Cα) , so by
the definition of Σκi , the set{
(tβi )β<κ ∈ Cκi | T κi ((tβi )β<κ) (E) ≥ p}
is measurable.
It remains to prove the introspection property. (The measurability of θκ is
clear anyway.) Let cκi , a
κ
i ∈ Cκi , with cκi 6= aκi . Then, by the definitions, there is a
α < κ and a Eα ∈ Σα such that
T κi (c
κ
i )
(
pi−1α,κ (Eα)
) 6= T κi (aκi ) (pi−1α,κ (Eα)) .
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It follows that
[T κi (c
κ
i )] := {aκ ∈ Cκ | T κi (cκi ) = T κi (aκi )} = {cκi } × Cκ−i.
Let A ∈ Σκ with A ⊇ {cκi }×Cκ−i. Since A = pi−1α,κ (Aα) for a α < κ and a Aα ∈ Σα,
it follows that Aα ⊇ {cκi dα} × Cα−i. By the definition of cκi = (tβi )β<κ, we have
margCαi (t
α
i ) = δ(tβi )β<α
= δcκi dα. Therefore t
α
i (A
α) = 1, and by the definition,
T κi (c
κ
i ) (A) = 1 and therefore margCκi (T
κ
i (c
κ
i )) = δcκi .
Definition 2.30 Let
〈M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉
be a κ-type space on S for player set I. By transfinite induction on α ≤ κ, we
define:
1. Define
hα0 :M → Cα0 = S by hα0 := θ,
for 0 ≤ α ≤ κ. Note that θ is measurable.
2. Define
h0i :M → C0i
in the obvious way, for i ∈ I. Note that h0i is uniquely defined and measur-
able, since C0i is a singleton.
3. If hαi :M → Cαi is already defined and measurable, for i ∈ I, then define
hα :M → Cα by hα (m) := (hαj (m))j∈I0 .
hα is measurable, since by 1. hα0 is measurable and each h
α
i , for i ∈ I, is
measurable.
4. If hα :M → Cα is already defined and measurable and if α < κ, then define
gαi (m) (·) := Ti (m)
(
(hα)−1 (·)) , for i ∈ I and m ∈M.
Note that (in the notation of Remark 2.4) gαi = ∆
κ
hα ◦ Ti, for i ∈ I. By
Remark 2.4, it follows that
gαi :M → ∆κ (Cα) , for i ∈ I.
By the measurability of hα and of Ti, for i ∈ I, and by Remark 2.4, we have
that gαi is measurable, for i ∈ I.
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5. Define
h1i :M → C1i = ∆κ
(
C0
)
by h1i := g
0
i , for i ∈ I.
6. Let α = γ+1, where 0 < γ < κ, and let hγi :M → Cγi , for i ∈ I, be already
defined and measurable such that hγi (m) = (g
β
i (m))β<γ, for all m ∈M and
for i ∈ I, where gβi : M → ∆κ
(
Cβ
)
is already defined and measurable, for
i ∈ I and β < γ. By 3. and 4. from above, gγi : M → ∆κ (Cγ) is defined
and measurable, for i ∈ I. Define
hγ+1i (m) := (g
β
i (m))β<γ+1, for m ∈M and i ∈ I.
We have to show that hγ+1i :M → Cγ+1i , for i ∈ I. It suffices to show that
margCγi (g
γ
i (m)) = δ(gβi (m))β<γ
, for m ∈M and i ∈ I,
and for all β < γ :
margCβ (g
γ
i (m)) = g
β
i (m) , for m ∈M and i ∈ I.
Let i ∈ I and Eγ ∈ Σγ such that Eγ ⊇ {(gβi (m))β<γ} × Cγ−i. We have to
show that
gγi (m) (E
γ) = 1.
First observe that for all m,m′ ∈ M and i ∈ I : if Ti (m) = Ti (m′) ,
then, by the definition, gβi (m) = g
β
i (m
′) , for all β < γ. So it follows that
hγi (m) = h
γ
i (m
′) . Obviously, we have hγ (m) ∈ {hγi (m)}×Cγ−i. This implies
that (hγ)−1 (Eγ) ⊇ [Ti (m)] and therefore
Ti (m)
(
(hγ)−1 (Eγ)
)
= 1.
By the definitions of hβi and h
η
i , for i ∈ I, we have
hβi = pi
i
β,η ◦ hηi and hβ0 = θ = idS ◦ θ = pi0β,η ◦ hη0, for β < η ≤ γ and i ∈ I.
Therefore, hβ = piβ,η ◦ hη, for β < η ≤ γ. It follows that(
hβ
)−1 (
Eβ
)
= (hη)−1
(
pi−1β,η
(
Eβ
))
,
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for β < η ≤ γ and Eβ ∈ Σβ.
Let Eβ ∈ Σβ, β < γ, m ∈M and i ∈ I. It follows now:
gγi (m)
(
pi−1β,γ
(
Eβ
))
= Ti (m)
(
(hγ)−1
(
pi−1β,γ
(
Eβ
)))
= Ti (m)
((
hβ
)−1 (Eβ))
= gβi (m)
(
Eβ
)
.
We note that hαi , for i ∈ I, is measurable, since every gβi , for i ∈ I and
β < α, is measurable.
7. Let α be a limit ordinal ≤ κ and let, for every i ∈ I and every γ < α,
hγi : M → Cγi be already defined and measurable such that hγi (m) =
(gβi (m))β<γ , for all m ∈ M, where gβi : M → ∆κ
(
Cβ
)
is already defined
and measurable, for β < γ.
Since α is a limit ordinal, it follows for every β < α that β + 1 < α.
Therefore gβi :M → ∆κ
(
Cβ
)
is already defined and measurable, for β < α
and i ∈ I. It follows that
hαi (m) := (g
β
i (m))β<α
is well-defined and measurable, for m ∈M and i ∈ I. For i ∈ I, we have to
show that hαi :M → Cαi and that hαi is measurable:
Let β < γ < α. Since α is a limit ordinal, we have γ + 1 < α. By the
induction assumption, we have that hγ+1i : M → Cγ+1i , and it follows that
gξi is measurable, for 0 ≤ ξ ≤ γ and that
margCγi (g
γ
i (m)) = δ(gξi (m))ξ<γ
and margCβ (g
γ
i (m)) = g
β
i (m) ,
for all m ∈M. This shows that
hαi :M → Cαi , for i ∈ I.
Finally, we note that hαi , for i ∈ I, is measurable, since every gβi , for i ∈ I
and β < α, is measurable.
Proposition 2.4 Let 〈M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉 be a κ-type space on S for player set I.
Then, the κ-hierarchy description map
hκ :M → Cκ
is a type morphism.
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Proof We showed already in the above definition that hκ is measurable.
We have
θκ (hκ (m)) = hκ0 (m) = θ (m) , for m ∈M.
Let i ∈ I and E ∈ Σκ. Then there is an ordinal α < κ and Eα ∈ Σα such that
E = pi−1α,κ (Eα) . It follows by the definitions that for m ∈M :
T κi (h
κ (m)) (E) = T κi ((g
β
i (m))β<κ) (E)
= gαi (m) (E
α)
= Ti (m)
(
(hα)−1 (Eα)
)
= Ti (m)
(
(hκ)−1
(
pi−1α,κ (Eα)
))
= Ti (m)
(
(hκ)−1 (E)
)
.
The next Lemma shows that type morphisms between κ-type spaces preserve
the κ-hierarchy descriptions.
Lemma 2.23 Let 〈M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉 and 〈M̂, Σ̂, (T̂i)i∈I , θ̂〉 be κ-type spaces on S
for player set I, let hκ :M → Cκ and ĥκ : M̂ → Cκ be the κ-hierarchy description
maps, and let f :M → M̂ be a type morphism.
Then, for all m ∈M :
hκ (m) = ĥκ (f (m)) .
Proof Since C0i is a singleton, for i ∈ I, we have that h0i (m) = ĥ0i (f (m)) , for
i ∈ I and m ∈M.
For 0 ≤ α ≤ κ and m ∈M we have
hα0 (m) = θ (m) = θ̂ (f (m)) = ĥ
α
0 (f (m)) .
Let α = β + 1 < κ and hβ (m) = ĥβ (f (m)) , for m ∈ M . For i ∈ I and
m ∈M, it follows that
gβi (m) = Ti (m) ◦
(
hβ
)−1
= Ti (m) ◦ (f−1 ◦ (ĥβ)−1)
= T̂i (f (m)) ◦ (ĥβ)−1
= ĝβi (f (m)) .
76 CHAPTER 2. FINITELY ADDITIVE BELIEFS
This implies that hβ+1i (m) = ĥ
β+1
i (f (m)) , for i ∈ I and m ∈M.
Let i ∈ I, let α be a limit ordinal ≤ κ, and let hβi (m) = ĥβi (f (m)) , for all
β < α and m ∈ M. To show that hαi (m) = ĥαi (f (m)) , for i ∈ I and m ∈ M, it
suffices to verify that gβi (m) = ĝ
β
i (f (m)) , for all β < α. But this follows from
the fact that β < α implies that β + 1 < α and from
(gζi (m))ζ≤β = h
β+1
i (m) = ĥ
β+1
i (f (m)) = (ĝ
ζ
i (f (m)))ζ≤β.
Proposition 2.5 The κ-hierarchy description map
hκ : Cκ → Cκ
is the identity.
Proof Let cκ ∈ Cκ, let 0 ≤ α ≤ κ and, for i ∈ I0, let pii be the projection
pii : Cκ → Cκi .
Then
•
hα0 (c
κ) = θκ (cκ) = cκ0 = pi0 (c
κ) = pi0α,κ (pi0 (c
κ)) .
• We have h0i (cκ) = c0i , for i ∈ I, where {c0i } = C0i , and therefore h0i (cκ) =
pii0,κ (pii (c
κ)) .
• Let α = β + 1 < κ and let hβi = piiβ,κ ◦ pii, for i ∈ I. Let furthermore
cκi = (t
ζ
i )ζ<κ, for i ∈ I, and let Eβ ∈ Σβ. For i ∈ I, we have
gβi (c
κ)
(
Eβ
)
= T κi (c
κ)
((
hβ
)−1 (Eβ))
= T κi (c
κ)
(((
piiβ,κ ◦ pii
)
i∈I0
)−1 (
Eβ
))
= T κi (c
κ)
(
(piβ,κ)
−1 (Eβ))
= tβi
(
Eβ
)
.
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It follows that gβi (c
κ) = tβi and therefore h
α
i (c
κ) = piiα,κ (pii (c
κ)) . (Note
that by the induction assumption, hβi (c
κ) = piiβ,κ (pii (c
κ)) = (tζi )ζ<β, for all
i ∈ I.)
• Let now α be a limit ordinal ≤ κ and let for all β < α, for all i ∈ I, and all
cκi = (t
ζ
i )ζ<κ :
hβi (c
κ) = (gζi (c
κ) )ζ<β = (t
ζ
i )ζ<β.
Then
hαi (c
κ) = (gβi (c
κ) )β<α = (t
β
i )β<α = pi
i
α,κ ◦ pii (cκ) .
(Note that β < α implies β + 1 < α.)
Altogether, it follows that hκi (c
κ) = pii (cκ) , for i ∈ I0, and therefore hκ = idCκ .
Theorem 2.5 Cκ is a universal κ-type space on S for player set I.
Proof Let M =
〈
M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ
〉
be a κ-type space on S. By Proposition 2.4,
there is a type morphism from M to Cκ. By Proposition 2.5 and Lemma 2.23,
this type morphism is unique.
2.6 Beliefs Completeness
In this section, we show that the universal κ-type space is beliefs complete. In the
case κ = ℵ0, we can say much more: The component space of each player is - up
to isomorphism of measurable spaces - the space of finitely additive probability
measures on the product of the space of states of nature and the other players’
component spaces.
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Theorem 2.6 Let 〈Cκ,Σκ, (T κi )i∈I , θκ〉 be the universal κ-type space on S for
player set I constructed in the previous section.
Then, for every i ∈ I :
•
T κi : C
κ
i → ∆κ (Cκ)
is one-to-one and measurable.
•
margCκ−i ◦ T κi : Cκi → ∆κ
(
Cκ−i
)
is onto and measurable.
•
margCℵ0−i
◦ T ℵ0i : Cℵ0i → ∆ℵ0
(
Cℵ0−i
)
is an isomorphism of measurable spaces.5
Proof The first point was already proved in the proof of Theorem 2.4.
Fix i ∈ I. According to the first point of this theorem, T κi : Cκi → ∆κ (Cκ)
is measurable. Since all the inverse images (under the projection) of the gener-
ators of Σκ−i are among the generators of Σκ, the projection from Cκ to Cκ−i is
measurable. Remark 2.4 implies now that
margCκ−i : ∆
κ (Cκ)→ ∆κ (Cκ−i)
is measurable, and hence
margCκ−i ◦ T κi : Cκi → ∆κ
(
Cκ−i
)
is measurable.
5Although, for κ > ℵ0, it is no longer true (contrary to the case κ = ℵ0) that the values
of a finitely additive probability measure on the measurable rectangles in a product of two κ
-measurable spaces determine this finitely additive probability measure, we believe that this is
true in the special case where the marginal on one of the factors is a delta-measure. Therefore
we tend to conjecture that the third point of Theorem 2.6 holds also for κ > ℵ0, but it seems
to be considerably harder to prove.
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Let µ ∈ ∆κ (Cκ−i) . Now, we construct a product κ-type space on S for player
set I
U :=
〈
(Uj)j∈I0 ,
(
ΣUj
)
j∈I0 ,
(
TUj
)
j∈I0 , θ
U
〉
such that there is a point u ∈ Ui with margCκ−i ◦ T κi (hκi (u)) = µ.
Without loss of generality, let u /∈ Cκi and define
Ui := Cκi ∪ {u} ,
Uj := Cκj , for j ∈ I0\ {i} ,
ΣUi := Σ
κ
i ∪ {E ∪ {u} | E ∈ Σκi } ,
ΣUj := Σ
κ
j , for j ∈ I0\ {i} ,
U := Πj∈I0Uj,
ΣU := the product κ-field of the ΣUj , j ∈ I0,
U−i := Πj∈I0\{i}Uj,
ΣU−i := the product κ-field of the ΣUj , j ∈ I0\ {i} .
It is obvious that ΣUi is a κ-field on Ui. Note that Σ
κ ⊆ ΣU .
Let E = Πj∈I0Ej such that Ej = Uj for all but one j ∈ I0. The sets of this form
generate ΣU . If E is of this form, we have E ∩Cκ ∈ Σκ. Since (⋂F∈Ψ F) ∩Cκ =⋂
F∈Ψ (F ∩ Cκ) , for Ψ ⊆ ΣU , and since (U\F )∩Cκ = Cκ\ (F ∩ Cκ) , for F ⊆ U,
it follows by the proof of Lemma 2.1 that F ∩ Cκ ∈ Σκ, for F ∈ ΣU .
Now define for j ∈ I, cκj ∈ Cκj and E ∈ ΣU :
TUj (c
κ
j ) (E) := T
κ
j (c
κ
j ) (E ∩ Cκ) .
It is obvious that TUj
(
cκj
)
is a finitely additive probability measure on
(
U,ΣU
)
,
for j ∈ I and cκj ∈ Cκj . Clearly, TUj : Uj → ∆κ (U) is ΣUj -Σ∆κ(U) measurable, for
j ∈ I\ {i} .
Let j ∈ I, cκj ∈ Cκj , E ∈ ΣU , and E ⊇
{
cκj
} × U−j. We have to show that
TUj (c
κ
j ) (E) = 1. We have
{
cκj
} × U−j ⊇ {cκj} × Cκ−j, so, Cκ ∩ E ⊇ {cκj} × Cκ−j
and it follows that
TUj (c
κ
j ) (E) = T
κ
j (c
κ
j ) (C
κ ∩ E) = 1.
ΣUi and Σ
U−i are fields on Ui and U−i := Πj∈I0\{i}Uj = Cκ−i. The finite disjoint
unions of sets of the form Ei × E−i, where Ei ∈ ΣUi and E−i ∈ ΣU−i, form a fieldF on U that is contained in ΣU . Note that for every finitely additive probability
measure ν on
(
U,ΣU
)
, the values of ν on F determine already the marginal of ν on(
Ui,ΣUi
)
and on
(
U−i,ΣU−i
)
. Now, define for disjoint E1i ×E1−i, . . . , Eni ×En−i ∈ F :
µ̂(
n⋃
l=1
Eli × El−i) := δu
(
E1i
) · µ (E1−i)+ δu (E2i ) · µ (E2−i)+ . . .+ δu (Eni ) · µ (En−i) .
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Obviously µ̂ is well-defined (because of the additivity of δu and µ) and it is a
finitely additive probability measure on F . Next, by the  Los´-Marczewski Theo-
rem, extend µ̂ to a finitely additive probability measure µ˜ on ΣU . By the def-
initions, it is clear that margUi (µ˜) = δu and that margCκ−i (µ˜) = µ. Note also
that
µ˜
({u} × Cκ−i) = 1 6= TUi (cκi ) ({u} × Cκ−i) = 0, for cκi ∈ Cκi .
(By definition, we have {u} × Cκ−i ∈ ΣU .) Define now
TUi (u) := µ˜.
It follows that TUi (u) ({u} × U−i) = 1.
Finally, define
θU (cκ0) := c
κ
0 .
To check that U is a κ-type space, it remains to show that
TUi : Ui → ∆κ (U)
is measurable. We have for p ∈ [0, 1] and E ∈ ΣU :(
TUi
)−1 ({ν ∈ ∆κ (U) | ν (E) ≥ p}) ={
(T κi )
−1 ({ν ∈ ∆κ (Cκ) | ν (E ∩ Cκ) ≥ p}) ∈ Σκi ⊆ ΣUi , if µ˜ (E) < p,
(T κi )
−1 ({ν ∈ ∆κ (Cκ) | ν (E ∩ Cκ) ≥ p}) ∪ {u} ∈ ΣUi , if µ˜ (E) ≥ p.
Since U is a product κ-type space on S for player set I, gβj is defined on Uj
and is ΣUj -Σ∆κ(Cβ)-measurable, for j ∈ I0 and 0 ≤ β < κ, and hαj is defined on
Uj and is ΣUj -Σ
α
j -measurable, for j ∈ I0 and 0 ≤ α ≤ κ.
Since U0 = S and θU = idS, we have hα0 = θ
U = pi0α,κ, for 0 ≤ α ≤ κ.
For j ∈ I, h0j is uniquely defined, since the C0j are singletons. It follows that
h0j = pi
j
0,κ, for j ∈ I \ {i} and h0i dCκi = pii0,κ.
Let j ∈ I, α = β + 1 < κ, and hβl dCκl = pilβ,κ, for all l ∈ I0, and furthermore,
let cκj = (t
ζ
j)ζ<κ ∈ Cκj and Eβ ∈ Σβ. Then
gβj (c
κ
j )
(
Eβ
)
= TUj (c
κ
j )
((
hβ
)−1 (Eβ))
= T κj (c
κ
j )
(
Cκ ∩ (hβ)−1 (Eβ))
= T κj (c
κ
j )
(
(piβ,κ)
−1 (Eβ))
= tβj
(
Eβ
)
.
It follows that gβj (c
κ
j ) = t
β
j and therefore h
α
j dCκj = pijα,κ.
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Let j ∈ I, let α = λ ≤ κ be a limit ordinal and for all β < α : let hβj dCκj =
pijβ,κ, and let c
κ
j = (t
ζ
j)ζ<κ. By the definition and the induction assumption (note
that β < α implies β + 1 < α),
hαj (c
κ
j ) = (g
β
j (c
κ
j ))β<α = (t
β
j )β<α = pi
j
α,κ(c
κ
j ).
Altogether, we showed now that hκj dCκj = idCκj , for j ∈ I0.
Let now E−i ∈ Σκ−i. By the definition and Proposition 2.4,
T κi (h
κ
i (u)) (C
κ
i × E−i) = TUi (u)
(
(hκ)−1 (Cκi × E−i)
)
= TUi (u) (Ui × E−i)
= δu (Ui) · µ (E−i)
= µ (E−i)
and the second part of the theorem is proved.
For the third point, it remains to prove that
1.
margCℵ0−i
◦ T ℵ0i : Cℵ0i → ∆ℵ0
(
Cℵ0−i
)
is one-to-one, and
2. for every Ei ∈ Σℵ0i :
margCℵ0−i
◦ T ℵ0i (Ei) ∈ Σ∆ℵ0 (Cℵ0−i ).
To 1 : Let (tni )n<ℵ0 , (r
n
i )n<ℵ0 ∈ Cℵ0i and
margCℵ0−i
(
T ℵ0i
(
(tni )n<ℵ0
))
= margCℵ0−i
(
T ℵ0i
(
(rni )n<ℵ0
))
.
We show by induction on n < ℵ0 that tni = rni :
Step n = 0: Let E0 ∈ Σ0. Since C0i is a singleton, there is a E0−i ∈ Σ0−i such
that E0 = C0i ×E0−i. We have pi−10,ℵ0 (E0) = Cℵ0i × (
(
pi−i0,ℵ0
)−1 (E0−i)). Since pij0,ℵ0 is
measurable, for j ∈ I0, we have, by definition,
t0i (E
0) = T ℵ0i
(
(tni )n<ℵ0
) (
Cℵ0i ×
((
pi−i0,ℵ0
)−1 (E0−i)))
= T ℵ0i
(
(rni )n<ℵ0
) (
Cℵ0i ×
((
pi−i0,ℵ0
)−1 (E0−i)))
= r0i (E
0) .
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Step n→ n+ 1: Since Σn+1 is the product field of Σn+1i and Σn+1−i and since finite
direct sums of measurable rectangles form already the product field of Σn+1i and
Σn+1−i , it is enough to show that tn+1i (F n+1) = rn+1i (F n+1) , for sets of the form
F n+1 = En+1i × En+1−i , where En+1i ∈ Σn+1i and En+1−i ∈ Σn+1−i . Since
(
tki
)
0≤k≤n =(
rki
)
0≤k≤n , we have margCn+1i
((
tn+1i
))
= margCn+1i
((
rn+1i
))
= δ(tki )0≤k≤n, and
since
tn+1i
(
Cn+1i × En+1−i
)
= T ℵ0i
(
(tni )n<ℵ0
) (
Cℵ0i ×
((
pi−in+1,ℵ0
)−1 (En+1−i )))
= T ℵ0i
(
(rni )n<ℵ0
) (
Cℵ0i ×
((
pi−in+1,ℵ0
)−1 (En+1−i )))
= rn+1i
(
Cn+1i × En+1−i
)
,
we have
tn+1i
(
En+1i × En+1−i
)
= δ(tki )0≤k≤n (En+1i ) · (margCℵ0−i (T ℵ0i ((tni )n<ℵ0)))((pi−in+1,ℵ0)−1 (En+1−i ))
= δ(rki )0≤k≤n (En+1i ) · (margCℵ0−i (T ℵ0i ((rni )n<ℵ0)))((pi−in+1,ℵ0)−1 (En+1−i ))
= rn+1i
(
En+1i × En+1−i
)
.
It follows that tn+1i = r
n+1
i .
To 2 : Since Σℵ0i is the field on C
ℵ0
i inherited from the product field of the Σ∆ℵ0 (Cn),
n < ℵ0, and since
margCℵ0−i
◦ T ℵ0i : Cℵ0i → ∆ℵ0
(
Cℵ0−i
)
is one-to-one and onto, it remains to show - by an induction on m < ℵ0 - that
(∗) margCℵ0−i ◦ T
ℵ0
i
({
(tni )n<ℵ0 ∈ Cℵ0i | tmi ∈ Am
})
∈ Σ
∆ℵ0

Cℵ0−i
,
for Am ∈ Σ∆ℵ0 (Cm) :
Again, since margCℵ0−i
◦ T ℵ0i is one-to-one and onto and since the sets{
µ ∈ ∆ℵ0 (Cm) | µ (Em) ≥ p} , where Em ∈ Σm and p ∈ [0, 1] , generate Σ∆ℵ0 (Cm),
to show (∗), it is enough to verify that
margCℵ0−i
◦ T ℵ0i
({
(tni )n<ℵ0 ∈ Cℵ0i | tmi (Em) ≥ p
})
∈ Σ
∆ℵ0

Cℵ0−i
,
for all Em ∈ Σm and p ∈ [0, 1].
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Step m = 0: Let E0 ∈ Σ0 and p ∈ [0, 1]. Since C0i is a singleton, there is a
E0−i ∈ Σ0−i such that E0 = C0i × E0−i. We have
pi−10,ℵ0
(
E0
)
= Cℵ0i × (
(
pi−i0,ℵ0
)−1 (E0−i) )
and by definition, for (tni )n<ℵ0 ∈ Cℵ0i ,
t0i (E
0) = T ℵ0i
(
(tni )n<ℵ0
) (
pi−10,ℵ0 (E
0)
)
=
(
margCℵ0−i
◦ T ℵ0i
(
(tni )n<ℵ0
))((
pi−i0,ℵ0
)−1 (E0−i)) .
Hence
margCℵ0−i
◦ T ℵ0i
({
(tni )n<ℵ0 ∈ Cℵ0i | t0i (E0) ≥ p
})
={
µ ∈ ∆ℵ0 (Cℵ0−i) | µ((pi−i0,ℵ0)−1 (E0−i)) ≥ p} ∈ Σ∆ℵ0Cℵ0−i.
(Note that margCℵ0−i
◦ T ℵ0i was onto.)
Step m→ m+ 1: Let Em+1 ∈ Σm+1 and p ∈ [0, 1]. Σm+1 is the product field
of Σm+1i and Σ
m+1−i . Em+1 can be written as a finite direct sum of measurable
rectangles. Furthermore, Em+1 can be written as
Em+1 = F 1i × F 1−i + . . .+ F ki × F k−i,
for some k ≥ 1 and F l−i ∈ Σm+1−i , for l = 1, . . . , k, and F li ∈ Σm+1i , for l = 1, . . . , k,
such that the F li are disjoint.
According to the induction assumption, we have
margCℵ0−i
◦ T ℵ0i
({
(tni )n<ℵ0 ∈ Cℵ0i | tqi ∈ Aq
})
∈ Σ
∆ℵ0

Cℵ0−i
,
for q = 0, . . . ,m and Aq ∈ Σ∆ℵ0(Cq). Recall that Σm+1i is the field on Cm+1i inher-
ited from the product field of the Σ∆ℵ0 (Cq), q = 0, . . . ,m, on Πq≤m∆ℵ0 (Cq) . In
particular, the projection from Cm+1i to ∆
ℵ0 (Cq) is measurable, for q = 0, . . . ,m.
Since piim+1,ℵ0 is onto and measurable, and since margCℵ0−i ◦ T
ℵ0
i is one-to-one and
onto, it follows that
margCℵ0−i
◦ T ℵ0i
({
(tni )n<ℵ0 ∈ Cℵ0i | (tqi )q≤m ∈ F li
})
∈ Σ
∆ℵ0

Cℵ0−i

and that
margCℵ0−i
◦ T ℵ0i
({
(tni )n<ℵ0 ∈ Cℵ0i | (tqi )q≤m ∈ F l0i
})
∩ margCℵ0−i ◦ T
ℵ0
i
({
(tni )n<ℵ0 ∈ Cℵ0i | (tqi )q≤m ∈ F l1i
})
= ∅,
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for 0 ≤ l0 6= l1 ≤ k. As argued in 1, we have
tm+1i
(
F li × F l−i
)
= δ(tqi )q≤m (F li ) · (margCℵ0−i ◦ T ℵ0i ((tni )n<ℵ0))((pi−im+1,ℵ0)−1 (F l−i)) .
Since all the F li are disjoint, we have t
m+1
i (E
m+1) ≥ p iff there is a l such that
(tqi )q≤m ∈ F li and
(
margCℵ0−i
◦ T ℵ0i
(
(tni )n<ℵ0
))((
pi−im+1,ℵ0
)−1 (F l−i)) ≥ p. Hence
margCℵ0−i
◦ T ℵ0i
({
(tni )n<ℵ0 ∈ Cℵ0i | tm+1i (Em+1) ≥ p
})
=
⋃k
l=1 (
(
margCℵ0−i
◦ T ℵ0i
({
(tni )n<ℵ0 ∈ Cℵ0i | (tqi )q≤m ∈ F li
}))
∩
{
µ ∈ ∆ℵ0 (Cℵ0−i) | µ((pi−im+1,ℵ0)−1 (F l−i)) ≥ p}) ∈ Σ∆ℵ0Cℵ0−i.
Chapter 3
An Infinitary Probability Logic
for Type Spaces
3.1 Introduction
It is well-known that Kripke structures (and in particular Knowledge spaces in-
troduced by Aumann (1976)) can be axiomatized in terms of modal logic (See for
example Kripke (1963), Aumann (1995), Fagin et al. (1995), Heifetz (1997), and
Aumann (1999a)). In this chapter we aim to do the same for type spaces in the
sense of Harsanyi (1967/68), which can be considered as the probabilistic analog
of Kripke structures. Type spaces are the predominant structures to describe
incomplete information in an interactive context in game theory. (See Aumann
and Heifetz (2001) for a nice and well-accessible introduction to the subject.)
We define an infinitary modal language with operators pαi , “individual i assigns
probability at least α” for rational α ∈ [0, 1] , and then a system of infinitary
axioms and inference rules, which we prove to be strongly sound and strongly
complete with respect to the class of (Harsanyi) type spaces (Theorem 3.1). To
the best of our knowledge, this is the very first strong completeness theorem for a
probability logic of the present kind. Strongly complete means that, if a formula
ϕ holds whenever a (possibly infinite) set of formulas Γ holds, then there is a
proof of ϕ from Γ.
Heifetz and Mongin (2001) - and before Fagin, Halpern and Megiddo (1990)
for a much richer syntax also expressing valuations for linear combinations of
formulas - axiomatized the class of type spaces in terms of a purely finitary logic.
They showed that their axiomatization is sound and complete with respect to the
class of (Harsanyi) type spaces.
However, a purely finitary axiomatization cannot be used to get strong sound-
ness and strong completeness for this class of models. This was noted by Heifetz
and Mongin (2001) and Aumann (1999b). They argue that for the set of formulas{
p
1
2− 1n
i (ϕ) : n ≥ 2, n ∈ N
}
∪
{
¬p 12i (ϕ)
}
, each finite subset has a model (a type
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space and a state in it, such that each formula in this finite subset is true in that
state), while the whole set itself has no model. This implies that, although we
prove a strong completeness theorem, our logic is not compact.
We construct (Proposition 3.3) a canonical model whose points consist of the
maximal consistent sets of formulas. This construction requires strong soundness
and strong completeness. In a very natural way, the maximal consistent sets of
formulas determine already the structure of this space. The spirit of this construc-
tion follows the constructions of the canonical models for the infinitary versions
of the S5-epistemic logics, proposed by Heifetz (1997) (see Aumann (1999a) for
the finitary version). Such constructions show that there is a space which con-
tains “all states of the world” in the syntactic sense. A state of the world in
the syntactic sense is a maximal consistent set of formulas of the language. The
existence of a canonical model guarantees that, without loss of generality, a game
of incomplete information can be modeled by a type space.
Type spaces cannot be axiomatized by an infinitary logic in the sense of
Heifetz (1997): An example by Karp (1964) in a purely propositional setting
shows already that, in the presence of ℵγ many formulas (where ℵγ denotes the
γth infinite cardinal number) whose truth values can be chosen independently
of one another, if one allows for infinite conjunctions of ℵγ many formulas, then
one must also allow for conjunctions of 2ℵγ many formulas and proofs of length
of cardinality ≤ 2ℵγ to get strong completeness. This collides with measurability
conditions that must be met: When we want to define the validity relation “|=”
for a type space τ and some point (i.e. state) ω in τ , then, for a formula ϕ
in our language, (τ , ω) |= pαi (ϕ) can be defined, if [ϕ]τ , the set of points in τ
where ϕ is true, is a measurable set. Since conjunctions of formulas correspond
to intersections of subsets of the structure, uncountable conjunctions cannot be
guaranteed to interpret measurable sets unless we do assume that the σ-fields of
the type spaces are closed under uncountable intersections (i.e. they would be
κ-fields for some κ > ℵ1), which, of course, would strongly restrict the class of
type spaces we could consider.
We resolve this problem by defining a language which takes the advantages
and avoids the disadvantages of both the finitary and the infinitary languages.
We start with a finitary language L0 a` la Aumann (1995) and Heifetz and Mongin
(2001) with operators pαi , “individual i assigns probability at least α”. Then, we
define an infinitary propositional language L, the primitive propositions of which
are the formulas in L0. So, L0 is a sublanguage of L.
For the class of type spaces - contrary to the class of knowledge spaces, as was
shown by Heifetz and Samet (1998a) - there is also a unique (up to isomorphism)
special type space, defined in purely semantic terms, namely the universal type
space, a space to which every type space can be mapped by a unique structure
preserving map, a so called “type morphism”. The existence of such a space
was first proved - under certain topological assumptions - by Mertens and Zamir
(1985), followed by many others. Recently Heifetz and Samet (1998b) proved the
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general measure-theoretic case. In their proof, they - as well as Aumann (1999b)
for the proof of the existence of a canonical knowledge-belief system - used a
language similar to ours, with one important difference: They did not have a
purely syntactic definition of what the maximal consistent sets of formulas are.
Instead, such sets were obtained semantically by collecting the sets of formulas
that hold true in some state in some type space, thus constructing the universal
space (resp. the canonical knowledge-belief system).
It is not too surprising then that the canonical model and the universal space
are one and the same. This is stated in our Theorem 3.2. Hence, we provide here
a (up to now missing) characterization of the universal type space (as the space
of maximal consistent sets of formulas).
In the literature, “type spaces” usually are what we call here “product type
spaces”. Other authors who considered the more general version are Heifetz and
Mongin (2001), who called it also “type spaces” and Mertens and Zamir (1985),
who called these spaces “beliefs spaces”. As it turned out in their topological
setting, the universal type space of Mertens and Zamir is a product type space.
In Theorem 3.3 we prove that this is still true in our topology-free setting,
namely our canonical model is a product type space.
Furthermore, everywhere in the literature except in (Heifetz and Mongin
(2001)), only type spaces are considered where the players know their own be-
liefs (we call these spaces, in this chapter only, like Heifetz and Mongin (2001),
“Harsanyi type spaces”).
We construct our canonical model with and without this property and estab-
lish the first proof of the existence of a universal type space for the class of type
spaces without introspection.
In the topological cases of Mertens and Zamir (1985), Brandenburger and
Dekel (1993), Heifetz (1993) and Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994) it was shown
that the universal type space is beliefs complete. However, the general measure-
theoretic case was left open up to now.
We show here in Theorem 3.4 that this is also still true in the general mea-
sure-theoretic setting, in the introspective as well as in the non-introspective
case. Moreover the component space of each player is - as a measurable space
- isomorphic to the space of probability measures on the whole space in the
nonintrospective case, and in the introspective case, the component space of each
player is isomorphic to the space of probability measures on the product of the
space of states of nature and the other players’ component spaces.
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3.2 Preliminaries
For this chapter, we fix a nonempty set X of primitive propositions (to be in-
terpreted as statements about nature, i.e. the primary source of uncertainty for
the players)1 and a nonempty set I of players, and we assume without loss of
generality that 0 /∈ I and define I0 := I ∪ {0}. For a set M, denote by |M | the
cardinality of M .
In this chapter, α and β denote rational numbers ∈ [0, 1] , ϕ, χ, ψ formulas, and
ω formulas that are conjunctions of maximal consistent sets of finitary formulas.
Definition 3.1 We define
ℵγ := max {|I| , |X| ,ℵ0} .
Definition 3.2 The set L0 of finitary formulas is the least set such that:
1. each x ∈ X ∪{>} is a finitary formula,
2. if ϕ is a finitary formula, then (¬ϕ) is a finitary formula,
3. if ϕ and ψ are finitary formulas, then (ϕ ∧ ψ) is a finitary formula,
4. if ϕ is a finitary formula, then for every i ∈ I and rational α ∈ [0, 1] :
(pαi (ϕ)) is a finitary formula.
Remark 3.1
|L0| = max{|I| , |X| ,ℵ0} = ℵγ.
Definition 3.3 The set L of formulas is the least set such that:
1. each ϕ ∈ L0 is a formula,
2. if ϕ is a formula, then (¬ϕ) is a formula,
3. if Φ is a set of formulas of cardinality ≤ 2ℵγ , then (∧ϕ∈Φ ϕ) is a formula.2
1If we define things in this way, the S of the other chapters corresponds to Pow (X) and ΣS
to the σ-field on Pow (X) generated by the sets {s ⊆ X | x ∈ s} , where x ∈ X.
2By convention, we set:
∧
ϕ∈∅ ϕ := >, and accordingly:
∨
ϕ∈∅ ϕ := ¬>. Futhermore, if we
write “ϕ ∧ ψ”, where ϕ or ψ ∈ L \L0, we mean implicitly the formula ∧χ∈{ϕ,ψ} χ.
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Convention 3.1 • As usual, “↔”, “→”, “∨” and “∨” are abbreviations,
defined in the usual way:
(
∨
ϕ∈Φ ϕ) := (¬(
∧
ϕ∈Φ (¬ϕ))),
(ϕ→ ψ) := ((¬ϕ) ∨ ψ) ,
(ϕ↔ ψ) := ((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ)) .
• To avoid the use of too many brackets, we apply the usual convention of
decreasing priority: ¬, ∧, ∧, ∨, ∨, →, ↔ . This means, for example, that
“¬ϕ ∧ ψ” is an abbreviation for “((¬ϕ) ∧ ψ)”.
Definition 3.4 The set L0 of 0-formulas is the set of (infinitary) propositional
formulas in L. More formally, it is the least set of formulas (and obviously: subset
of L) such that:
1. each x ∈ X ∪ {>} is a 0-formula,
2. if ϕ is a 0-formula, then ¬ϕ is a 0-formula,
3. if Φ is a set of 0-formulas of cardinality ≤ 2ℵγ , then ∧ϕ∈Φ ϕ is a 0-formula.
Definition 3.5 Let i ∈ I. The set Li of i-formulas is the least set of formulas
(and obviously: subset of L) such that:
1. if ϕ ∈ L0, then for every rational α ∈ [0, 1] : pαi (ϕ) is an i-formula,
2. if ϕ is an i-formula, then ¬ϕ is an i-formula,
3. if Φ is a set of i-formulas of cardinality ≤ 2ℵγ , then ∧ϕ∈Φ ϕ is an i-formula.
Definition 3.6 For i ∈ I0 define
Li0 := L0 ∩ Li.
Definition 3.7 LetM be a nonempty set and let Σ be a σ-field onM . We denote
by ∆(M,Σ) - or short: ∆(M) - the set of all σ-additive probability measures on
(M,Σ). Unless stated differently, we consider ∆(M,Σ) as a measurable space
with the σ-field Σ∆ generated by all the sets of the form bα(E) := {µ ∈ ∆(M,Σ) |
µ(E) ≥ α}, where E ∈ Σ and α ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q.
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Note that if r ∈ [0, 1] and E ∈ Σ, then br (E) = ⋂α∈[0,r]∩Q bα (E) ∈ Σ∆.
Therefore Σ∆ is also generated by all the sets br (E) , where E ∈ Σ and r ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 3.8 A type space on X for player set I is a 4-tupel
M := 〈M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I, v〉,
where
• M is a nonempty set,
• Σ is a σ-field on M ,
• for i ∈ I : Ti is a Σ − Σ∆-measurable function from M to ∆ (M,Σ) , the
space of probability measures on (M,Σ) ,
• v is a function from M × (X ∪ {>}) to {0, 1}, such that v (·, x) is Σ −
Pow ({0, 1})-measurable, for every x ∈ X, and such that v (m,>) = 1, for
all m ∈M.
Definition 3.9 For a type space 〈M, Σ, (Ti)i∈I, v〉 on X for player set I define
[Ti (m)] := {m′ ∈M | Ti (m′) = Ti (m)} ,
for m ∈M and i ∈ I.
〈M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I, v〉
is called a Harsanyi type space on X for player set I iff for all A ∈ Σ, m ∈ M
and i ∈ I : A ⊇ [Ti (m)] implies Ti (m) (A) = 1.3
The following lemma, which will be needed in the proof of the Completeness
Theorem, is a slightly changed version of Lemma 2.1. of Heifetz and Samet
(1999):
Lemma 3.1 Let M be a nonempty set, let F be a field on M that generates the
σ-field Σ on M and let F∆ be the σ-field on ∆(M,Σ) generated by the sets of the
form
bp(E) := {µ ∈ ∆(M,Σ) | µ (E) ≥ p} ,
where E ∈ F and p ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q. Then
F∆ = Σ∆.
3Note that if [Ti (m)] is measurable, then this condition reduces to: Ti (m) ([Ti (m)]) = 1.
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Proof The proof is the same as the proof of Lemma 2.1. of Heifetz and Samet
(1999), if we replace there “such that βp(F ) ∈ F∆ for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1” by “such
that βp(F ) ∈ F∆ for all p ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q”.
Definition 3.10 Let M = 〈M, Σ, (Ti)i∈I, v〉 be a type space on X for player set
I. We define:
• (M,m) |= > in any case,
• for every x ∈ X ∪ {>} :
(M,m) |= x iff v (m,x) = 1,
• for all ϕ, ψ ∈ L:
(M,m) |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff (M,m) |= ϕ and (M,m) |= ψ,
• for every ϕ ∈ L:
(M,m) |= ¬ϕ iff (M,m) 6|= ϕ,
• for ϕ ∈ L0, such that [ϕ]M := {m ∈M | (M,m) |= ϕ} ∈ Σ, and for i ∈ I
and rational α ∈ [0, 1] :
(M,m) |= pαi (ϕ) iff Ti (m) ([ϕ]M) ≥ α.
It is easy to show by induction on the formation of the formulas in L0 that
[ϕ]M ∈ Σ, for every ϕ ∈ L0 (in particular, since Ti : M → ∆(M) is Σ − Σ∆-
measurable, it follows that [ϕ]M ∈ Σ implies [pαi (ϕ)]M ∈ Σ), so the relation
“(M,m) |= ϕ” is well-defined for every type spaceM on X for player set I, every
m ∈M , and every ϕ ∈ L0.
• If Φ ⊆ L and |Φ| ≤ 2ℵγ , then:
(M,m) |= ∧ϕ∈Φ ϕ iff for every ϕ ∈ Φ : (M,m) |= ϕ.
It is now easy to show, that the relation “(M,m) |= ϕ” is well-defined for every
type space M on X for player set I, every m ∈M , and every ϕ ∈ L.
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Definition 3.11 A formula ϕ ∈ L is valid in the class of type spaces (resp.
Harsanyi type spaces) on X for player set I, iff for every type space (resp.
Harsanyi type space) M = 〈M, Σ, (Ti)i∈I, v〉 on X for player set I and every
m ∈M :
(M,m) |= ϕ.
Notation 3.1 1. Let Γ ⊆ L, letM = 〈M, Σ, (Ti)i∈I, v〉 be a type space (resp.
Harsanyi type space) on X for player set I, and let m ∈M . We write
(M,m) |= Γ,
iff for every ψ ∈ Γ :
(M,m) |= ψ.
2. Let Γ ⊆ L. We say Γ has a model in the class of type spaces (resp. Harsanyi
type spaces) on X for player set I, iff there is a type space (resp. Harsanyi
type space) M on X for player set I and a m ∈M such that (M,m) |= Γ.
3. Let Γ ⊆ L and ϕ ∈ L. We write
Γ |= ϕ,
iff for every type space (resp. Harsanyi type space) M on X for player set
I and every m ∈M :
(M,m) |= Γ implies (M,m) |= ϕ.
3.3 Strong Completeness
In this section we define our axioms and inference rules, our notion of “proof”
(in the sense of our logic) and prove strong soundness and, by constructing the
canonical model, strong completeness. As already said, in this chapter, α and β
denote rational numbers in [0, 1].
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The List of Axioms
(A0) >
(A1) ϕ→ (ψ → ϕ), for ϕ, ψ ∈ L,
(A2) (ϕ→ (ψ → %)) → ((ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ %)), for ϕ, ψ, % ∈ L,
(A3) (¬ϕ→ ¬ψ)→ (ψ → ϕ), for ϕ, ψ ∈ L,
(A4)
∧
ϕ∈Φ(ψ → ϕ)→ (ψ →
∧
ϕ∈Φ ϕ), for ψ ∈ L and Φ ⊆ L
such that |Φ| ≤ 2ℵγ ,
(A5)
∧
ϕ∈Φ ϕ→ ψ, for ψ ∈ Φ, where Φ ⊆ L such that |Φ| ≤ 2ℵγ ,
(A6)
∧
a∈A(
∨
b∈A ϕa,b)→
∨
g∈AA(
∧
a∈A ϕa,g(a)), whenever |A| ≤ ℵγ,4
(P1) p0i (ϕ), for ϕ ∈ L0,
(P2) p1i (>),
(P3)
∧
α<β p
α
i (ϕ) → pβi (ϕ), for ϕ ∈ L0,
(P4)
(
pαi (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ pβi (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)
)
→ pα+βi (ϕ), for α, β with α+ β ≤ 1
and ϕ, ψ ∈ L0,
(P5)
(
¬pαi (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ ¬pβi (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)
)
→ ¬pα+βi (ϕ), for α, β with α+ β ≤ 1
and ϕ, ψ ∈ L0,
(P6) pαi (ϕ)→ ¬pβi (¬ϕ), for α, β with α+ β > 1 and ϕ ∈ L0,
(P7) pαi (ϕ)→ pβi (ϕ), for α, β with β < α and ϕ ∈ L0,
(P8) p1i (ϕ→ ψ)→ (pαi (ϕ)→ pαi (ψ)), for ϕ, ψ ∈ L0,
(I1) pαi (ϕ)→ p1i (pαi (ϕ)) , for ϕ ∈ L0,
(I2) ¬ pαi (ϕ)→ p1i (¬ pαi (ϕ)), for ϕ ∈ L0.
Except (A0) and (P2), all the above axioms are in fact axiom schemes, i.e. lists
of axioms.
4AA denotes here the set of all functions from A to A.
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We adopt the following inference rules:
• Modus Ponens: From ϕ and ϕ→ ψ infer ψ.
• Conjunction: From Φ infer ∧ϕ∈Φ ϕ , if Φ ⊆ L such that | Φ | ≤ 2ℵγ .
• Necessitation: From ϕ infer p1i (ϕ), if ϕ ∈ L0.
• Continuity at ∅ : From ∧n∈N ϕn → ¬>, where ϕn ∈ L0, for all n ∈ N,
infer
∧
k∈N\{0}
∨
l∈N ¬p
1
k
i (
∧
n≤l ϕn).
• Uncountable Introspection: From ϕ → ∨n∈N ϕn, where ϕ ∈ Li and ϕn ∈L0 for all n ∈ N,
infer ϕ→ ∧k∈N\{0}∨l∈N p1− 1ki (∨n≤l ϕn).
(A0) − (A6) are the axioms and “Modus Ponens” and “Conjunction” are
the inference rules for infinitary propositional logic, where the language is the
propositional part, L0, of our infinitary language L. Karp (1964), has proved
strong soundness and strong completeness (Karp (1964, Theorem 5.5.4)) for this
logic. We will use this result, sometimes without referring to it explicitly.
Most of the axioms (P1) - (P8), (I1), (I2) above can be found in Aumann
(1995) and Heifetz and Mongin (2001).
Note that the above set of axioms is not minimal:
• (P1) follows from (P3), (A0) and Modus Ponens, if we adopt the usual
convention that
∧
ϕ∈∅ ϕ := >.
• (P2) follows from (A0) and Necessitation.
• Heifetz and Mongin (2001) proved that (P7) follows from (A0) - (A6), (P3)
- (P6) and (P8).
• The proof of the Completeness Theorem will also show that (A0) - (A6),
(P3) - (P6), (P8) and (I1) imply (I2).
• It is easy to see that the inference rule “Uncountable Introspection” implies
(together with (A0) - (A6), (P3) - (P6) and (P8) and the other inference
rules) the axioms (I1) and (I2).
• The proof of the Completeness Theorem shows that, in the case of ℵγ = ℵ0,
(I1) (together with (A0) - (A6), (P3) - (P6) and (P8) and the other inference
rules) implies the inference rule “Uncountable Introspection”.
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Definition 3.12 1. The system P consists of the axioms (A0) - (A6), (P3) -
(P6), (P8), and the inference rules “Modus Ponens”, “Conjunction”, “Ne-
cessitation”, and “Continuity at ∅”.
2. The system H is the system P together with the additional axiom (I1) if
ℵγ = ℵ0 and the system H is the system P together with the inference rule
“Uncountable Introspection” otherwise.
Definition 3.13 1. The set of theorems of the system P is the minimal set
of formulas that contains the axioms (A0) - (A6), (P3) - (P6), (P8), and
that is closed under “Modus Ponens”, “Conjunction”, “Necessitation” and
“Continuity at ∅”.
2. The set of theorems of the system H is the minimal set of formulas that
contains the axioms (A0) - (A6), (P3) - (P6), (P8), (I1), and that is closed
under “Modus Ponens”, “Conjunction”, “Necessitation” and “Continuity
at ∅”, in the case ℵγ = ℵ0.
And if ℵγ > ℵ0: The set of theorems of the system H is the minimal
set of formulas that contains the axioms (A0) - (A6), (P3) - (P6), (P8),
and that is closed under “Modus Ponens”, “Conjunction”, “Necessitation”,
“Continuity at ∅” and “Uncountable Introspection”.
In fact we have here two papers (or chapters) in one: Given a nonempty set of
players I and a nonempty set of primitive propositions X, if nothing else is said,
we do all what follows for the system P on the syntactic side and for the class of
type spaces on X for player set I on the semantic side. And we also do all what
follows for the system H on the syntactic side and for the class of Harsanyi type
spaces on X for player set I on the semantic side. We only specify the system, if
there is a difference between the two cases in the proofs or in the statements of
the Lemmas, Propositions or Theorems.
Definition 3.14 Let Γ be a set of formulas in L. A proof of ϕ from Γ in the
system P (resp. in the system H) is a sequence whose length is smaller than
(2ℵγ )+ and whose last formula is ϕ, such that each formula in the proof is in Γ, a
theorem of the system P (resp. of the system H), or inferred from the previous
formulas by “Modus Ponens” or “Conjunction”.5
If there is a proof of ϕ from Γ, we write Γ ` ϕ. In particular, “` ϕ” means
that ϕ is a theorem.
5Of course, whether ϕ is a theorem of the system, resp., whether there is a proof of ϕ from
Γ, depends on the system under consideration, i.e. there might be a proof of ϕ from Γ in the
system H, but not in the system P. It follows also that the notion of consistency depends on
the system.
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Definition 3.15 • The system P (resp. H) is strongly sound iff for every
Γ ⊆ L and every ϕ ∈ L :
Γ ` ϕ implies Γ |= ϕ.
• The system P (resp. H) is strongly complete iff for every Γ ⊆ L and every
ϕ ∈ L :
Γ |= ϕ implies Γ ` ϕ.
Definition 3.16 Γ is consistent in the system P (resp. in the system H), if
there is no formula ϕ ∈ L such that there are proofs of ϕ and ¬ϕ from Γ in the
system P (resp. in the system H).
Lemma 3.2 Let ϕ, ψ, ψ˜ ∈ L. Then:
1. If Φ ⊆ L and |Φ| ≤ 2ℵγ , then Φ ` ϕ iff
{∧
χ∈Φ χ
}
` ϕ.
2. {ψ} ` ϕ iff ` ψ → ϕ.
3. If Γ ` ϕ→ ψ and Γ ` ψ → ψ˜, then Γ ` ϕ→ ψ˜.
4. ` ϕ→ ¬ (¬ϕ) .
5. If ψ ∈ Φ, Φ ⊆ L, and |Φ| ≤ 2ℵγ , then ` ¬ψ → ¬∧χ∈Φ χ.
Proof
1. “If” follows by applying the inference rule “Conjunction” to Φ. “Only if”
follows by replacing in the proof of ϕ from Φ every occurrence of a χ ∈ Φ
by the sequence
∧
χ′∈Φ χ′,
∧
χ′∈Φ χ′ → χ, χ. This yields then a proof of ϕ
from
{∧
χ∈Φ χ
}
.
2. “If” follows immediately by Modus Ponens. “Only if” follows by induction
on the length of the proof of ϕ from {ψ} . There are four cases:
(a) ϕ = ψ : By (A5) applied to {ψ} , it follows that ` ψ → ψ.
(b) ϕ is a theorem: By (A1), ` ϕ → (ψ → ϕ) , and by Modus Ponens it
follows that ` ψ → ϕ.
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(c) ϕ follows by Modus Ponens: Then there is a χ such that χ and χ→ ϕ
occur in the proof of ϕ. The sequences up to (and including) χ and
χ→ ϕ are proofs of χ and χ→ ϕ from {ψ} of shorter length. Hence,
by the induction hypothesis, ` ψ → χ and ` ψ → (χ→ ϕ).
(ψ → (χ→ ϕ))→ ((ψ → χ)→ (ψ → ϕ))
is a theorem (A2), so by applying Modus Ponens two times we get
` ψ → ϕ.
(d) ϕ follows by Conjunction: Then ϕ =
∧
χ∈Φ χ with |Φ| ≤ 2ℵγ . By
the induction hypothesis (since each χ must occur before ϕ in the
proof), we have ` ψ → χ, for every χ ∈ Φ. By conjunction, we get
` ∧χ∈Φ (ψ → χ) and by applying Modus Ponens to (A4),` ψ → ∧χ∈Φ χ.
3. We have Γ ` ψ → ψ˜. By (A1), (ψ → ψ˜) → (ϕ → (ψ → ψ˜)) is an axiom.
Modus Ponens yields Γ ` ϕ→ (ψ → ψ˜). By (A2),
(ϕ→ (ψ → ψ˜))→ ((ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ˜))
is an axiom. Modus Ponens yields Γ ` (ϕ → ψ) → (ϕ → ψ˜). Together
with Γ ` ϕ→ ψ, Modus Ponens yields now Γ ` ϕ→ ψ˜.
4. and 5. are well-known tautologies of Propositional Calculus, so, according
to the Completeness Theorem of Karp (1964, Theorem 5.5.4), theorems of
our system.
Proposition 3.1 • The system P is strongly sound with respect to the class
of type spaces on X for player set I.
• The system H is strongly sound with respect to the class of Harsanyi type
spaces on X for player set I.
Proof
1. For ϕ ∈ L, we have to show that if ` ϕ (i.e. ϕ is a theorem) in the system
P (resp. in the system H) and if M is a type space (resp. Harsanyi type
space) on X for player set I and m ∈M , then (M,m) |= ϕ.
2. And for ϕ ∈ L and a nonempty set Γ ⊆ L, we have to show that if M is
a type space (resp. Harsanyi type space) on X for player set I, m ∈ M ,
(M,m) |= Γ and if Γ ` ϕ in the system P (resp. in the system H), then
(M,m) |= ϕ.
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To:
1. It suffices to show for ϕ, ψ ∈ L and Φ ⊆ L:
(a) If ϕ is an axiom of the system P (resp. of the system H) and if M
is a type space (resp. Harsanyi type space) on X for player set I and
m ∈M, then (M,m) |= ϕ.
(b) If ϕ is valid and ϕ→ ψ is valid, then ψ is valid.
(c) If ϕ ∈ L0 and ϕ is valid, then p1i (ϕ) is valid.
(d) If |Φ| ≤ 2ℵγ and each ϕ ∈ Φ is valid, then ∧ϕ∈Φ ϕ is valid.
(e) If ϕn ∈ L0, for n ∈ N, and ∧ϕn → ¬> is valid, then∧
k∈N\{0}
∨
l∈N
¬p 1ki (
∧
n≤l
ϕn)
is valid.
(f) If ϕ ∈ Li and ϕn ∈ L0, for n ∈ N, then the validity of ϕ → ∨n∈N ϕn
in the class of Harsanyi type spaces on X for player set I implies that
ϕ→ ∧
k∈N\{0}
∨
l∈N
p
1− 1k
i (
∨
n≤l
ϕn)
is valid in the class of Harsanyi type spaces on X for player set I.
To:
(a) That the axioms are valid is an easy check, (A6) is valid, provided we
include the axiom of choice (like always) in our underlying set theory.
(P1) − (P8) correspond to well-known properties of probability mea-
sures.
(I1): Let M be a Harsanyi type space on X for player set I, ϕ ∈ L0
and m ∈ M. Then, (M,m) |= ¬pαi (ϕ) ∨ p1i (pαi (ϕ)) iff (M,m) |=¬pαi (ϕ) or (M,m) |= p1i (pαi (ϕ)) . Let (M,m) |= pαi (ϕ) . This means
that Ti (m) ([ϕ]
M) ≥ α. But then [Ti (m)]M ⊆ [pαi (ϕ)]M and hence
Ti (m) ([pαi (ϕ)]
M) = 1 and (I1) is valid. (I2) follows in the same man-
ner.
(b) - (d) above are clear,
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(e) corresponds to the continuity at ∅, a well-known property of σ-additive
probability measures: Let M be a type space (resp. Harsanyi type
space) on X for player set I, m ∈ M and ϕn ∈ L0, for n ∈ N. By the
definition of “|=”, we have[∧
n∈N ϕn → ¬>
]M = (M \⋂n∈N [ϕn]M ) ∪ (M \ [>]M )
= (M \⋂n∈N [ϕn]M ).
If ∧
n∈N
ϕn → ¬>
is valid, then
⋂
n∈N [ϕn]
M = ∅. In this case, we have for
El :=
⋂
n≤l
[ϕn]
M =
[∧
n≤l
ϕn
]M
,
that El ↓ ∅. So, for everym ∈M and k ∈ N\{0} there is a l (k,m) ∈ N
such that Ti (m)
(
El(k,m)
)
< 1k . By definition of “|=”, we have
(M,m) |= ¬p 1ki (
∧
n≤l(k,m)
ϕn).
Again by definition of “|=”, it follows that
(M,m) |= ∧
k∈N\{0}
∨
l∈N
¬p 1ki (
∧
n≤l
ϕn).
Hence ∧
k∈N\{0}
∨
l∈N
¬p 1ki (
∧
n≤l
ϕn)
is valid.
(f) LetM be a type space (resp. Harsanyi type space) on X for player set
I and m ∈ M. Then, it is easy to see by induction on the formation
of formulas ϕ ∈ Li: Either [Ti(m)]M ⊆ [ϕ]M or [Ti(m)]M ∩ [ϕ]M = ∅,
for ϕ ∈ Li. Let ϕn ∈ L0, for n ∈ N. Then,
(M,m) |= ∧
k∈N\{0}
∨
l∈N
p
1− 1k
i (
∨
n≤l
ϕn) iff liml→∞Ti(m)([
∨
n≤l
ϕn]) = 1,
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which is by σ-additivity the case iff
Ti(m)([
∨
n∈N
ϕn]) = 1.
Let ϕ ∈ Li and assume that
ϕ→ ∨
n∈N
ϕn
is valid in the class of Harsanyi type spaces on X for player set I.
Assume that (M,m) |= ϕ. By the above, [Ti(m)]M ⊆ [ϕ]M , since ϕ
is an i-formula. This implies that [Ti(m)]M ⊆ [∨n∈N ϕn]M and by the
introspection property of the Harsanyi type spaces Ti(m)([
∨
n∈N ϕn]) =
1. The above observation implies now that
(M,m) |= ∧
k∈N\{0}
∨
l∈N
p
1− 1k
i (
∨
n≤l
ϕn),
hence
ϕ→ ∧
k∈N\{0}
∨
l∈N
p
1− 1k
i (
∨
n≤l
ϕn)
is valid in the class of Harsanyi type spaces on X for player set I.
2. Given 1., we have to show:
(a) If M is a type space (resp. Harsanyi type space) on X for player
set I, m ∈ M , ϕ, ψ ∈ L, (M,m) |= ϕ and (M,m) |= ϕ → ψ, then
(M,m) |= ψ. But
(M,m) |= ϕ→ ψ iff m ∈ [¬ϕ ∨ ψ]M = (M \ [ϕ]M) ∪ [ψ]M ,
so m ∈ [ϕ]M and (M,m) |= ϕ→ ψ imply m ∈ [ψ]M .
(b) IfM is a type space (resp. Harsanyi type space) on X for player set I,
m ∈ M and Φ ⊆ L such that |Φ| ≤ 2ℵγ and such that for all ϕ ∈ Φ :
(M,m) |= ϕ, then (M,m) |= ∧ϕ∈Φ ϕ, but this is clear by the definition
of “|=”.
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Definition 3.17 • Ω :=
 ∧
ϕ∈Φ0
ϕ ∧ ∧
ψ∈L0\Φ0
¬ψ | Φ0 ⊆ L0, s.t. Φ0 ∪ {¬ψ | ψ ∈ L0\Φ0} is consistent
 ,
• for ψ ∈ L, define
[ψ] := {ω ∈ Ω |` ω → ψ} ,
• for Γ ⊆ L, define
[Γ] :=
⋂
ψ∈Γ
[ψ] ,
• for ω ∈ Ω, such that ω = ∧ϕ∈Φ0 ϕ ∧∧ψ∈L0\Φ0 ¬ψ, define
Ψω := Φ0 ∪ {¬ψ | ψ ∈ L0\Φ0} .
Note that although we write “Ω”, we define in fact two Ω’s, one corresponding
the to system P , and one corresponding to the system H. By the definitions of
the system P and of the system H, it follows that a set of L-formulas that is
consistent in the system H is also consistent in the system P . Hence the Ω
corresponding to the system H is a subset of the Ω corresponding to the system
P .
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Remark 3.2 1. The class of Harsanyi type spaces on X for player set I
is nonempty. And hence, class of type spaces on X for player set I is
nonempty.
2. The set Ω is nonempty.
Proof
1. Set
M := {m},
Σ := Pow (M) , (i.e. the power set of M),
Ti (m) := δm, for every i ∈ I, (i.e. the delta-measure at m),
v(m,x) := 1, for every x ∈ X ∪ {>}.
Then,
M := 〈M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , v〉
forms a Harsanyi type space on X for player set I.
2. Let M be the Harsanyi type space on X for player set I constructed above.
Consider the set
Φ0 := {ϕ ∈ L0 | (M,m) |= ϕ} .
By the definition of “|=”, we have (M,m) |= ¬ψ, for ψ ∈ L0\Φ0, and hence
Φ0 = Φ0 ∪ {¬ψ ∈ L0 | ψ ∈ L0\Φ0} .
We claim that Φ0 is consistent in the system H, (and hence also in the
system P ). Otherwise, Φ0 ` χ and Φ0 ` ¬χ, for some χ ∈ L. But then, by
Proposition 3.1, we have (M,m) |= χ and (M,m) |= ¬χ. By the definition
of the relation “”, this is impossible. Hence,∧
ϕ∈Φ0
ϕ ∧ ∧
ψ∈L0\Φ0
¬ψ ∈ Ω 6= ∅.
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Proposition 3.2 1.
` ∨
ω∈Ω
ω.
2. For every formula ψ ∈ L and for every ω ∈ Ω :
Either ` ω → ψ or ` ω → ¬ψ,
but not both.
3. For every formula ψ ∈ L :
` ψ ↔ ∨
ω∈[ψ]
ω.
4. If Φ ⊆ L such that |Φ| ≤ 2ℵγ , then
` ∧
ϕ∈Φ
ϕ↔ ∨
ω∈[Φ]
ω.
5. For every formula ψ ∈ L :
` ¬ψ ↔ ∨
ω∈Ω\[ψ]
ω.
6. For every formula ψ ∈ L :
[¬ψ] = Ω \ [ψ] .
7. If Φ ⊆ L such that |Φ| ≤ 2ℵγ , then
[Φ] =
[∧
ϕ∈Φ
ϕ
]
.
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Proof
1. By (A5), ` ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ, for ϕ ∈ L0. Since |L0| ≤ ℵγ, it follows by Conjunction
that ` ∧ϕ∈L0 (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ). By (A6) and Modus Ponens, it follows that
` ∨
Φ0⊆L0
( ∧
ϕ∈Φ0
ϕ ∧ ∧
ϕ∈L0\Φ0
¬ϕ).
If Φ0 ∪ {¬ϕ|ϕ ∈ L0\Φ0} is inconsistent (i.e. not consistent), then it follows
by 1 and 2 of the Lemma 3.2 that
` ( ∧
ϕ∈Φ0
ϕ ∧ ∧
ϕ∈L0\Φ0
¬ϕ)→ ψ and ` ( ∧
ϕ∈Φ0
ϕ ∧ ∧
ϕ∈L0\Φ0
¬ϕ)→ ¬ψ,
for a ψ ∈ L. By Conjunction, (A4) and Modus Ponens, we get
` ( ∧
ϕ∈Φ0
ϕ ∧ ∧
ϕ∈L0\Φ0
¬ϕ)→ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ) .
Since (χ→ ρ) → (¬ρ→ ¬χ) is a tautology of the Propositional Calculus,
we get, by Modus Ponens,
` ¬ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ)→ ¬( ∧
ϕ∈Φ0
ϕ ∧ ∧
ϕ∈L0\Φ0
¬ϕ).
¬ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ) is a tautology of the Propositional Calculus, hence Modus Po-
nens yields
` ¬( ∧
ϕ∈Φ0
ϕ ∧ ∧
ϕ∈L0\Φ0
¬ϕ).
Let C0 be the set of all Φ0 ⊆ L0 such that Φ0 ∪ {¬ϕ|ϕ ∈ L0\Φ0} is incon-
sistent. By Conjunction,∧
Φ0∈C0
¬( ∧
ϕ∈Φ0
ϕ ∧ ∧
ϕ∈L0\Φ0
¬ϕ)
is a theorem. By the definition of “
∨
”, “∨” and “→”,
( ∨
Φ0⊆L0
( ∧
ϕ∈Φ0
ϕ ∧ ∧
ϕ∈L0\Φ0
¬ϕ))→ (( ∧
Φ0∈C0
¬( ∧
ϕ∈Φ0
ϕ ∧ ∧
ϕ∈L0\Φ0
¬ϕ))→ ∨
ω∈Ω
ω),
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is a tautology of Propositional Calculus, hence a theorem. Applying Modus
Ponens two times yields now
` ∨
ω∈Ω
ω.
2. Follows by induction on the formation of the formulas in L. Let ω ∈ Ω. If
` ω → ϕ and ` ω → ¬ϕ for some ϕ ∈ L, then by 1 and 2 of Lemma 3.2,
Ψω is not consistent, a contradiction.
For every ψ ∈ L0 we have ψ ∈ Ψω or ¬ψ ∈ Ψω. Again by 1 and 2 of Lemma
3.2 it follows that ` ω → ψ or ` ω → ¬ψ.
If ϕ ∈ L and ψ = ¬ϕ, then, by the induction hypothesis, either ` ω → ¬ϕ,
or ` ω → ϕ. In the second case, since ϕ → ¬ (¬ϕ) is a tautology of the
Propositional Calculus, we have ` ϕ→ ¬ψ and by 3 of Lemma 3.2 it follows
that ` ω → ¬ψ.
If Φ ⊆ L such that |Φ| ≤ 2ℵγ and ψ = ∧ϕ∈Φ ϕ, then, by the induction
hypothesis, either ` ω → ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Φ, or there is a χ ∈ Φ such that
` ω → ¬χ. In the first case, by Conjunction, it follows that ` ∧ϕ∈Φ(ω → ϕ)
and by (A4) and Modus Ponens,
` ω → ∧
ϕ∈Φ
ϕ.
In the second case, since ¬χ→ ¬∧ϕ∈Φ ϕ is a tautology of the Propositional
Calculus, hence a theorem, we conclude by 3 of Lemma 3.2 that
` ω → ¬∧
ϕ∈Φ
ϕ.
3. Let ω ∈ Ω and ψ ∈ L. If ω /∈ [ψ] , then ` ω → ¬ψ. But then, since
(ω → ¬ψ) → (ψ → ¬ω) is a tautology of the Propositional Calculus, we
have ` ψ → ¬ω. By Conjunction, (A4) and Modus Ponens, we conclude
` ψ → ∧ω∈Ω\[ψ] ¬ω. ∧
ω∈Ω\[ψ]
¬ω → ¬ ∨
ω∈Ω\[ψ]
ω
is a tautology of the Propositional Calculus, so we conclude ` ψ → ¬∨ω∈Ω\[ψ] ω.∨
ω∈Ω
ω → (¬ ∨
ω∈Ω\[ψ]
ω → ∨
ω∈[ψ]
ω)
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is a tautology of the Propositional Calculus, hence a theorem, so we infer
by 1 and Modus Ponens that ` ¬∨ω∈Ω\[ψ] ω → ∨ω∈[ψ] ω. By 3 of Lemma
3.2, it follows that
` ψ → ∨
ω∈[ψ]
ω.
If ω ∈ [ψ] , then ` ω → ψ. Since (ω → ψ) → (¬ψ → ¬ω) is a tautology of
the Propositional Calculus, hence a theorem, it follows by Modus Ponens
that ` ¬ψ → ¬ω. By Conjunction, (A4) and Modus Ponens, we get `
¬ψ → ∧ω∈[ψ] ¬ω. Then, since
(¬ψ → ∧
ω∈[ψ]
¬ω)→ ( ∨
ω∈[ψ]
ω → ψ)
is a tautology of the Propositional Calculus, hence a theorem, it follows by
Modus Ponens that
` ∨
ω∈[ψ]
ω → ψ,
so, by Conjunction, we conclude
` ψ ↔ ∨
ω∈[ψ]
ω.
4. Let ω ∈ Ω and Φ ⊆ L such that |Φ| ≤ 2ℵγ . By 3 it suffices to show
that ω ∈
[∧
ϕ∈Φ ϕ
]
iff ω ∈ [Φ] . If ω ∈ [Φ] , then, for every ϕ ∈ Φ, we
have ` ω → ϕ. By Conjunction, (A4) and Modus Ponens it follows that
` ω → ∧ϕ∈Φ ϕ, so ω ∈ [∧ϕ∈Φ ϕ].
If ω ∈
[∧
ϕ∈Φ ϕ
]
, then ` ω → ∧ϕ∈Φ ϕ. For every ψ ∈ Φ we have, by (A5),
` ∧ϕ∈Φ ϕ→ ψ, so, by 3 of Lemma 3.2, it follows that ` ω → ψ, and hence
ω ∈ [Φ] .
5. By 2. we have Ω\ [ψ] = [¬ψ] . 5. follows now from 3.
6. See the Proof of 5.
7. See the Proof of 4.
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Now, we are going to build the canonical model. The first step is to define a
measurable space:
Definition 3.18 Let Σ be the σ−Field on Ω generated by the set
{[ψ] | ψ ∈ L0} .
By (A0) and 2 of Lemma 3.2, it follows that Ω = [>] and by 2 of Proposition
3.2, it follows that Ω\ [ψ] = [¬ψ] , for ψ ∈ L0. By Conjunction, (A4) and Modus
Ponens, and by (A5) and 3 of Lemma 3.2, it follows that [ϕ] ∩ [ψ] = [ϕ ∧ ψ] , for
ϕ, ψ ∈ L0. Hence:
Remark 3.3 The set
F := {[ψ] | ψ ∈ L0}
is a field on Ω.
Definition 3.19 • For ω ∈ Ω and ψ ∈ L0, define
T ′i (ω) ([ψ]) := sup {α ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q |` ω → pαi (ψ)} .
• For ω ∈ Ω and x ∈ X ∪ {>}, define
v (ω, x) :=
{
1, if ω ∈ [x] ,
0, if ω /∈ [x] .
Obviously, we have:
Remark 3.4 v (·, x) is F − Pow ({0, 1})-measurable, for every x ∈ X.
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Lemma 3.3 Let ψ ∈ L0, ω ∈ Ω, and α ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q such that ` ω → ¬pαi (ψ).
Then,
T ′i (ω) ([ψ]) < α.
Proof Assume that T ′i (ω) ([ψ]) ≥ α. Then, for every β′ < α, there is a β > β′
with ` ω → pβi (ψ). By (P7), ` pβi (ψ)→ pβ′i (ψ). Hence, by 3 of Lemma 3.2, ` ω →
pβ
′
i (ψ). By Conjunction, (A4) and Modus Ponens, we have ` ω → ∧β<α pβi (ψ).
By 3 of Lemma 3.2 and (P3), it follows that ` ω → pαi (ψ), a contradiction to 2
of Proposition 3.2.
Lemma 3.4 For every i ∈ I and ω ∈ Ω :
T ′i (ω) (·)
is well-defined and a countably additive measure on F .
Furthermore, for every i ∈ I and ω ∈ Ω :
T ′i (ω) (Ω) = 1.
Proof Let ϕ ∈ L0. By (P1), p0i (ϕ) is an axiom and by (A1),
p0i (ϕ)→
(
ω → p0i (ϕ)
)
is an axiom. By Modus Ponens, it follows that ` ω → p0i (ϕ) . Hence T ′i (ω) ([ϕ]) ≥
0.
Let ϕ, ψ ∈ L0 with [ϕ] = [ψ] . (Of course we, have by (A5) and Modus
Ponens that ` ϕ ↔ ϕ′ implies ` ϕ → ϕ′ and ` ϕ′ → ϕ, and by Conjunction
follows the opposite direction.) Then, ` ψ ↔ ∨
ω∈[ψ] ω and ` (
∨
ω∈[ψ] ω) ↔ ϕ, so
by Lemma 3.2, ` ϕ ↔ ψ. By Necessitation, (P8) and Modus Ponens, it follows
that ` pαi (ϕ)→ pαi (ψ) and ` pαi (ψ)→ pαi (ϕ), so
sup {α |` ω → pαi (ϕ)} = sup {α |` ω → pαi (ψ)} ,
and T ′i (ω) is well-defined.
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Let ω ∈ Ω. To show that T ′i (ω) is countably additive it is enough to show that
it is finitely additive and continuous at ∅ (see Dudley (1989), Theorem 3.1.1). Let
ϕ, ψ ∈ L0 with [ϕ] ∩ [ψ] = ∅. Then, [ϕ] ⊆ Ω \ [ψ] . It follows that
[ϕ] = ([ϕ] ∪ [ψ]) ∩ (Ω \ [ψ]) and [ψ] = ([ϕ] ∪ [ψ]) ∩ [ψ] .
By 6 and 7 of Proposition 3.2, it follows that
([ϕ] ∪ [ψ]) ∩ (Ω \ [ψ]) = [(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬ψ] and ([ϕ] ∪ [ψ]) ∩ [ψ] = [(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ψ] .
Now, let
T ′i (ω) ([ϕ]) = r and T ′i (ω) ([ψ]) = r′.
Assume that r+r′ > 1. Then there are rationals α, β ∈ [0, 1] , such that α ≤ r,
β ≤ r′ and α+ β > 1. But then,
` ω → pαi ((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬ψ) and ` ω → pβi ((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ψ) .
We have
` (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ψ → ¬ ((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬ψ) ,
because this is a tautology of the Propositional Calculus. Necessitation, (P8) and
Modus Ponens yield now
` pβi ((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ψ)→ pβi (¬ ((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬ψ)).
By Lemma 3.2, we conclude that
` ω → pβi (¬ ((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬ψ)).
But since α+ β > 1, we have that
pαi ((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬ψ)→ ¬pβi (¬ ((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬ψ))
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is an axiom (P6), hence
` ω → ¬pβi (¬ ((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬ψ)),
which is by 2 of Proposition 3.2 a contradiction. So, it follows that r + r′ ≤ 1.
For every ε > 0, there are rational α, β ∈ [0, 1] with α ≤ r and β ≤ r′ such
that α ≥ r − ε2 and β ≥ r′ − ε2 . For such α and β we have
` ω → pαi ((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬ψ) and ` ω → pβi ((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ψ) ,
so, by Conjunction, (A4) and Modus Ponens,
` ω → pαi ((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬ψ) ∧ pβi ((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ψ) .
Together with (P4) and Lemma 3.2, we conclude that ` ω → pα+βi (ϕ ∨ ψ) . This
implies that
T ′i (ω) ([ϕ] ∪ [ψ]) = T ′i (ω) ([ϕ ∨ ψ]) ≥ r + r′.
If r+r′ = 1, then we have T ′i (ω) ([ϕ ∨ ψ]) = 1, since by definition T ′i (ω) ([ϕ ∨ ψ])≤ 1. If r + r′ < 1, then for all ε > 0 such that ε+ r + r′ ≤ 1, there are rationals
α, β ∈ [0, 1] , such that α > r, β > r′ and α + β ≤ ε + r + r′. For such α, β we
have
` ω → ¬pαi ((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬ψ) and ` ω → ¬pβi ((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ψ) .
This implies (like above, but with the use of (P5)) that ` ω → ¬pα+βi (ϕ ∨ ψ) .
So, by Lemma 3.3, we have
T ′i (ω) ([ϕ] ∪ [ψ]) = T ′i (ω) ([ϕ ∨ ψ]) ≤ r + r′.
Altogether, this shows that T ′i (ω) is finitely additive.
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Since > is an axiom, we have for every ω ∈ Ω that {ω} ` >. Therefore, by
Lemma 3.2, ` ω → >, and hence [>] = Ω. Since > is a theorem, Necessitation
yields ` p1i (>) , so, as above, we have for every ω ∈ Ω that ` ω → p1i (>) . This
implies that T ′i (ω) (Ω) = 1, for every ω ∈ Ω.
Note that we have [¬>] = ∅, and since, for ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ I, T ′i (ω) is finitely
additive, we have
T ′i (ω) (∅) = T ′i (ω) (∅ ∪ ∅) = T ′i (ω) (∅) + T ′i (ω) (∅) ,
and hence T ′i (ω) (∅) = 0.
For ω ∈ Ω, it remains to show that T ′i (ω) is continuous at ∅ : For n ∈ N, let
En = [ϕn] with ϕn ∈ L0 and let En ↓ ∅, that is, for all n ∈ N : En+1 ⊆ En and⋂
n∈NEn = ∅. Then, by 7 of Proposition 3.2, we have
[ϕn] = [ ∧
m≤n
ϕm] and [∧
n∈N
ϕn] = ⋂
n∈N
[ϕn] = ∅.
It follows that
Ω = ((Ω \ [∧
n∈N
ϕn]) ∪ [¬>]) = [∧
n∈N
ϕn → ¬>],
by 6 and 7 of Proposition 3.2. By 3 and 1 of Proposition 3.2 and by Modus
Ponens, it follows that
` ∧
n∈N
ϕn → ¬>.
So, by the inference rule “Continuity at ∅”, we have
` ∧
k∈N\{0}
∨
l∈N
¬p 1ki (
∧
n≤l
ϕn).
Hence,
{ω} ` ∧
k∈N\{0}
∨
l∈N
¬p 1ki (
∧
n≤l
ϕn)
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and, by 2 of Lemma 3.2,
` ω → ∧
k∈N\{0}
∨
l∈N
¬p 1ki (
∧
n≤l
ϕn).
For ε > 0 fix k ∈ N\{0} with 1k ≤ ε. By (A5) and 3 of Lemma 3.2, it follows that
` ω →∨
l∈N
¬p 1ki (
∧
n≤l
ϕn).
But then there is a l ∈ N such that
` ω → ¬p 1ki (
∧
n≤l
ϕn),
for if not, it follows by 2 of Proposition 3.2, Conjunction, (A4) and Modus Ponens
that
` ω →∧
l∈N
p
1
k
i (
∧
n≤l
ϕn),
a contradiction. (Note that
∨
l∈N ¬ψl → ¬
∧
l∈N ψl is a tautology of the Proposi-
tional Calculus). By Lemma 3.3, it follows that
T ′i (ω)([∧
n≤l
ϕn]) < 1k ≤ ε.
The additivity implies then that
T ′i (ω)([ ∧
n≤m
ϕn]) < 1k ≤ ε,
for m ≥ l. So, we have
limn→∞T ′i (ω) (En) = 0.
3.3. STRONG COMPLETENESS 113
Proposition 3.3 1. For every i ∈ I and ω ∈ Ω, there is a unique extension
of T ′i (ω) to a σ-additive probability measure Ti (ω) on (Ω,Σ) .
2. For every i ∈ I and ω ∈ Ω, Ti (ω) is a Σ−Σ∆-measurable function from Ω
to ∆(Ω,Σ) , the space of probability measures on (Ω,Σ) , which is endowed
with the σ-field Σ∆ generated by the sets {µ ∈ ∆(Ω,Σ) | µ (E) ≥ α}, where
E ∈ Σ and rational α ∈ [0, 1] .
3.
Ω :=
〈
Ω,Σ, (Ti)i∈I, v
〉
is a type space on X for player set I.
4. For every ψ ∈ L and ω ∈ Ω :(〈
Ω,Σ, (Ti)i∈I, v
〉
, ω
)
|= ψ iff ω ∈ [ψ] .
5. If the axiom (I1) is added in case of ℵγ = ℵ0, and if the inference rule
Uncountable Introspection is added in case of ℵγ > ℵ0 (i.e. in the H-system
case), then 〈
Ω,Σ, (Ti)i∈I, v
〉
is a Harsanyi type space on X for player set I.
Proof
1. Follows directly from Lemma 3.4 and Caratheodory’s extension Theorem.
2. Follows from Lemma 3.1. Since F is a field that generates Σ, by that
Lemma, the σ-field on ∆ (Ω,Σ) generated by the sets
{µ ∈ ∆(Ω,Σ) | µ (F ) ≥ α},
with F ∈ F and rational α ∈ [0, 1] , is equal to the σ−field on ∆ (Ω,Σ)
generated by the sets
{µ ∈ ∆(Ω,Σ) | µ (E) ≥ α},
with E ∈ Σ and rational α ∈ [0, 1] . Inverse images commute with arbitrary
intersections and unions and with complements. So, it suffices to show that
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{ω | Ti (ω) ([ψ]) ≥ α} ∈ Σ, for all ψ ∈ L0, i ∈ I and rational α ∈ [0, 1] . By
Lemma 3.3, 2 of Proposition 3.2 and the definition of Ti (ω) , it follows that
Ti (ω) (ψ) ≥ α iff ` ω → pαi (ψ) .
But we have that
` ω → pαi (ψ) iff ω ∈ [pαi (ψ)] ,
and [pαi (ψ)] ∈ F ⊆ Σ.
3. Follows from Remark 3.4, 2 of Remark 3.2, and 1. and 2. of this proposition.
4. We proceed by induction on the formation of the formulas in L: Let ω ∈ Ω.
Then:
(a) For x ∈ X ∪ {>} :
(Ω, ω) |= x iff v (ω, x) = 1
iff ω ∈ [x] .
(b) For ϕ ∈ L :
(Ω, ω) |= ¬ϕ iff (Ω, ω) 6|= ϕ
iff ω /∈ [ϕ]
iff ω ∈ [¬ϕ] ,
where the last equivalence follows from 2 of Proposition 3.2.
(c) For Φ ⊆ L such that |Φ| ≤ 2ℵγ :
(Ω, ω) |= ∧ϕ∈Φ ϕ iff (Ω, ω) |= ϕ, for all ϕ ∈ Φ,
iff ω ∈ ⋂ϕ∈Φ [ϕ]
iff ω ∈
[∧
ϕ∈Φ ϕ
]
,
where the last equivalence follows from 7 of Proposition 3.2.
(d) For i ∈ I, α ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q, and ϕ ∈ L0 :
(Ω, ω) |= pαi (ϕ) iff {ω′ ∈ Ω | (Ω, ω′) |= ϕ} ∈ Σ and
Ti (ω) ({ω′ ∈ Ω | (Ω, ω′) |= ϕ}) ≥ α.
But, by the induction hypothesis,
{ω′ ∈ Ω | (Ω, ω′) |= ϕ} = [ϕ] ∈ Σ.
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So,
(Ω, ω) |= pαi (ϕ) iff sup
{
β ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q |` ω → pβi (ϕ)
}
≥ α
iff ` ω → pαi (ϕ),
where the last equivalence follows by Lemma 3.3 and Proposition 3.2.
5.
(a) Case ℵγ = ℵ0: We show that, for all ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ I: [Ti (ω)] is
measurable and Ti (ω) ([Ti (ω)]) = 1. Since L0 is countable and since
{ω′ ∈ Ω | Ti (ω′) ([ϕ]) ≥ α} = [pαi (ϕ)] ,
for ϕ ∈ L0 (by 4. of this proposition), the set
[Ti (ω)]0 :=
⋂
α∈[0,1]∩Q, ϕ∈L0, s.t. Ti(ω)([ϕ])≥α
{ω′ ∈ Ω | Ti (ω′) ([ϕ]) ≥ α}
is measurable. Since F is closed under complements, every ω′ ∈
[Ti (ω)]0 satisfies for all A ∈ F :
Ti (ω) (A) = Ti (ω′) (A) .
Since F is a field which generates Σ, by Caratheodory’s extension
Theorem, it follows that Ti (ω) = Ti (ω′) . Hence,
[Ti (ω)] = [Ti (ω)]0 ∈ Σ.
By (I1), pαi (ϕ) → p1i (pαi (ϕ)) is an axiom, so, by 3. of Lemma 3.2,` ω → pαi (ϕ) implies ` ω → p1i (pαi (ϕ)). Hence, by the definition
of Ti (ω) , it follows that Ti (ω) ([ϕ]) ≥ α implies Ti (ω) ([pαi (ϕ)]) =
1. Since Ti (ω) is a σ−additive probability measure, it follows that
Ti (ω) ([Ti (ω)]) = 1.
(b) Case ℵγ > ℵ0: We have to show that, for all ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ I and A ∈ Σ:
[Ti (ω)] ⊆ A implies Ti (ω) (A) = 1.
By the definition of Ti(ω) in the proof of Caratheodory’s Theorem, it
is enough to show that for (ϕn)n∈N, where ϕn ∈ L0, for n ∈ N:⋃
n∈N
[ϕn] ⊇ A implies
∑
n∈N
Ti(ω)([ϕn]) ≥ 1.
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We can assume without loss of generality that the [ϕn] are pairwise
disjoint. (That
inf{∑
n∈N
T ′i (ω)([ϕn])| ϕn ∈ L0, n ∈ N such that ⋃
n∈ N
[ϕn] ⊇ A} ≤ 1
is clear, because A ⊆ Ω and T ′i (ω)(Ω) = 1.)
For i ∈ I and ω ∈ Ω define
ϕi (ω) := ∧
α∈[0,1]∩Q, χ∈L0, s.t. `ω→pαi (χ)
pαi (χ) ∧
∧
β∈[0,1]∩Q, ψ∈L0, s.t. `ω→¬pβi (ψ)
¬pβi (ψ) .
By the definition of Ti(ω), we have [Ti(ω)] = [ϕi (ω)] , where the for-
mula on the right hand side is an i-formula. From
[Ti(ω)] ⊆
⋃
n∈N
[ϕn] = [∨
n∈N
ϕn]
it follows that
Ω = [ϕi (ω)→ ∨
n∈N
ϕn].
By 1 and 3 of Proposition 3.2 and Modus Ponens, it follows that
ϕi (ω) → ∨n∈N ϕn is a theorem. By the inference rule “Uncountable
Introspection”, we can conclude that
ϕi (ω)→
∧
k∈N\{0}
∨
l∈N
p
1− 1k
i (
∨
n≤l
ϕn)
is a theorem. Since ` ω → ϕi (ω) , it follows that
` ω → ∧
k∈N\{0}
∨
l∈N
p
1− 1k
i (
∨
n≤l
ϕn),
which implies that
1 = liml→∞Ti(ω)([∨
n≤l
ϕn]) ≤∑
n∈N
Ti(ω)([ϕn]).
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Theorem 3.1 1. The system P is strongly sound and strongly complete with
respect to the class of type spaces on X for player set I.
2. The system H is strongly sound and strongly complete with respect to the
class of Harsanyi type spaces on X for player set I.
Proof The “strongly sound” follows from Proposition 3.1.
According to Proposition 3.3, Ω = 〈Ω, Σ, (Ti)i∈I, v〉 is a type space (resp.
Harsanyi type space) on X for player set I.
Let Γ |= ϕ in the class of type spaces (resp. Harsanyi type spaces) on X for
player set I. Then, for all ω ∈ Ω:
(Ω, ω) |= Γ implies (Ω, ω) |= ϕ.
So, by 4 of Proposition 3.3, [Γ] ⊆ [ϕ] , which implies, by 3 of Proposition 3.2,
` ∨ω∈[Γ] ω → ϕ, because for sets of formulas A ⊆ B with |B| ≤ 2ℵγ : ∨χ∈A χ →∨
χ∈B χ is a tautology of the Propositional Calculus. Let ω ∈ Ω and ω /∈ [Γ] .
Then there is ψ ∈ Γ with ω /∈ [ψ] , so ` ω → ¬ψ. But then, ` ψ → ¬ω (since
(χ→ ¬χ˜)→ (χ˜→ ¬χ) is a tautology of the Propositional Calculus). By Modus
Ponens, it follows that Γ ` ¬ω. By Conjunction and the fact that |Ω| ≤ 2ℵγ ,
we have Γ ` ∧ω/∈[Γ] ¬ω. Then, since (as in the proof of 3. of Proposition 3.2)` ∧ω/∈[Γ] ¬ω → ∨ω∈[Γ] ω is a theorem, it follows that Γ ` ∨ω∈[Γ] ω, hence, by
Modus Ponens, we have Γ ` ϕ.
Corollary 3.1 Let Γ ⊆ L.
• Then Γ is consistent in the system P (resp. in the system H) iff Γ has
a model in the class of type spaces (resp. Harsanyi type spaces) on X for
player set I.
• Furthermore, if Γ is consistent in the system P (resp. in the system H),
then there is a ω ∈ Ω, where Ω is the Ω corresponding to the system P
(resp. to the system H), such that (Ω, ω) |= Γ.
Proof Assume that (Ω, ω) 6|= Γ, for every ω ∈ Ω, where Ω is the Ω corresponding
to the system P (resp. to the system H). Hence, for every ω there is a ϕω ∈ Γ
such that (Ω, ω) |= ¬ϕω. By 4 of Proposition 3.3, it follows that ω ∈ [¬ϕω] , that
is ` ω → ¬ϕω, hence, ` ϕω → ¬ω. Since |Ω| ≤ 2ℵγ , we have ` ∧ω′∈Ω ϕω′ → ¬ω
(because ` ∧ω′∈Ω ϕω′ → ϕω is an axiom). It follows (by Conjunction, (A4) and
Modus Ponens) that ` ∧ω′∈Ω ϕω′ → ∧ω∈Ω ¬ω. By 4 of Proposition 3.3 and the
definition of “|=”, we have [¬ (x ∧ ¬x)] = Ω, for x ∈ X. So, by Proposition 3.2,
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it follows that ` ¬ (x ∧ ¬x) → ∨ω∈Ω ω and hence ` ∧ω∈Ω ¬ω → x ∧ ¬x, which
implies ` ∧ω′∈Ω ϕω′ → x∧¬x, and we conclude Γ ` x∧¬x. By (A5) and Modus
Ponens, it follows that Γ ` x and Γ ` ¬x, so Γ is inconsistent in the system P
(resp. in the system H).
If Γ is not consistent in the system P (resp. in the system H), then there
is a ϕ such that Γ ` ϕ and Γ ` ¬ϕ in the system P (resp. in the system H).
So, by the strong soundness, for every type space (resp. Harsanyi type space) M
on X for player set I and every m ∈ M : If (M,m) |= Γ, then (M,m) |= ϕ and
(M,m) |= ¬ϕ. By the definition of the relation “|=”, there is no (M,m) such that
(M,m) |= ϕ and (M,m) |= ¬ϕ. So Γ has no model in the class of type spaces
(resp. Harsanyi type spaces) on X for player set I.
3.4 Universality of the Canonical (Harsanyi)
Type Space
In this section we prove that, by a fortunate coincidence, the canonical (Harsanyi)
type space on X for player set I is (up to type isomorphism) the universal
(Harsanyi) type space on X for player set I. This gives a characterization of
the universal (Harsanyi) type space on X for player set I and shows that our
language is rich enough to describe the states in the universal (Harsanyi) type
space on X for player set I. (So, in some sense, the language is rich enough to
capture “all relevant information”.)
Definition 3.20 Let M = 〈M, Σ, (Ti)i∈I, v〉 and N = 〈N, ΣN ,
(
TNi
)
i∈I, v
N〉 be
type spaces on X for player set I. A function f : M → N is a type morphism if
it satisfies the following conditions:
1. f is Σ− ΣN -measurable,
2. for all m ∈M and x ∈ X :
v (m,x) = v (f (m) , x) ,
3. for all m ∈M , E ∈ ΣN , and i ∈ I :
TNi (f (m)) (E) = Ti (m)
(
f−1 (E)
)
.
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Definition 3.21 A type morphism f is a type isomorphism if it is one-to-one,
onto, and the inverse of f is also a type morphism.
Lemma 3.5 Type morphisms preserve the validity of formulas, i.e. if f is a type
morphism from M to N, m ∈M, and ϕ ∈ L, then
(M,m) |= ϕ iff (N, f (m)) |= ϕ.
Proof By induction on the formation of the formulas in L:
1. Let x ∈ X ∪ {>} . Then,
(M,m) |= x iff v (m,x) = 1 iff v (f (m) , x) = 1 iff (N, f (m)) |= x.
2. Let Φ ⊆ L such that |Φ| ≤ 2ℵγ . Then, by the induction hypothesis,
(M,m) |= ∧ϕ∈Φ ϕ iff (M,m) |= ϕ, for all ϕ ∈ Φ,
iff (N, f (m)) |= ϕ, for all ϕ ∈ Φ,
iff (N, f (m)) |= ∧ϕ∈Φ ϕ.
3. Let ϕ ∈ L. Then, by the induction hypothesis,
(M,m) |= ¬ϕ iff (M,m) 6|= ϕ iff (N, f (m)) 6|= ϕ iff (N, f (m)) |= ¬ϕ.
4. Let ψ ∈ L0. As remarked in the definition of the relation “|=”, [ψ]M is
measurable inM and [ψ]N is measurable in N. By the induction hypothesis,
we have f−1([ψ]N) = [ψ]M , so we have
(M,m) |= pαi (ψ) iff α ≤ Ti (m) ([ψ]M)
iff α ≤ TNi (f (m)) ([ψ]N)
iff (N, f (m)) |= pαi (ψ) .
An easy check shows:
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Remark 3.5 • The type spaces on X for player set I - as the objects - to-
gether with the type morphisms - as the morphisms - form a category.
• The Harsanyi type spaces on X for player set I - as the objects - together
with the type morphisms - as the morphisms - form a category.
Definition 3.22 A type space (resp. Harsanyi type space) M on X for player
set I is universal, if for every type space (resp. Harsanyi type space) N there is
exactly one type morphism from N to M.
It is obvious that a type morphism f :M → N is a type isomorphism iff there
is a type morphism g : N → M such that g ◦ f = idM and f ◦ g = idN . Hence,
type isomorphisms coincide with the isomorphisms of the category of type spaces
on X. In category theoretic terms, a universal (Harsanyi) type space on X for
player set I is a terminal object of the category of (Harsanyi) type spaces on X
for player set I. Terminal objects, if they exist, are known to be unique up to
isomorphism, hence (but it is also easily seen directly):
Remark 3.6 If there exists a universal type space (resp. Harsanyi type space)
on X for player set I, then it is unique up to type isomorphism.
Theorem 3.2 The (Harsanyi) type space
Ω =
〈
Ω,Σ, (Ti)i∈I, v
〉
on X for player set I is universal.
Proof LetM =
〈
M,ΣM ,
(
TMi
)
, vM
〉
be a type space (resp. Harsanyi type space)
on X for player set I. By Lemma 3.5, 2 of Proposition 3.2, and 4 of Proposition
3.3, it follows that there is at most one type morphism from M to Ω.
Let
Φm := {ϕ ∈ L0 | (M,m) |= ϕ} ,
for m ∈M , and define
f (m) :=
∧
ϕ∈Φm
ϕ.
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By Corollary 3.1, Φm is consistent and by the definition of the relation “|=”, it
follows for ψ ∈ L0, that
ψ ∈ Φm iff ¬ψ /∈ Φm.
This implies that f (m) ∈ Ω. It remains to show that f : M → Ω is a type
morphism:
1. It is enough to show that for every ψ ∈ L0 : f−1 ([ψ]) ∈ ΣM , since the set
{[ϕ] | ϕ ∈ L0} is a field that generates Σ. We have
f (m) ∈ [ψ] iff ` f (m)→ ψ iff ψ ∈ Φm iff m ∈ [ψ]M .
But [ψ]M ∈ ΣM (see the definition of “|=”).
2. Let x ∈ X ∪ {>} . Then,
vM (m,x) = 1 iff x ∈ Φm iff ` f (m)→ x iff f (m) ∈ [x] iff v (f (m) , x) = 1.
3. Let i ∈ I andm ∈M. Since f :M → Ω is ΣM−Σ-measurable, TMi (m) (f−1 (·))
is a σ-additive probability measure on (Ω,Σ). Since F is a field that gen-
erates Σ, by Caratheodory’s Extension Theorem,
TMi (m)
(
f−1 ([ϕ])
)
= Ti (f (m)) ([ϕ]) ,
for all ϕ ∈ L0, implies
TMi (m)
(
f−1 (E)
)
= Ti (f (m)) (E) ,
for all E ∈ Σ. As shown in 1, we have f−1 ([ϕ]) = [ϕ]M , for ϕ ∈ L0, and
hence
TMi (m) (f
−1 ([ϕ])) = TMi (m) ([ϕ]
M)
= sup {α | (M,m) |= pαi (ϕ)}
= sup {α | pαi (ϕ) ∈ Φm}
= sup {α |` f(m)→ pαi (ϕ)}
= Ti (f (m)) ([ϕ]) .
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3.5 Product Type Spaces
The aim of this section is to show that the canonical (Harsanyi) type space on X
for player set I is (up to isomorphism) a product (Harsanyi) type space. Since
this space is then a universal (Harsanyi) type space in the category of product
(Harsanyi) type spaces on X for player set I, this implies that - in the case of
Harsanyi type spaces (i.e. the H-system case) - our canonical model is, up to
isomorphism, the universal Harsanyi type space on X for player set I constructed
by Heifetz and Samet (1998b).
We define (in the same fashion as in the previous chapter):
Definition 3.23 A product type space on X for player set I is a 4-tupel
M := 〈M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , v〉
such that there are measurable spaces (Mj,Σj) , for j ∈ I0, such that (up to type
isomorphism):
• M0 = Pow (X) ,
• Σ0 is the σ-field on Pow (X) generated by the sets
[x]0 := {m0 ⊆ X | x ∈ m0}, where x ∈ X,
• M = Pow (X)× Πi∈IMi, where all the Mi are nonempty,
• Σ is the product σ-field on M which is generated by the σ-fields Σj, j ∈ I0,
• for i ∈ I: Ti is a Σi − Σ∆-measurable function from Mi to ∆(M,Σ), the
space of probability measures on (M,Σ),
• for x ∈ X: v(m0, x) =
{
1, if x ∈ m0,
0, if x /∈ m0,
and v(m0,>) = 1 in any case.
Obviously, Ti, for i ∈ I, can be viewed as a Σ−Σ∆-measurable function from M
to ∆(M,Σ) and v(., x) can be viewed as a Σ− Pow ({0, 1})-measurable function
from M to {0, 1}, for every x ∈ X ∪ {>}. So every product type space on X for
player set I is a type space on X for player set I.
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Definition 3.24 • For j ∈ I0, define
Ωj :={∧
ϕ∈Φj0 ϕ ∧
∧
ψ∈Lj0\Φj0 ¬ψ| Φj0 ⊆ Lj0, s.t. Φj0 ∪ {¬ψ | ψ ∈ Lj0\Φj0} is consistent} .
• For j ∈ I0 and ψj ∈ Lj0, define[
ψj
]j := {ωj ∈ Ωj |` ωj → ψj} .
• For j ∈ I0, denote by Σj the σ-field on Ωj generated by the all the sets[
ψj
]j, where ψj ∈ Lj0.
• Define
Ω∗ := Πj∈I0Ωj.
• Denote by Σ∗ the product σ-field of the σ-fields Σj, j ∈ I0, on Ω∗.
• For i ∈ I, define
Ω−i := Πj∈I0\{i}Ωj.
• For i ∈ I, denote by Σ−i the product σ-field of the σ-fields Σj, j ∈ I0 \ {i},
on Ω−i.
Remark 3.7 Let j ∈ I0. By 4 of Proposition 3.3 and Corollary 3.1, for every
ωj ∈ Ωj, there is a ω ∈ Ω such that ` ω → ωj.
For ω ∈ Ω, we have,
` ω → ∧
ϕj∈Lj0∩Ψω
ϕj
and by the definitions and the consistency of ω, we have (
∧
ϕj∈Lj0∩Ψω ϕj) ∈ Ωj.
By definition of the ωj ∈ Ωj, two such formulas contradict each other, i.e. for
ωj 6= ω′j ∈ Ωj there is a ϕ ∈ Li0 such that ` ωj → ϕ and ` ω′j → ¬ϕ. Hence, for
every ω ∈ Ω, there is exactly one ωj ∈ Ωj such that ` ω → ωj. We denote this
ωj by ω(j).
Since Ω is nonempty and since ω(j) ∈ Ωj, for ω ∈ Ω and j ∈ I0, we have that
each Ωj, for j ∈ I0, is nonempty.
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Lemma 3.6 Let j ∈ I0, ωj ∈ Ωj and ψj ∈ Lj. Then,
either ` ωj → ψj or ` ωj → ¬ψj,
but not both.
Proof The “either” follows by the consistency of ωj, while the “or” follows by
an easy induction on the formation of the formulas in Lj, which is done in the
same way as in the proof of 2 of Proposition 3.2.
Definition 3.25 For i ∈ I0 and Ei ∈ Σi define
E∗i := Πj∈I0Uj,
where Uj = Ωj, for j 6= i and Ui = Ei.
We have E∗i ∈ Σ∗. Observe that Li0 ∩ Lj0 = ∅, for i 6= j ∈ I0. Hence, for ϕi ∈ Li0,
the following is well-defined:
[ϕi]
∗ := ([ϕi]i)∗
and by the definition and the consistency of the ωi ∈ Ωi, we have
Ω∗ \ [ϕi]∗ = [¬ϕi]∗ and [ϕi]∗ ∩ [ψi]∗ = [ϕi ∧ ψi]∗,
for ϕi, ψi ∈ Li0.
By starting with the i-formulas, for i ∈ I0, we define now recursively:
[¬ϕ]∗ := Ω∗ \ [ϕ]∗ and [ϕ ∧ ψ]∗ := [ϕ]∗ ∩ [ψ]∗,
for ϕ, ψ ∈ L0.
This is still well-defined for the finitary i -formulas, for i ∈ I0, and it is well-defined
for the other finitary formulas by the unique readability of finitary formulas as
finite Boolean combinations of finitary formulas ϕ ∈ ⋃i∈I0 Li0, which can be
proved in the usual way (what we don’t know at the moment is that logically
equivalent finitary formulas define the same sets in Ω∗).
It is obvious that these sets form a field F∗ on Ω∗ which generates Σ∗.
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Remark 3.8 • Σ0 is generated by the sets [x]0, where x ∈ X.
• For every m0 ⊆ X, there is exactly one ω0 ∈ Ω0 such that for every x ∈ X :
` ω0 → x iff x ∈ m0.
Proof For ω0 ∈ Ω0 and ϕ0, ψ0 ∈ L00, we have by Conjunction, (A4) , and Modus
Ponens that
ω0 ∈ [ϕ0]0 ∩ [ψ0]0 implies ω0 ∈ [ϕ0 ∧ ψ0]0 ,
and by (A5) and 3 of Lemma 3.2
ω0 ∈ [ϕ0 ∧ ψ0]0 implies ω0 ∈ [ϕ0]0 ∩ [ψ0]0 ,
and hence
[ϕ0 ∧ ψ0]0 = [ϕ0]0 ∩ [ψ0]0 .
By Lemma 3.6, we have
Ω0 \ [ϕ0]0 = [¬ϕ0]0 ,
for ϕ0 ∈ L00. It follows that the generators of Σ0 are finite Boolean combinations
of the sets [x]0 , where x ∈ X. Hence Σ0 is generated by the sets [x]0 , where
x ∈ X.
For the second point: Existence: Take a type space M on X for player set
I consisting of one point (i.e. M = {m} , note that M is necessarily a Harsanyi
type space) such that v(m,x) = 1 iff x ∈ m0. By Corollary 3.1
ω0 :=
∧
ϕ0∈L00:(M,m)|=ϕ0
ϕ0
is consistent in the system H (and hence in the system P ) and by the definition
of the relation “|=”, ω0 ∈ Ω0. By (A5) and Lemma 3.6, we have
` ω0 → x iff x ∈ m0.
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Furthermore, we have by Lemma 3.6, Conjunction, (A4), and Modus Ponens,
` ω0 →
∧
x∈X:`ω0→x
x ∧ ∧
y∈X:`ω0→¬y
¬y.
Uniqueness: An easy induction on the formation of the formulas in L00 shows
that for all ϕ0 ∈ L00:
` ∧
x∈m0
x ∧ ∧
y∈X\m0
¬y → ϕ0 or ` ∧
x∈m0
x ∧ ∧
y∈X\m0
¬y → ¬ϕ0.
By 3 of Lemma 3.2 and the consistency of ω0, this implies
` ω0 ↔
∧
x∈X:`ω0→x
x ∧ ∧
y∈X:`ω0→¬y
¬y.
Lemma 3.7 Let (ωj)j∈I0 ∈ Ω∗ and let {ωj | j ∈ I0} be consistent. Then there is
exactly one ω ∈ Ω such that
` ω ↔ ∧
j∈I0
ωj,
and furthermore ωj = ω(j), for all j ∈ I0. Conversely, for every ω ∈ Ω :
` ω ↔ ∧
j∈I0
ω(j).
Proof An easy induction on the formation of the formulas shows that for all
ϕ ∈ L: Either
` ( ∧
j∈I0
ωj)→ ϕ or ` (
∧
j∈I0
ωj)→ ¬ϕ,
but not both. By the consistency of
∧
j∈I0 ωj, Corollary 3.1 and 4 of Proposition
3.3, the rest is now obvious.
The above lemma shows that h : Ω → Ω∗, defined by h(ω) := (ω(j))j∈I0 is
one to one. We are now justified to identify with some abuse of notation h(Ω)
with Ω.
3.5. PRODUCT TYPE SPACES 127
Lemma 3.8 Let ϕ ∈ L0. Then:
•
[ϕ]∗ ∩ h(Ω) = h([ϕ]),
•
h−1 ([ϕ]∗) = [ϕ] .
Proof The first assertion is true for i-formulas, according to the above two Lem-
mas 3.6 and 3.7. The rest of the first assertion follows from the definition of [·]∗
and 6 and 7 of Proposition 3.2.
To the second assertion: Since
[ϕ] ⊆ h−1 ([ϕ]∗) and Ω \ [ϕ] = [¬ϕ] ⊆ h−1 ([¬ϕ]∗) ,
and since
h−1 ([ϕ]∗) ∩ h−1 ([¬ϕ]∗) = h−1 ([ϕ]∗) ∩ h−1 (Ω∗ \ [ϕ]∗) = ∅,
we have
[ϕ] = h−1 ([ϕ]∗) .
Definition 3.26 • For i ∈ I, ωi ∈ Ωi, and ψ ∈ L0, define
T ∗i (ωi)([ψ]∗) := sup {α ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q |` ωi → pαi (ψ)} .
• For ω0 ∈ Ω0 and x ∈ X, define
v∗ (ω0, x) :=
{
1, if ω0 ∈ [x]0 ,
0, if ω0 /∈ [x]0 ,
and
v∗ (ω0,>) := 1 in any case.
Obviously, for every x ∈ X, v∗ (·, x) is Σ0−Pow ({0, 1})-measurable, hence viewed
as a function from Ω∗ to {0, 1}, it is Σ∗ − Pow ({0, 1})-measurable.
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Lemma 3.9 For every i ∈ I and ωi ∈ Ωi :
T ∗i (ωi) (·)
is well-defined and a countably additive measure on F∗.
Furthermore, for every i ∈ I and ωi ∈ Ωi :
T ∗i (ωi) (Ω∗) = 1.
Proof Let i ∈ I. For ωi ∈ Ωi, choose ω ∈ Ω such that ω(i) = ωi. By the
definitions and Lemma 3.6,
T ∗i (ωi)([ϕ]∗) = T ′i (ω)([ϕ]),
for all ϕ ∈ L0. This implies in particular that T ∗i (ωi) (·) is non-negative.
If for ϕ, ψ ∈ L0: [ϕ]∗ = [ψ]∗, then [ϕ] = [ψ], by Lemma 3.8. It follows that
T ∗i (ωi)([ϕ]∗) = T ′i (ω)([ϕ]) = T ′i (ω)([ψ]) = T ∗i (ωi)([ψ]∗),
hence T ∗i (ωi) (·) is well-defined.
If for ϕ, ψ ∈ L0: [ϕ]∗ ∩ [ψ]∗ = ∅, then [ϕ] ∩ [ψ] = ∅, by Lemma 3.8. By the
definition of [·]∗, it follows that [ϕ]∗ ∪ [ψ]∗ = [ϕ ∨ ψ]∗. Hence,
T ∗i (ωi)([ϕ]∗) + T ∗i (ωi)([ψ]∗) = T ′i (ω)([ϕ]) + T ′i (ω)([ψ])
= T ′i (ω)([ϕ ∨ ψ])
= T ∗i (ωi)([ϕ ∨ ψ]∗)
= T ∗i (ωi)([ϕ]∗ ∪ [ψ]∗).
Therefore, T ∗i (ωi) (·) is additive on F∗.
Since > and p1i (>) are theorems, we have Ω0 = [>]0 and, by the definition of
the ωi ∈ Ωi, ` ωi → p1i (>). It follows that T ∗i (ωi) (Ω∗) = 1.
Let ϕn ∈ L0, for n ∈ N, and let [ϕn]∗ ↓ ∅. It follows by Lemma 3.8 that
[ϕn] ↓ ∅ and therefore
limn→∞T ∗i (ωi) ([ϕn]∗) = limn→∞T ′i (ω) ([ϕn]) = 0.
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Proposition 3.4 1. For every i ∈ I and ωi ∈ Ωi, there is a unique extension
of T ∗i (ωi) to a σ-additive probability measure on (Ω∗,Σ∗), which we denote
also by T ∗i (ωi) .
2. For every i ∈ I and ωi ∈ Ωi, this extension is a Σi−Σ∗∆-measurable function
from Ωi to ∆(Ω∗,Σ∗) , the space of probability measures on (Ω∗,Σ∗) , which
is endowed with the σ-field Σ∗∆ generated by the sets {µ ∈ ∆(Ω∗,Σ∗) |
µ (E) ≥ α}, where E ∈ Σ∗ and rational α ∈ [0, 1] .
3.
Ω∗ := 〈Ω∗,Σ∗, (T ∗i )i∈I , v∗〉
is a product type space on X for player set I.
4. For every ψ ∈ L0 and (ωj)j∈I0 ∈ Ω∗ :
(〈Ω∗,Σ∗, (T ∗i )i∈I , v∗〉 , (ωj)j∈I0) |= ψ iff (ωj)j∈I0 ∈ [ψ]∗.
5. In the H-system case, i.e. if the axiom (I1) is added in case of ℵγ = ℵ0, and
if the inference rule Uncountable Introspection is added in case of ℵγ > ℵ0,
then
〈Ω∗,Σ∗, (T ∗i )i∈I , v∗〉
is a Harsanyi product type space on X for player set I.
Proof
1. Follows from Caratheodory’s extension Theorem and Lemma 3.9.
2. Follows from Lemma 3.1: It suffices to show that for every ψ ∈ L0, rational
α ∈ [0, 1] and i ∈ I :
{ωi | T ∗i (ωi)([ψ]∗) ≥ α} ∈ Σi.
Chose a ω ∈ Ω such that ω (i) = ωi. By Lemma 3.6, we have
` ω → pαi (ψ) iff ` ωi → pαi (ψ) .
By Lemma 3.3, it follows that
T ∗i (ωi)([ψ]∗) ≥ α iff ` ωi → pαi (ψ).
Hence,
{ωi | T ∗i (ωi)([ψ]∗) ≥ α} = [pαi (ψ)]i ∈ Σi.
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3. Follows from Remark 3.8 and 1 and 2 of this proposition.
4. We proceed by induction on the formation of the formulas in L0:
• For x ∈ X ∪ {>} and (ωj)j∈I0 ∈ Ω∗ :
(Ω∗, (ωj)j∈I0) |= x iff v∗ (ω0, x) = 1
iff ω0 ∈ [x]0
iff (ωj)j∈I0 ∈ [x]∗.
• The induction steps “¬ϕ”, for ϕ ∈ L0, and “ϕ∧ψ”, for ϕ and ψ ∈ L0,
are clear by the definition of “|=” and “[·]∗”.
• So it remains the step “pαi (ϕ)”, for i ∈ I, α ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q, and ϕ ∈ L0.
By the induction hypothesis, we have
[ϕ]∗ =
{
(ω′j)j∈I0 ∈ Ω∗| (Ω∗, (ω′j)j∈I0) |= ϕ} .
It follows that, for (ωj)j∈I0 ∈ Ω∗:
(Ω∗, (ωj)j∈I0) |= pαi (ϕ) iff T ∗i ((ωj)j∈I0) ([ϕ]∗) ≥ α
iff sup
{
β ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q| ` ωi → pβi (ϕ)} ≥ α
iff ` ωi → pαi (ϕ)
iff ωi ∈ [pαi (ϕ)]i
iff (ωj)j∈I0 ∈ [pαi (ϕ)]∗,
where the third equivalence follows by the axioms (P7) and (P3)).
5. We have to show that, for i ∈ I and ωi ∈ Ωi :
A ∈ Σ∗ and [T ∗i (ωi)]∗ := {(ω′j)j∈I0 | T ∗i (ω′i) = T ∗i (ωi)} ⊆ A
imply
T ∗i (ωi)(A) = 1.
By definition of F∗,Σ∗, and T ∗i (ωi), it suffices to show that (ϕn)n∈N ∈ L0
and
⋃
n∈N[ϕn]∗ ⊇ A imply
liml→∞T ∗i (ωi)(
[∨
n≤l
ϕn
]∗
) = 1.
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Choose ω ∈ Ω with ` ω → ωi.
By an easy induction on the formation of the i-formulas ϕi ∈ Li, we have
that for ω′, ω˜ ∈ Ω and i ∈ I : Ti(ω′) = Ti(ω˜) implies
(Ω, ω′) |= ϕi iff (Ω, ω˜) |= ϕi.
Hence, by 4 of Proposition 3.3, Ti(ω′) = Ti(ω˜) implies
` ω′ → ωi iff ` ω˜ → ωi.
It follows that h−1 ([T ∗i (ωi)]∗) ⊇ [Ti(ω)]. Hence, by Lemma 3.8, ⋃n∈N[ϕn] ⊇
[Ti (ω)]. This implies
liml→∞T ∗i (ωi)(
[∨
n≤l
ϕn
]∗
) = liml→∞Ti (ω)(
[∨
n≤l
ϕn
]
) = 1.
Theorem 3.3
h : Ω→ Ω∗
defined by
h(ω) := (ω(j))j∈I0 , for ω ∈ Ω,
is a type isomorphism from Ω to Ω∗.
Proof By Lemma 3.7, h is one-to-one.
Let (ωj)j∈I0 ∈ Ω∗. By 4 of Proposition 3.4, Lemma 3.6 and the definition of
[·]∗, we have for i ∈ I0 and ϕi ∈ Li0:
` ωi → ϕi iff (ωj)j∈I0 ∈
[
ϕi
]∗ iff 〈Ω∗, (ωj)j∈I0〉 |= ϕi.
By definition of “|=”, this implies that 〈Ω∗, (ωj)j∈I0〉 |= ωi, for i ∈ I0. Hence, we
have
〈Ω∗, (ωj)j∈I0〉 |=
∧
j∈I0
ωj.
So
∧
j∈I0 ωj is consistent for every (ωj)j∈I0 ∈ Ω∗, hence, by Lemma 3.7, h is onto.
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For (ωj)j∈I0 ∈ Ω∗ let ω ∈ Ω such that ` ω ↔ ∧j∈I0 ωj. Then it follows that
〈Ω∗, (ωj)j∈I0〉 |= ω.
Hence, h−1 is the type morphism from the proof of Theorem 3.2.
h is a type morphism:
For ϕ ∈ L0, we have by Lemma 3.8:
h−1([ϕ]∗) = [ϕ] ∈ Σ.
Since F∗ is a field that generates Σ∗, it follows that h is measurable.
Let ω ∈ Ω. For x ∈ X ∪ {>}, we have by Lemma 3.6, Lemma 3.7 and the
definitions
v∗(h(ω), x) = v∗((ω(j))j∈I0 , x) = v∗(ω(0), x),
and
v∗(ω(0), x) = 1 iff ` ω(0)→ x
iff ` ω → x
iff v(ω, x) = 1.
By Caratheodory’s extension Theorem, it is enough to show that for ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ I
and ϕ ∈ L0:
T ∗i (ω(j)j∈I0) ([ϕ]∗) = Ti (ω) (h−1([ϕ]∗)).
Since h−1([ϕ]∗) = [ϕ], this is clear by Lemma 3.6, Lemma 3.7 and the defini-
tions.
That the canonical space is a product space implies the following: For states
ui ∈ Ω, where i ∈ I0, there is one state u ∈ Ω such that: v (u0, x) = v (u, x) , for
all x ∈ X, and Ti (ui) = Ti (u) , for i ∈ I. This fact is reflected by the axioms
in the following way: There is no axiom and also no inference rule that relates
the believes of one player with the beliefs of other players or with nature. So,
whatever a player in a state of the world believes about other players or nature
might be wrong (as long as this is nothing tautological, of course). This is not the
case for the canonical knowledge space and the corresponding S5 axiom system,
where there is an axiom “kiϕ → ϕ”. So, if, for example, ϕ = kjx and if kiϕ is
true in a state, then the fact that i knows that j knows x forces j to know x, and
this forces x to be true in that state.
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3.6 Beliefs Completeness
The aim of this section is to prove the following - somewhat surprising - theorem
of appealing measure-theoretic taste, which, in some topological cases, was proved
by Mertens and Zamir (1985), Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), Heifetz (1993)
and Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994). The general measure-theoretic case proved
here is original. The theorem says that, in the P -system case, the component
space of each player is - up to isomorphism of measurable spaces - the space of
probability measures on the space of states of the world, and in the H-system
case, for each player i ∈ I, the component space of i is - up to isomorphism of
measurable spaces - the space of probability measures on Ω−i.
Theorem 3.4 • In the P -system, let µ ∈ ∆(Ω∗,Σ∗). For every i ∈ I, there
is exactly one ωi ∈ Ωi such that T ∗i (ωi) = µ. Furthermore, for every i ∈ I,
T ∗i : Ωi → ∆(Ω∗,Σ∗)
is an isomorphism of the measurable spaces (Ωi,Σi) and (∆(Ω∗,Σ∗),Σ∗∆).
• In the H-system, let i ∈ I and µi ∈ ∆(Ω−i,Σ−i). Then there is exactly one
ωi ∈ Ωi such that the marginal of T ∗i (ωi) on Ω−i is µi. Furthermore, for
every i ∈ I,
margΩ−i ◦ T ∗i : Ωi → ∆(Ω−i,Σ−i)
is an isomorphism of the measurable spaces (Ωi,Σi) and (∆(Ω−i,Σ−i), (Σ−i)∆).
Proof We prove the P -system case and sketch the differences for the proof of
the H-system case. For the P -system case:
Let i ∈ I. For ωi ∈ Ωi define
ϕi (ωi) :=
( ∧
χ∈L0, α∈[0,1]∩Q, s.t. `ωi→pαi (χ)
pαi (χ)) ∧ ( ∧
ψ∈L0, β∈[0,1]∩Q, s.t. `ωi→¬pβi (ψ)
¬pβi (ψ)).
An easy induction on the formation of the i-formulas shows that for every i-
formula χi ∈ Li:
Either ` ϕi (ωi)→ χi or ` ϕi (ωi)→ ¬χi.
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Since ` ωi → ϕi (ωi) , by the consistency of ωi, it follows that ` ωi ↔ ϕi (ωi) .
Hence, ω′i 6= ω′′i ∈ Ωi implies that ϕi (ω′i) 6= ϕi (ω′′i ) . Therefore, by the definitions
of T ∗i (ω′i) and T ∗i (ω′′i ), we have T ∗i (ω′i)([ϕ]∗) 6= T ∗i (ω′′i )([ϕ]∗), for some ϕ ∈ L0. We
conclude that
T ∗i : Ωi → ∆(Ω∗,Σ∗)
is one-to-one.
It follows - and in the same manner, also in the H-system case - that for
i ∈ I and ωi ∈ Ωi : [T ∗i (ωi)]∗ = {ωi} × Ω−i. Hence, in the H-system case, the
introspection property of the canonical Harsanyi type space on X for player set
I implies that
margΩi ◦ T ∗i (ωi) = δωi ,
for i ∈ I and ωi ∈ Ωi.
By 2 of Proposition 3.4, T ∗i is measurable, for i ∈ I.
Let µ ∈ ∆(Ω∗,Σ∗) and fix i ∈ I. Consider the following set of formulas:
Φµ := {pαi (ϕ) | ϕ ∈ L0, α ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q s.t. µ([ϕ]∗) ≥ α}
∪{¬pβi (ψ) | ψ ∈ L0, β ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q s.t. µ([ψ]∗) < β}.
If this set of formulas is consistent in the system P, then by Corollary 3.1, there
is a ω ∈ Ω, where Ω is the Ω belonging to the system P , such that
(Ω, ω) |= Φµ.
But then, from 4 of Proposition 3.3, the definition of ω (i) , the fact that ` ω →
ω (i) , and the consistency of ω, it follows that ` ω (i) → χ, for all χ ∈ Φµ. The
definition of T ∗i (ω (i)) implies then that
T ∗i (ω (i)) ([ϕ]
∗) = µ ([ϕ]∗) ,
for all ϕ ∈ L0. Hence, since T ∗i (ω (i)) and µ are σ-additive probability measures
on Σ∗ that coincide on the field F∗, and since F∗ generates Σ∗, Caratheodory’s
extension Theorem implies then that
T ∗i (ω (i)) = µ.
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In the following, we show that Φµ is consistent in the system P .
Let u /∈ Ωi. Define
Ωµi := Ωi ∪ {u},
Ωµj := Ωj, for j ∈ I0 \ {i} ,
Σµi := Σi ∪ {E ∪ {u} | E ∈ Σi},
Σµj := Σj, for j ∈ I0 \ {i} ,
Ωµ := Πj∈I0Ω
µ
j ,
Σµ := the product σ-field of the Σµj , j ∈ I0.
Note that Σµi is a σ-field, Σ
∗ ⊆ Σµ, and E ∩ Ω∗ ∈ Σ∗, for E ∈ Σµ. Note
furthermore that, since each Ωj, for j ∈ I0, is nonempty, each Ωµj , for j ∈ I0, is
nonempty.
For j ∈ I0 \ {i} , chose uj ∈ Ωj and set ui := u and define
u := (uj)j∈I0 .
For j ∈ I, ωj ∈ Ωµj and E ∈ Σµ define
T µj (ωj)(E) := T
∗
j (ωj)(E ∩ Ω∗), if j 6= i or if i = j and ωi 6= u,
T µi (ωi)(E) := µ(E ∩ Ω∗), if ωi = u.
By this definition, T µj (ωj) is a σ-additive probability measure on (Ω
µ,Σµ), for
j ∈ I and ωj ∈ Ωµj .
For x ∈ X and ω0 ∈ Ωµ0 define:
vµ(ω0, x) := v∗(ω0, x),
vµ(ω0,>) := 1, in any case.
By this definition, it is clear that vµ(·, x) is Σ0 − Pow ({0, 1})-measurable, for
x ∈ X ∪ {>}.
Let E ∈ Σµ, j ∈ I \{i}, α ∈ [0, 1]∩Q, and bα(E) := {ν ∈ ∆(Ωµ,Σµ) | ν(E) ≥ α}.
Then, by the definitions:
(T µj )
−1(bα(E)) = (T ∗j )−1(bα(E ∩ Ω∗)) ∈ Σj.
Hence,
T µj : Ω
µ
j → ∆(Ωµ,Σµ)
is Σµj − Σµ∆-measurable, for j ∈ I \ {i}.
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Note that
T µi (u) (E) = µ (E ∩ Ω∗) = T µi (u) (E ∩ Ω∗) ,
for E ∈ Σµ. So, for all j ∈ I, ωj ∈ Ωµj and E ∈ Σµ:
T µj (ωj) (E) = T
µ
j (ωj) (E ∩ Ω∗).
By definition, we have
(T µi )
−1(bα(E)) =
{
(T ∗i )−1(bα(E ∩ Ω∗)) ∈ Σi ⊆ Σµi , if µ (E ∩ Ω∗) < α,{u} ∪ (T ∗i )−1(bα(E ∩ Ω∗)) ∈ Σµi , if µ (E ∩ Ω∗) ≥ α.
Hence,
T µi : Ω
µ
i → ∆(Ωµ,Σµ)
is Σµi − Σµ∆-measurable.
Now, we have proved that
Ωµ :=
〈
Ωµ,Σµ, (T µj )j∈I , vµ
〉
is a product type space on X for player set I.
Next, we show by induction on the formation of the formulas in ϕ ∈ L0 that, for
ω ∈ Ω∗:
(Ωµ, ω) |= ϕ iff (Ω∗, ω) |= ϕ.
An equivalent statement is:
[ϕ]∗ = [ϕ]µ ∩ Ω∗, where [ϕ]µ := {ω ∈ Ωµ | (Ωµ, ω) |= ϕ}.
(Recall that, by 4 of Proposition 3.4, [ϕ]Ω
∗
= [ϕ]∗, for ϕ ∈ L0.)
Since
T µi (u)([ϕ]
µ) = µ([ϕ]µ ∩ Ω∗),
it follows then that
(Ωµ, u) |= Φµ.
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Let ω ∈ Ω∗. By definition, we have for x ∈ X ∪ {>}:
(Ωµ, ω) |= x iff vµ (ω (0) , x) = 1
iff v∗ (ω (0) , x) = 1
iff (Ω∗, ω) |= x.
The steps “∧” and “¬” are trivial.
Let j ∈ I. For ϕ ∈ L0, we have by the induction hypothesis [ϕ]∗ = [ϕ]µ ∩Ω∗, and
hence, for α ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q :
[pαj (ϕ)]
∗ = {ω ∈ Ω∗ | T ∗j (ω(j))([ϕ]∗) ≥ α}
= {ω ∈ Ω∗ | T ∗j (ω(j))([ϕ]µ ∩ Ω∗) ≥ α}
= {ω ∈ Ω∗ | T µj (ω(j))([ϕ]µ) ≥ α}
= {ω ∈ Ωµ | T µj (ω(j))([ϕ]µ) ≥ α} ∩ Ω∗
= [pαj (ϕ)]
µ ∩ Ω∗.
Now, we have shown that
T ∗i : Ωi → ∆(Ω∗,Σ∗)
is onto, for i ∈ I.
For i ∈ I, it remains to prove that (T ∗i )−1 is measurable:
The sets [pαi (ϕ)]
i, where ϕ ∈ L0 and α ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q, generate the σ-field Σi. So
it is enough to show that T ∗i ([pαi (ϕ)]i) is a measurable set in ∆(Ω∗,Σ∗). But we
have
T ∗i ([pαi (ϕ)]i) = {ν ∈ ∆(Ω∗,Σ∗) | ν([ϕ]∗) ≥ α} ∈ Σ∗∆.
The the H-system case is proved similarly, but for the “onto part” one starts
with µ ∈ ∆(Ω−i,Σ−i) and defines T µ := δu × µ, where “×” denotes here the
product of measures and δu is the delta measure at u ∈ Ωµi .
And for the “one-to-one” part, one uses the following fact, which holds in
general for σ-additive probability measures on product spaces (endowed with
the product σ-field): If ν ∈ ∆(Ω∗,Σ∗) and for ωi ∈ Ωi: margΩi(ν) = δωi , then
ν = δωi × margΩ−i(ν). This fact together with Caratheodory’s extension Theo-
rem is then used to show by induction on the formation of the i-formulas that
margΩ−i ◦T ∗i is one-to-one. The measurability of margΩ−i ◦T ∗i is straightforward,
while, using Lemma 3.1, the measurability of
(
margΩ−i ◦ T ∗i
)−1 follows in a simi-
lar fashion as the measurability of
(
margCℵ0−i
◦ T ℵ0i
)−1
in third point of Theorem
2.6 in the preceding chapter.

Chapter 4
Conditional Possibility
Structures
4.1 Introduction
In the general introduction, we gave a short exposition of the nonexistence result
of Brandenburger and Keisler (1999), who showed that, given at least two players
and two states of nature, there is no first-order definably beliefs complete possibil-
ity structure. We also mentioned two possible ways of modifying the framework
that could help to get a positive beliefs completeness (resp. universality) result.
The first one, to impose topological restrictions, we will follow in Section 4.3, the
second one, considering another language than the one used by Brandenburger
and Keisler (1999), we will follow in Section 4.4.
We start with a set I of at least two players and, for each i ∈ I, a nonempty
set Si, called “ i’s” space of states of nature, and Bi, the set of observable events in
Si, i.e. a fixed set of nonempty subsets of Si such that Si ∈ Bi. The interpretation
is that player i is uncertain about the “true” state of nature si ∈ Si and Bi stands
for a fixed collection of possible observations about the true state of nature player
i might make. For example, given a perfect information game, Si could be the
space of strategy profiles (of the players j ∈ I\ {i}) and each Bi ∈ Bi could be
the set of those strategy profiles that are consistent with some partial history of
play (given some strategy of i).
But again, as in the previous chapters, being in a strategic environment, apart
from having beliefs on “his” space of states of nature, player i must also have
beliefs on the other players’ beliefs on “their” spaces of states of nature and beliefs
on other players’ beliefs on his beliefs on “his” space of states of nature and so
on. So, Si is only the primary source of uncertainty for player i.
Similarly to the case of Harsanyi type spaces or the case of Kripke structures,
the different levels of the players’ hierarchies of beliefs are described implicitly by
introducing, for each i ∈ I, a nonempty set U i, i’s component space (i.e. the set
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of “i’s types”), and mappings ρi : U i → ∏Bi∈Bi Pow∅ (Bi × Πj 6=iU j), for i ∈ I,
where Pow∅ (M) denotes the set of nonempty subsets of the nonempty set M.
The interpretation is that (si, (uj)j 6=i) ∈ (ρi (ui))Bi iff being of type ui and should
he observe that the true state of nature is in Bi, i would believe it possible that si
is the true state of nature and player j’s type is uj, for j ∈ I\ {i} . The fact that
the sets on which the players condition their beliefs are of the form Bi×Πj 6=iU j,
expresses the view that only observations about nature are possible, while there is
no way to “look into other players’ minds”, i.e. there is no way to receive certain
information about other players’ beliefs, and hence there is no way to exclude for
sure any type of another player.
There is no explicit time in this framework. However, in the interpretation,
we have in mind that more informative observations about nature are made,
should they be made at all, later than less informative ones. Otherwise the
less informative ones would be irrelevant and could be ignored. Furthermore, if
Ci ∈ Bi is observed after Di ∈ Bi, should Ci be observed at all, then we assume
that Ci ⊆ Di. Otherwise Ci could be replaced by Ci∩Di, which is nonempty since
Ci and Di have some state in common that would be the “true” state of nature
if Ci should be observed after Di. Also, just like a strategy in an extensive-form
game is a plan to act at different information sets, a conditional belief, i.e. a
conditional possibility set, is a plan to hold beliefs at different information sets.
(See Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999a).)
After some very basic definitions, we define the two versions of how the players
would revise their beliefs should they make some new observation about the true
state of nature.
In the A-version, should a player make a new observation, i.e. becoming sure
that the true state of nature is in Ci ⊆ Di, for some Ci, Di ∈ Bi, where Di stands
for an observation “made before”, he would keep his beliefs “as long as possible”,
while taking the new information into account: ACi = ADi ∩ (Ci × Πj 6=iU j) , if
ADi ∩ (Ci × Πj 6=iU j) 6= ∅, where ACi , resp. ADi , stands for the player’s belief, i.e.
his possibility set, should he observe Ci ⊆ Si, resp. Di ⊆ Si, for Ci, Di ∈ Bi.
In the B-version, a player is allowed to change his beliefs in a more free
manner. He would just be forced to keep his beliefs as long as they would be
“completely confirmed”, i.e. if ADi ⊆ Ci×Πj 6=iU j, then ACi = ADi , and he could
change his beliefs as soon as he would have “a good reason”, i.e. if there is at
least one state (si, (uj)j 6=i) ∈ ADi \ Ci × Πj 6=iU j. The “philosophy” here is that,
although there are no probabilities in this framework, the player could consider
this state “much more likely” than the other states he believes to be possible in
case he observes Di. The need to exclude this state would be such a “surprise”
that he wishes to change his beliefs completely in case he observes Ci.
An element (ABi)Bi∈Bi ∈
∏
Bi∈Bi Pow∅ (Bi × Πj 6=iU j) that satisfies the A-
version (resp. B-version) of conditionality is said to be A-nice (resp. B-nice).
We define PowBi∅ (Si × Πj 6=iU j) as the set of A-nice (resp. B-nice) elements of∏
Bi∈Bi Pow∅ (Bi × Πj 6=iU j) in the A-version of conditionality (resp. in the B-
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version of conditionality), and we define a conditional possibility structure on
(Si,Bi)i∈I as a tuple
〈
(U i)i∈I , (ρi)i∈I
〉
, where each U i is a nonempty set and each
ρi is a mapping from U i to PowBi∅ (Si × Πj 6=iU j) . The conditional possibility struc-
ture is beliefs complete if each ρi is onto. An element of PowBi∅ (Si × Πj 6=iU j) is
called a conditional i-event (or a (nonempty) conditional subset of Si×Πj 6=iU j).
A conditional i-event that is the image of a ui ∈ U i under the mapping ρi is
called a conditional possibility set for i (or the conditional possibility set of ui).
In section 4.3 we follow the topological avenue to produce a beliefs complete-
ness and universality result. There, we make the additional assumption that all
the Si, for i ∈ I, and all the U i, for i ∈ I, are compact and Hausdorff, and
all the Bi ∈ Bi, for i ∈ I, are closed and open (clopen). We denote the space
of nonempty compact subsets of Bi × Πj 6=iU j, where Bi × Πj 6=iU j is endowed
with the product topology, by V (Bi × Πj 6=iU j) and endow this space with the
Vietoris topology. Then, we endow
∏
Bi∈Bi V (Bi × Πj 6=iU j) with the product
topology and define VBi (Si × Πj 6=iU j) to be the set of A-nice (resp. B-nice)
elements of
∏
Bi∈Bi V (Bi × Πj 6=iU j) in the A-version of conditionality (resp. in
the B-version of conditionality), and endow this space with the topology inher-
ited from the topology of
∏
Bi∈Bi V (Bi × Πj 6=iU j) . We require in addition that
ρi : U i → VBi (Si × Πj 6=iU j) and that ρi is continuous, for i ∈ I.
We also define structure preserving maps (morphisms) between topological
conditional possibility structures
〈
(V i)i∈I , (σi)i∈I
〉
on (Si,Bi)i∈I and
〈
(U i)i∈I , (ρi)i∈I
〉
on (Si,Bi)i∈I as an I-tuple (vi)i∈I of continuous maps vi : V i → U i, for i ∈ I,
such that
VBi (idSi × Πj 6=ivj) ◦ σi = ρi ◦ vi,
for every i ∈ I, where VBi (idSi × Πj 6=ivj) is the mapping from VBi (Si × Πj 6=iV j)
to VBi (Si × Πj 6=iU j) that is induced by idSi × Πj 6=ivj.
Under these topological assumptions we construct, by a projective limit con-
struction, a universal topological conditional possibility structure
〈(T i)i∈I , (δi)i∈I〉 on (Si,Bi)i∈I such that for every topological conditional possibil-
ity structure on (Si,Bi)i∈I there is a unique morphism to the universal topological
conditional possibility structure (Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.1). The universal
topological conditional possibility structure on (Si,Bi)i∈I is unique up to iso-
morphism of topological conditional possibility structures on (Si,Bi)i∈I and each
δi, for i ∈ I, is a homeomorphism. This implies that the universal topological
conditional possibility structure is also beliefs complete. (Again, Theorem 4.1
and Corollary 4.1). In the special unconditional, i.e. Bi = {Si} , for i ∈ I, two
player case I = {a, b}, where both players are uncertain about the same space of
states of nature (i.e. Sa = Sb), the results of Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.1 were
already obtained by Mariotti and Piccione (2000).
In Section 4.4 we follow the other avenue to produce a (definably) beliefs
completeness result, namely to use a language other than the one used by Bran-
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denburger and Keisler (1999), but similar to it. Here, we restrict ourselves to a
finite player set N and a finite set of states of nature Si, for each player i ∈ N .
We define inductively structures
An =
〈
(Si)i∈N , (Bi)i∈N ,
(
T ik
)
i∈N,−1≤k≤n ,
(
Ri,nl
)
i∈N,0≤l≤n ,
(
qik,l
)
i∈N,−1≤k<l≤n
〉
,
for n ∈ N∪{−1} . On level 0, we define (up to isomorphism) T i0, the component
space of player i, to be PowBi∅ (Si) , i.e. the set of conditional i-events in Si.
On higher levels n ≥ 1, we define each player’s component space to be T in :=
PowBi∅
(
Si × Πj 6=iT jn−1
)
, i.e. the set of conditional i-events in the product space
of Si and the other players’ component spaces on the level n−1. qik,l is a projection
from T il onto T
i
k. In An, the tik ∈ T ik, for k < n, serve as names for the subsets of
T in that are of the form
(
qik,n
)−1 ({tik}). The relations Ri,nn are defined in a way
such that the conditional possibility set of tin, i.e. the t
i
n-section of R
i,n
n , is the
inverse image of tin under VBi
(
idSi × Πj 6=iqjn−1,n
)
.〈
(T in)i∈N , (Ri,nn )i∈N
〉
is the conditional possibility structure of level n on (Si,Bi)i∈N ,
where the usual mapping ρi is replaced by it’s “graph” Ri,nn , Si stands for player
i’s space of states of nature and Bi for the observable events in Si, and (T il )i∈N
and
(
Ri,nl
)
i∈N , for 0 ≤ l < n, stand for (the inverse images of) the conditional
possibility structures of lower levels l < n in
〈
(T in)i∈N , (Ri,nn )i∈N
〉
. As mentioned
above, qik,l is a projection from T
i
l onto T
i
k. (The T
i−1 are singletons and just
needed for a technical purpose.)
The counterpart of An on the syntactic side is Ln, the language induced by
An, for n ∈ N∪{−1} , which is defined in a similar way as the language induced
by a possibility structure defined by Brandenburger and Keisler. However, Ln,
for n ∈ N, is not a first-order language: The language Ln contains the language
Ln−1 and is a kind of mixture between first-order and second-order logic, where
the Ln−1-part of Ln (that “talks” about the inverse image of An−1 in An) is the
“second-order part” of Ln. The definition of Ln is done in a way such that all
subsets of Si × Πj 6=iT jn, for i ∈ N, are Ln-definable, i.e. describable by someLn-formula.
It is easy to see that the Brandenburger-Keisler Impossibility Theorem implies
that An cannot be Ln-definably beliefs complete, but at least we manage to get
Ln−1-definably beliefs completeness of An. Since we will show that the subset
defined by a Ln−1-formula in Si × Πj 6=iT jn is the inverse image of the subset
defined by the same formula in Si × Πj 6=iT jn−1, the definition of the tin ∈ T in
and the fact that all subsets of Si × Πj 6=iT jn−1 are Ln−1-definable imply that
the conditional possibility sets of player i in An are exactly the Ln−1-definable
conditional i-events.
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The structure A we aim to construct, is the limit structure〈
(Si)i∈N , (Bi)i∈N ,
(
T i
)
i∈N ,
(
T im
)
i∈N,−1≤m ,
(
Ri
)
i∈N ,
(
Rin
)
i∈N,0≤n ,
(
pim
)
i∈N,−1≤m
〉
.
The structure A can be viewed as the “projective limit” of the An, n ∈ N∪{−1} .
Player i’s component space T i is the projective limit of the T im, m ∈ N ∪ {−1} ,
and pim is the projection from T
i to T im, for m ∈ N∪{−1} . The elements tim ∈ T im
serve as names for their inverse images under pim. R
i
n, for n ∈ N, is defined to
be the inverse image of Ri,nn under p
i
n × idSi × Πj 6=ipjn, and Ri, the “projective
limit” of the Ri,nn , n ∈ N, is defined as Ri := ⋂n∈NRin. 〈(T i)i∈N , (Ri)i∈N〉 is a
conditional possibility structure on (Si,Bi)i∈N and the (T im)i∈N,0≤m , (Rim)i∈N,0≤m
stand for the inverse images of the finite-step conditional possibility structures〈
(T im)i∈N , (Ri,mm )i∈N
〉
in
〈
(T i)i∈N , (Ri)i∈N
〉
.
The syntactic counterpart of A is the limit language L, the “neocompact”
language induced by A, which is defined in the spirit of the neocompact language
invented by Keisler (1998), but as the Ln (and unlike Keisler’s original definition),
it is a kind of mixture between first and second-order logic, where L is defined in
such a way that the union of the Ln, n ∈ N∪{−1} , is the “second-order part”
of L. The Ln-part of L “talks”about the inverse image of An in A. Similarly to
the case of it’s semantic counterpart, L can be viewed as the “projective limit”
of the Ln, n ∈ N∪{−1}.
Up to now, in Section 4.4 no topological assumptions on the structures are
made (except in some proofs). However, for the proof of the main result of
Section 4.4, we endow each of the spaces Si, for i ∈ N, and T im, for i ∈ N
and m ∈ N ∪ {−1} , with the discrete topology and the T i, for i ∈ N, with
the projective limit topology. This allows us to apply Theorem 4.1. Essentially,
by proving that the possibility correspondence posi, that sends ti ∈ T i to the ti-
section of Ri, is equal to the δi of Theorem 4.1, and that the L-definable nonempty
subsets of finite products of sorts of the structure A are closed if considered to be
endowed with the corresponding product topology, we show that posi is a bijection
from T i to DefBiL (Si × Πj 6=iT j) , the space of nonempty L-definable conditional
i-events. It follows in particular that A is L-definably beliefs complete (Theorem
4.2, Corollary 4.2 and Corollary 4.3).
4.2 Preliminaries
After some basic definitions, we define the two versions of how the players update
their beliefs, should they make some new observation (about nature). Then,
we make some definitions and prove some lemmas (most of them of topological
nature), before we define the main objects of our study in this chapter, namely
conditional possibility structures.
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Unless stated otherwise, in this chapter k, l,m, n denote integers in N∪{−1} .
Notation 4.1 For a nonempty set M , denote by Pow∅(M) the set of nonempty
subsets of M .
Definition 4.1 Let S be a nonempty set and B a set of nonempty subsets of S
such that S ∈ B. For a nonempty set X, define B(X) := {B × X | B ∈ B}. It
follows that (up to isomorphism of product spaces) (B(X))(Y ) = B(X ×Y )1, for
nonempty sets X and Y .
Note that B(X) consists of nonempty subsets of S×X and that S×X ∈ B(X).
In the following, when no confusion may arise, we denote B(X) also by B.
Definition 4.2 Let S be a nonempty set and B a set of nonempty subsets of S
such that S ∈ B.
(AB)B∈B ∈
∏
B∈B
Pow∅(B)
is called:
• A-nice if C,D ∈ B, C ⊆ D, and AD ∩ C 6= ∅ imply AC = AD ∩ C.
• B-nice if C,D ∈ B, C ⊆ D, and C ⊇ AD imply AC = AD.
In fact, we write here two papers (or chapters) in one. In one version (hence-
forth “A-version”) the players are supposed to revise their beliefs according to
the A-version of conditionality (see the definition below), and in the other version
(henceforth “B-version”) the players are supposed to revise their beliefs according
to the B-version of conditionality (see also the definition below).
We will indicate if there are any differences in the formulations of the theo-
rems, propositions, lemmas, or definitions. Furthermore, we will indicate if there
are any differences between the two versions in the proofs.
Definition 4.3 Let S be a nonempty set and B a set of nonempty subsets of S
such that S ∈ B. Define
PowB∅ (S)
to be the set of all
1With some abuse of notation, we identify (S ×X)× Y with S × (X × Y ) .
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• A-nice elements of ∏B∈B Pow∅(B) in the A-version of conditionality,
• B-nice elements of ∏B∈B Pow∅(B) in the B-version of conditionality.
Note that if (AB)B∈B ∈∏B∈B Pow∅(B) is A-nice, then it is also B-nice.
Definition 4.4 For a nonempty topological space X let V(X) denote the space
of nonempty compact subsets of X. We consider, in all what follows, V(X) to be
endowed with the Vietoris topology, i.e. the topology with the basis consisting
of the sets
〈U0, . . . , Um〉 := {K ∈ V(X) | K ⊆ U0 ∪ . . . ∪ Um ∧K ∩ U0 6= ∅ ∧ . . . ∧K ∩ Um 6= ∅},
for U0, . . . , Um open in X. (See Michael (1951)).
Convention 4.1 Products of topological spaces are considered to be endowed
with the product topology.
Note that the product topology of finitely many discrete topological spaces is the
discrete topology.
Definition 4.5 A compactum is a compact Hausdorff space.
Definition 4.6 Let X be a nonempty compactum and B a set of nonempty
clopen subsets of X such that X ∈ B. Define VB(X), the set of nonempty
conditional compact subsets in the A-version as the set of all A-nice elements
of
∏
B∈B V(B). We endow VB(X) with the relative topology inherited from the
product topology of
∏
B∈B V(B).
Note that
∏
B∈B V(B) ⊆
∏
B∈B Pow∅(B).
Definition 4.7 Let X be a nonempty compactum and B a set of nonempty
clopen subsets of X such that X ∈ B. Define VB(X), the set of nonempty
conditional compact subsets in the B-version as the set of all B-nice elements
of
∏
B∈B V(B). We endow VB(X) with the relative topology inherited from the
product topology of
∏
B∈B V(B).
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Note that if (KB)B∈B ∈ VB(X) in the A-version, then (KB)B∈B ∈ VB(X) in
the B-version.
Definition 4.8 Let D ∈ B and let OD be an open subset of V(D). Then we
denote by O′D the following open subset of ∏B∈B V(B):
O′D :=
∏
B∈B
UB,
where
UB =
{ V(B), if B 6= D,
OD, if B = D.
Lemma 4.1 Let X be a nonempty compactum and B a set of nonempty clopen
subsets of X such that X ∈ B.
Then VB(X) is a closed subset of ∏B∈B V(B).
Proof
• A-version: LetD,E ∈ B,D ⊇ E, (AB)B∈B ∈∏B∈B V(B) and letAD∩E 6=∅ and AD ∩ E 6= AE.
We have to show that there exists an open subset of
∏
B∈B V(B) that has
empty intersection with VB(X) and that contains (AB)B∈B as an element.
1. case AD ∩E * AE: Then, since E and D are compact Hausdorff, there are
open subsets UD, UE of E (and hence of D) such that UD ∩ UE = ∅ and
AD ∩ E ∩ UD 6= ∅ and AE ⊆ UE.
(AB)B∈B is an element of the open set
{KD | KD ∩ (E ∩ UD) 6= ∅}′D ∩ {KE | KE ⊆ UE}′E.
Let (CB)B∈B be an element of this open set. Then CD ∩ (E ∩ UD) 6= ∅ and
CE ⊆ UE. This implies CD ∩ E * CE, hence this open subset has empty
intersection with VB(X).
2. case AD ∩ E + AE: Then there are open subsets UD, UE of E (and hence
of D) such that UD ∩UE = ∅ and AE ∩UE 6= ∅ and AD ∩E ⊆ UD. D \E is
open in D, hence also UD ∪ (D \E), and it follows that AD ⊆ UD ∪ (D \E).
(AB)B∈B is an element of the open set
{KD | KD ∩ E 6= ∅}′D ∩ {KD | KD ⊆ UD ∪ (D \ E)}′D ∩ {KE | KE ∩ UE 6= ∅}′E.
Let (CB)B∈B be an element of this open set. Then CD∩E 6= ∅ and CE * CD.
This implies CE * CD ∩ E, hence this open subset has empty intersection
with VB(X).
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• B-version: Let D,E ∈ B, D ⊇ E, (AB)B∈B ∈∏B∈B V(B) and let AD ⊆ E
and AD 6= AE.
1. case AD * AE: Then, since E and D are compact Hausdorff, there are
open subsets UD, UE of E (and hence of D) such that UD ∩ UE = ∅ and
AD ∩ UD 6= ∅ and AE ⊆ UE.
(AB)B∈B is an element of the open set
{KD | KD ⊆ E}′D ∩ {KD | KD ∩ UD 6= ∅}′D ∩ {KE | KE ⊆ UE}′E.
Let (CB)B∈B be an element of this open set. Then CD ⊆ E, CD ∩ UD 6= ∅
and CE ⊆ UE. This implies CD * CE, hence this open subset has empty
intersection with VB(X).
2. case AD + AE: Then there are open subsets UD, UE of E (and hence of D)
such that UD ∩ UE = ∅ and AE ∩ UE 6= ∅ and AD ⊆ UD.
(AB)B∈B is an element of the open set
{KD | KD ⊆ E}′D ∩ {KD | KD ⊆ UD}′D ∩ {KE | KE ∩ UE 6= ∅}′E.
Let (CB)B∈B be an element of this open set. Then CD ⊆ E and CE * CD,
hence this open subset has empty intersection with VB(X).
Lemma 4.2 Let X and Y be nonempty compacta and let f : X → Y be contin-
uous.
Then
V(f)(K) := {f(x) | x ∈ K} ∈ V(Y ),
for K ∈ V(X), and
V(f) : V(X)→ V(Y )
is continuous.
Proof Images of compact sets under continuous maps are compact.
The {K ∈ V(Y ) | K ⊆ U} and {K ∈ V(Y ) | K ∩ U 6= ∅}, for U open in
Y , form a subbase of the topology on V(Y ). Therefore it is enough to show that
V(f)−1({K ∈ V(Y ) | K ⊆ U}) and V(f)−1({K ∈ V(Y ) | K ∩ U 6= ∅}) are open.
But we have
V(f)−1({K ∈ V(Y ) | K ⊆ U}) = {K ∈ V(X) | K ⊆ f−1(U)} and
V(f)−1({K ∈ V(Y ) | K ∩ U 6= ∅}) = {K ∈ V(X) | K ∩ f−1(U) 6= ∅}.
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Remark 4.1 Let S and X be nonempty compact topological spaces, and B a set
of nonempty clopen subsets of S such that S ∈ B. Then
B(X) = {B ×X | B ∈ B}
consists of nonempty clopen subsets of S × X and we have S × X ∈ B(X).
Again, when no confusion may arise, we denote B(X) also by B. If Y is an-
other nonempty compact topological space, then we have, up to isomorphism,
(B(X))(Y ) = B(X × Y ), and we identify these two spaces (with some abuse of
notation).
Lemma 4.3 Let S, X and Y be nonempty compacta and let B be a set of
nonempty clopen subsets of S such that S ∈ B. Then:
1. VB(S) is a nonempty compactum.
2. Let f : X → Y be continuous, and define
VB(idS × f)((KB)B∈B) := ({(s, f(x)) | (s, x) ∈ KB})B∈B,
for (KB)B∈B ∈ VB(X)(S ×X).
Then
VB(idS × f) : VB(X)(S ×X)→ VB(Y )(S × Y ),
and VB(idS × f) is continuous.
3. If f : X → Y is continuous and onto, then
VB(idS × f) : VB(X)(S ×X)→ VB(Y )(S × Y )
is continuous and onto.
4. If f : X → Y is continuous and one-to-one, then
VB(idS × f) : VB(X)(S ×X)→ VB(Y )(S × Y )
is continuous and one-to-one.
5. If f : X → Y is a homeomorphism, then
VB(idS × f) : VB(X)(S ×X)→ VB(Y )(S × Y )
is a homeomorphism.
Proof
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1. TheB ∈ B are nonempty closed subspaces of a compactum, hence nonempty
compacta and therefore the V(B) are compacta (Michael (1951, Theorem
4.9.6)). This implies that
∏
B∈B V(B) is a compactum. Since VB(S) is a
closed subset of
∏
B∈B V(B) (by Lemma 4.1), it is a compactum, and since
(in both versions of conditionality) (B)B∈B ∈ VB(S), VB(S) is nonempty.
2. idS × f : B × X → B × Y is continuous, so by Lemma 4.2, V(idB × f) :
V(B ×X) → V(B × Y ) is continuous, for B ∈ B. Since the product of an
arbitrary set of continuous functions is a continuous function,
∏
B∈B V(idB×
f) :
∏
B∈B V(B × X) →
∏
B∈B V(B × Y ) is continuous. VB(idS × f) =
(
∏
B∈B V(idB×f))dVB(S×X) : VB(S×X)→
∏
B∈B V(B×Y ) is continuous,
because VB(S ×X) is endowed with the relative topology.
It remains to show that the image of VB(idS × f) is a subset of VB(S × Y ):
• A-version: Let (KB)B∈B ∈ VB(S ×X), let D,E ∈ B, D ⊇ E and let
(E×Y )∩((idS × f)(KD)) 6= ∅. This implies that there is a (s, x) ∈ KD
such that s ∈ E. But then KD ∩ (E×X) 6= ∅, hence KE = KD ∩ (E×
X). It follows that (idS × f)(KE) ⊆ ((idS × f)(KD)) ∩ (E × Y ). Let
(s, y) ∈ ((idS × f)(KD)) ∩ (E × Y ). Then there is x ∈ X such that
(s, x) ∈ KD and f(x) = y. But since s ∈ E and KE = KD ∩ (E ×X),
we have (s, x) ∈ KE and so (s, y) ∈ (idS × f)(KE). It follows that
VB(idS × f)((KB)B∈B) ∈ VB(S × Y ).
• B-version: Let (KB)B∈B ∈ VB(S × X), let D,E ∈ B, D ⊇ E and
let (E × Y ) ⊇ (idS × f)(KD). It follows that KD ⊆ E × X, so
KD = KE and hence (idS × f)(KD) = (idS × f)(KE). It follows that
VB(idS × f)((KB)B∈B) ∈ VB(S × Y ).
3. Let f be continuous and onto and let (AB)B∈B ∈ VB(S × Y ). Since AB
is a compact subset of the Hausdorff space B × Y , it is closed, and since
(idS × f) is continuous, (idS × f)−1(AB) is compact as a closed subset of
the compact space B × X. Since AB is not empty and (idS × f) is onto,
(idS×f)−1(AB) is not empty. So ((idS × f)−1(AB))B∈B ∈
∏
B∈B V(B×X).
We have to show that ((idS × f)−1(AB))B∈B ∈ VB(S ×X).
• A-version: Let D,E ∈ B, D ⊇ E and let (E×X)∩ ((idS × f)−1(AD))
6= ∅. Then AD ∩ (E × Y ) 6= ∅. This implies that AE = AD ∩ (E × Y ).
It follows that (idS × f)−1(AE) ⊆ (E ×X) ∩ ((idS × f)−1(AD)). Let
(s, x) ∈ (E × X) ∩ ((idS × f)−1(AD)). So, (s, f(x)) ∈ AD, but also
s ∈ E, hence (s, f(x)) ∈ (E × Y ) ∩ AD = AE. It follows that (idS ×
f)−1(AE) = (E ×X) ∩ ((idS × f)−1(AD)).
• B-version: Let D,E ∈ B, D ⊇ E and let (E ×X) ⊇
(idS × f)−1(AD). This implies AD ⊆ E × Y because (idS × f) is onto.
But then AD = AE and (idS × f)−1(AD) = (idS × f)−1(AE).
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4. is clear by 2. and the definitions.
5. By 3. and 4. of this lemma, VB(idS × f) is continuous, 1 to 1 and onto
from a compact space to a Hausdorff space. Hence it is a homeomorphism.
Lemma 4.4 Let X and Y be nonempty compacta and B a set of nonempty clopen
subsets of X such that X ∈ B.
If (KB×Y )B∈B ∈ VB(Y )(X × Y ), then (projX(KB×Y ))B∈B ∈ VB(X).
Proof Follows directly from Lemma 4.3, since the projections are continuous.
Lemma 4.5 Let S, X, Y and Z be nonempty compacta, let B be a set of
nonempty clopen subsets of S such that S ∈ B, and let g : X → Y and f : Y → Z
be continuous maps.
Then
VB(idS × (f ◦ g)) = VB(idS × f) ◦ VB(idS × g).
Proof Note that (idS × (f ◦ g)) = (idS × f) ◦ (idS × g).
For (KB)B∈B ∈ VB(S ×X) we have
VB(idS × (f ◦ g))((KB)B∈B) = ({(s, f ◦ g(x)) | (s, x) ∈ KB})B∈B
= ({(s, f(g(x))) | (s, g(x)) ∈ (idS × g)(KB)})B∈B
= VB(idS × f) (((idS × g)(KB))B∈B)
= VB(idS × f) (VB(idS × g)((KB)B∈B))
=
(VB(idS × f) ◦ VB(idS × g)) ((KB)B∈B) .
Lemma 4.6 • Let X be nonempty, finite, and endowed with the discrete
topology. Then
V (X) = Pow∅ (X)
and the topology of V (X) is the discrete topology.
• If I is finite, i ∈ I, and if Si and T j, for j ∈ I\ {i} , are nonempty, finite
and endowed with the discrete topology, and if Bi is a set of nonempty
subsets of Si such that Si ∈ Bi, then
VBi (Si × Πj 6=iT j) = PowBi∅ (Si × Πj 6=iT j)
and the topology of VBi (Si × Πj 6=iT j) is the discrete topology.
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Proof Of course, we have V (X) = Pow∅ (X) , since every subset ofX is compact.
Let ∅ 6= Y ⊆ X and Y = {x1, . . . , xn} . It follows that
{Y } = {Z ∈ V (X) | Z ⊆ Y ∧ Z ∩ {x1} 6= ∅ ∧ . . . ∧ Z ∩ {xn} 6= ∅} ,
hence {Y } is open in V (X) .
Since the product topology of finitely many spaces each of which is endowed
with the discrete topology is also the discrete topology, and since the relative
topology of a subspace of a topological space with the discrete topology is the
discrete topology, the second part of the lemma follows from the first part.
Lemma 4.7 Let S, X and Y be nonempty finite sets and let B be a set of
nonempty subsets of S such that S ∈ B. Then:
1. PowB∅ (S) is a nonempty set.
2. If f : X → Y is onto, then
PowB∅ (idS × f) : PowB(X)∅ (S ×X)→ PowB(Y )∅ (S × Y )
is onto, where
PowB∅ (idS × f)((AB)B∈B) := ({(s, f(x)) | (s, x) ∈ AB})B∈B.
3. If f : X → Y is one-to-one, then
PowB∅ (idS × f) : PowB(X)∅ (S ×X)→ PowB(Y )∅ (S × Y )
one-to-one.
Proof Endow all the spaces with the discrete topology. (Note that since S is
finite, B is finite.) The lemma follows now from the above lemma and Lemma
4.3.
Definition 4.9 Let I be a nonempty player set with |I| > 1, and, for every i ∈ I,
let Si be a nonempty set and Bi be a set of nonempty subsets of Si such that
Si ∈ Bi.
A conditional possibility structure on (Si,Bi)i∈I is a tuple
U :=
〈(
U i
)
i∈I ,
(
ρi
)
i∈I
〉
,
where U i is a nonempty set, for i ∈ I, and
ρi : U i → PowBi∅
(
Si × Πj 6=iU j) ,
for i ∈ I.
(ABi)Bi∈Bi ∈ PowBi∅ (Si × Πj 6=iU j) is called a conditional i-event, and a condi-
tional i-event that is the image of some ui ∈ U i under ρi is called a conditional
possibility set for player i.
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4.3 Topological Conditional Possibility
Structures
In this section, we impose topological restrictions on the conditional possibil-
ity structures. We define structure preserving maps, called morphisms, between
topological conditional possibility structures and we define the notions of univer-
sal topological conditional possibility structure and beliefs complete topological
conditional possibility structure. Next, given a fixed set I of at least two players
and, for each player i, a nonempty compact Hausdorff space Si, i.e. “i’s” space
of states of nature, and a set Bi of clopen subsets of Si, i.e. observable events
in nature, such that Si ∈ Bi, we construct a universal topological conditional
possibility structure
〈
(T i)i∈I ,
(
δi
)
i∈I
〉
on (Si,Bi)i∈I to which every topological
conditional possibility structure on (Si,Bi)i∈I can be mapped by a unique mor-
phism. The universal topological conditional possibility structure is unique up
to isomorphism and each δi is a homeomorphism. Therefore, the universal topo-
logical conditional possibility structure is also beliefs complete.
Definition 4.10 Let I be a nonempty player set with |I| > 1, and, for every
i ∈ I, let Si be a nonempty compactum and Bi be a set of nonempty clopen
subsets of Si such that Si ∈ Bi.
A topological conditional possibility structure on (Si,Bi)i∈I is a tuple
U :=
〈(
U i
)
i∈I ,
(
ρi
)
i∈I
〉
,
where U i is a nonempty compactum, for i ∈ I, and
ρi : U i → VBi (Si × Πj 6=iU j)
is continuous, for i ∈ I.
(ABi)Bi∈Bi ∈ VBi (Si × Πj 6=iU j) is called a topological2 conditional i-event,
and a conditional i-event that is the image of some ui ∈ U i under ρi is called a
topological conditional possibility set for player i.
2In the following, when no confusion may arrise, we skip the “topological” in “topological
conditional i-event” and in “topological conditional possibility set”.
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Definition 4.11 Let I be a nonempty set with |I| > 1, and, for every i ∈ I,
let Si be a nonempty compactum and Bi be a set of nonempty clopen subsets of
Si such that Si ∈ Bi. Let U := 〈(U i)i∈I , (ρi)i∈I〉 and V := 〈(V i)i∈I , (σi)i∈I〉 be
topological conditional possibility structures on (Si,Bi)i∈I .
A I-tuple (vi)i∈I of continuous maps vi : V i → U i, i ∈ I, is a morphism of
topological conditional possibility structures, if the following diagram commutes
for every i ∈ I :
V i VBi(Si × Πj 6=iV j)σ
i
-
U i
?
vi
VBi(Si × Πj 6=iU j)-ρ
i ?
idSi
?
vj
The morphism (vi)i∈I is a isomorphism of topological conditional possibility
structures, if vi is a homeomorphism, for every i ∈ I.
By 5 of Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.5, (vi)i∈I is a isomorphism of topological
conditional possibility structures iff each vi is one-to-one and onto and ((vi)−1)i∈I
is also a morphism.
Definition 4.12 Let I be a nonempty set with |I| > 1, and, for every i ∈ I, let
Si be a nonempty compactum and Bi be a set of nonempty clopen subsets of Si
such that Si ∈ Bi.
A topological conditional possibility structure U on (Si,Bi)i∈I is universal if
for every topological conditional possibility structure V on (Si,Bi)i∈I there is a
unique morphism from V to U.
Definition 4.13 Let I be a nonempty set with |I| > 1, and, for every i ∈ I, let
Si be a nonempty compactum and Bi be a set of nonempty clopen subsets of Si
such that Si ∈ Bi.
A topological conditional possibility structure
〈
(U i)i∈I , (ρi)i∈I
〉
on (Si,Bi)i∈I
is beliefs complete if ρi is onto, for every i ∈ I.
We are now ready to formulate and prove the main result of this section (i.e.
the topological part of this chapter), namely Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.1. In
order to see the analogy with the classical type space literature, Theorem 4.1 is
formulated in a way that is similar to Theorem 1.1. of Chapter III of Mertens,
Sorin and Zamir (2000) in the classical Bayesian setting.
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Theorem 4.1 • Let I be a nonempty player set with |I| > 1, and, for every
i ∈ I, let Si be a nonempty compactum and Bi a set of nonempty clopen
subsets of Si such that Si ∈ Bi.
Then there exist nonempty compacta T i, for i ∈ I, and homeomorphisms
δi : T i → VBi(Si × Πj 6=iT j), for i ∈ I, such that:
(∗) given nonempty compacta U i, for i ∈ I, and continuous maps
ρi : U i → VBi(Si×Πj 6=iU j), for i ∈ I, there is a unique I-tuple of continuous
maps (µi)i∈I such that the following diagram commutes for every i ∈ I :
U i VBi(Si × Πj 6=iU j)ρ
i
-
T i
?
µi
VBi(Si × Πj 6=iT j)-δ
i ?
idSi
?
µj
• The above property (∗) characterizes the spaces T i and the maps δi : If (∗)
is satisfied by compacta Tˆ i, i ∈ I, and continuous maps δˆi, i ∈ I, then the
µi : Tˆ i → T i, i ∈ I, are canonical homeomorphisms.
• Let |T i−1| = 1, for i ∈ I, and define inductively continuous maps qin, for
i ∈ I and n ∈ N, and nonempty compacta T im, for i ∈ I and m ∈ N∪{−1},
by the commutativity of the lower parts of the following diagrams:
T in+1 VBi(Si × Πj 6=iT jn)=
T in
?
qin+1
VBi(Si × Πj 6=iT jn−1)=
?
idSi
?
qjn
T i VBi(Si × Πj 6=iT j)δ
i
-
?
pin+1
?
idSi
?
pjn
Then the (T in, q
i
n) form a projective system with limit T
i and continuous
projections pin : T
i → T in, for n ∈ N∪{−1}, such that we have qin◦pin = pin−1,
for n ∈ N. Using the universal property of the projective limit, we define
δi by the commutativity of the upper parts of the above diagrams (for all
n ∈ N). δi is then a homeomorphism, for i ∈ I. The maps pin are onto and
have continuous selections rin (i.e. p
i
n ◦ rin = idT in) : Defining inductively cin,
for n ∈ N, ci0 arbitrary, by the commutativity of the diagrams:
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T in+1 VBi(Si × Πj 6=iT jn)=
T in
6
cin+1
VBi(Si × Πj 6=iT jn−1)=
6
idSi
6
cjn
we get inductively qin ◦ cin = idT in−1 and we can define rin as the projective
limit (i.e. rin−1 = rin ◦ cin).
Proof ot the theorem For every i ∈ I, Si×Πj 6=iT j−1 is a nonempty compactum
since Si is a nonempty compactum and since |T j−1| = 1, for all j ∈ I. (The
topology on the T j−1 is the obvious one). So T i0 = VBi(Si×Πj 6=iT j−1) is a nonempty
compactum (Lemma 4.3). qj0, for j ∈ I, is then continuous and onto, and so
is (idSi × Πj 6=iqj0), so qi1 := VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iqj0) is continuous and onto (Lemma
4.3). Inductively, by repeating this argumentation in the induction step, we get,
for every i ∈ I, a projective system (T in, qin)n≥0 of nonempty compacta T im, for
m ∈ N ∪ {−1}, and continuous maps qin : T in → T in−1 that are onto. By Kurosh’s
Theorem (Arkhangel’skij et al. (1990), Proposition 1, p. 75), the projective limit
exists and is a nonempty compactum T i ⊆ Πm≥−1T im with continuous projections
pim : T
i → T im. By the definition of the projective limit, we have qin ◦ pin = pin−1,
for n ∈ N.
Start, for i ∈ I, with ci0 arbitrary. Since |T i−1| = 1, ci0 is clearly continuous,
hence (idSi × Πj 6=icj0) is continuous and it is one-to-one, and of course, we have
qi0 ◦ ci0 = idT i−1 . Let now, for j ∈ I, cjn be continuous and one-to-one and qjn ◦ cjn =
idT jn−1 . It follows that c
i
n+1 := VBi(idSi × Πj 6=icjn) is continuous and one-to-one,
and by Lemma 4.5,
qin+1 ◦ cin+1 = VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iqjn) ◦ VBi(idSi × Πj 6=icjn)
= VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iqjn ◦ cjn)
= VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iidT jn−1)
= idT in .
Fix n ∈ N.
(cˆi(n)m)m≥−1 := (qi0 ◦ . . . ◦ qin−1, qi1 ◦ . . . ◦ qin−1, . . . , qin−1, idT in−1 , cin, cin+1 ◦ cin, . . . )
forms a family of continuous maps cˆi(n)m : T in−1 → T im such that qim+1◦cˆi(n)m+1 =
cˆi(n)m. By the universal property of the projective limit there exists a unique
continuous map rin−1 : T in−1 → T i such that cˆi(n)m = pim ◦ rin−1, and in particular
idT in−1 = p
i
n−1 ◦ rin−1. So, rin−1 is one-to-one and pin−1 is onto. Given rin−1, it
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follows from the above definitions that rin ◦ cin has also the desired properties of
rin−1, hence by the uniqueness, rin ◦ cin = rin−1.
For m ∈ N ∪ {−1}, the map
VBi(idSi × Πj 6=ipjm) : VBi(Si × Πj 6=iT j)→ VBi(Si × Πj 6=iT jm) = T im+1
is continuous and, for n ∈ N, we have
qin+1 ◦ VBi(idSi × Πj 6=ipjn) = VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iqjn) ◦ VBi(idSi × Πj 6=ipjn)
= VBi(idSi × Πj 6=ipjn−1).
Since |T i−1| = 1, there is a unique continuous map
pii−1 : VBi(Si × Πj 6=iT j)→ T i−1.
By the universal property of the projective limit, there is a unique continuous
map
γi : VBi(Si × Πj 6=iT j)→ T i
such that for all n ∈ N: pin ◦ γi = VBi(idSi × Πj 6=ipjn−1) and pi−1 ◦ γi = pii−1.
Lemma 4.8 γi is a homeomorphism.
Proof of the lemma γi is one-to-one: Let (ABi)Bi∈Bi , (KBi)Bi∈Bi ∈ VBi(Si ×
Πj 6=iT j) and (ABi)Bi∈Bi 6= (KBi)Bi∈Bi . Then there is a Di ∈ Bi such that ADi 6=
KDi . Without loss of generality, it follows that there is a (si, (t
j)j 6=i) ∈ ADi \KDi .
We show now that there is a m ∈ N ∪ {−1} such that (idSi × Πj 6=ipjm)(ADi)6= (idSi × Πj 6=ipjm)(KDi):
Claim: There is am ∈ N∪{−1} such that (si, ((pjm(tj))j 6=i) 6∈ (idSi×Πj 6=ipjm)(KDi).
Assume the contrary. {(si, (pjm(tj))j 6=i)} is closed in Si × Πj 6=iT jm. Hence
P−1m :=
(
(idSi × Πj 6=ipjm)−1({(si, (pjm(tj))j 6=i)})
) ∩KDi
is closed in Si × Πj 6=iT j and nonempty, for every m ∈ N ∪ {−1}. Furthermore
P−1m ⊇ P−1m+1, for all m ∈ N∪ {−1}. Since Si×Πj 6=iT j is compact, it follows that⋂
m≥−1 P−1m 6= ∅. Let (si, (tˆj)j 6=i) ∈
⋂
m≥−1 P−1m . But then pjm(tˆj) = pjm(tj), for
every m ∈ N ∪ {−1} and every j 6= i. This implies that tˆj = tj, for all j 6= i,
hence (si, (tj)j 6=i) ∈ KDi , a contradiction and the claim is proved and therefore
γi is one-to-one.
γi is onto: Let (tim)m≥−1 ∈ T i. Then, we have
tim+1 = (A
m
Bi)Bi∈Bi ∈ VBi(Si × Πj 6=iT jm)
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and qim+1(t
i
m+1) = t
i
m, for m ∈ N ∪ {−1}.
By the definitions, we have (idSi × Πj 6=iqjm+1)(Am+1Bi ) = AmBi , for Bi ∈ Bi and
m ∈ N ∪ {−1}.
Since
(idSi × Πj 6=ipjm) : Si × Πj 6=iT j → Si × Πj 6=iT jm
is continuous and onto, for all m ∈ N ∪ {−1} , and the AmBi ⊆ Bi × Πj 6=iT jm are
nonempty and closed, and since
(idSi × Πj 6=iqjn) ◦ (idSi × Πj 6=ipjn) = (idSi × Πj 6=ipjn−1),
for all n ∈ N, it follows that
(idSi × Πj 6=ipjm)−1(AmBi) ⊇ (idSi × Πj 6=ipjm+1)−1(Am+1Bi )
and that (idSi × Πj 6=ipjm)−1(AmBi) is closed in Bi × Πj 6=iT j and nonempty, for all
m ∈ N ∪ {−1}.
ABi :=
⋂
m≥−1
(idSi × Πj 6=ipjm)−1(AmBi)
is closed and nonempty, since Bi×Πj 6=iT j is compact. (Since AmBi ⊆ Bi×Πj 6=iT jm,
for m ∈ N ∪ {−1} , it follows that ABi ⊆ Bi × Πj 6=iT j.)
Let m ∈ N ∪ {−1} and (si, (tjm)j 6=i) ∈ AmBi . Then, for n ∈ N:
Q−1n+m :=
((idSi × Πj 6=ipjm)−1({(si, (tjm)j 6=i)})) ∩
(
(idSi × Πj 6=ipjm+n)−1(Am+nBi )
) ⊇
((idSi × Πj 6=ipjm)−1({(si, (tjm)j 6=i)})) ∩
(
(idSi × Πj 6=ipjm+n+1)−1(Am+n+1Bi )
)
.
Each of the sets Q−1n+m is nonempty and a closed subset of Bi×Πj 6=iT j. Note that
for −1 ≤ l < m: (idSi × Πj 6=ipjl )−1(AlBi) ⊇ Q−1n+m. It follows by the compactness
of Bi × Πj 6=iT j, that
( ⋂
l≥−1
(idSi × Πj 6=ipjl )−1(AlBi)) ∩ ((idSi × Πj 6=ipjm)−1({(si, (tjm)j 6=i)}))
is nonempty. This implies that (idSi × Πj 6=ipjm)(ABi) = AmBi .
It remains to show that (ABi)Bi∈Bi ∈ VBi(Si × Πj 6=iT j) :
A-version: LetDi ⊇ Ei and ADi∩(Ei×Πj 6=iT j) 6= ∅. Then, for allm ∈ N∪{−1},
AmDi ∩ (Ei × Πj 6=iT jm) 6= ∅ and AmEi = AmDi ∩ (Ei × Πj 6=iT jm). It follows that
AEi ⊆ ADi ∩ (Ei × Πj 6=iT j). Let (si, (tj)j 6=i) ∈ ADi ∩ (Ei × Πj 6=iT j). Then is
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(si, (pjm(t
j))j 6=i) ∈ AmEi , for m ∈ N∪ {−1} , hence (si, (tj)j 6=i) ∈ AEi and it follows
that AEi = ADi ∩ (Ei × Πj 6=iT j).
B-version: This is clear.
γi is one-to-one, onto and continuous from a compact space to a Hausdorff space,
hence γi is a homeomorphism and the lemma is proved.
We proceed now with the proof of the theorem:
Define now δi := (γi)−1. It remains to show for ti ∈ T i, that for all n ∈ N:
pin(t
i) = VBi(idSi × Πj 6=ipjn−1)(δi(ti)). But we have
pin(t
i) = pin(γi(δ
i(ti))) = VBi(idSi × Πj 6=ipjn−1)(δi(ti)).
We establish property (∗): For j ∈ I, define µj−1 : U j → T j−1 in the obvious
way. µj−1 is continuous. Let now µ
j
n−1 : U j → T jn−1 be defined and continuous,
for j ∈ I. Define
µin : U
i → T in by µin := VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iµjn−1) ◦ ρi, for i ∈ I.
The continuity of the µjn−1 implies the continuity of µin (Lemma 4.3).
We show now for all n ∈ N and j ∈ I, that qjn ◦ µjn = µjn−1: Since |T j−1| = 1,
qj0 ◦ µj0 = µj−1. Let now for all j ∈ I: qjn ◦ µjn = µjn−1. It follows that for i ∈ I :
qin+1 ◦ µin+1 = VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iqjn) ◦ VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iµjn) ◦ ρi
= VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iqjn ◦ µjn) ◦ ρi
= µin.
By the universal property of the projective limit, there is, for every i ∈ I, a unique
continuous map µi : U i → T i, such that for all m ∈ N ∪ {−1}: µim = pim ◦ µi. It
follows that, for all n ∈ N:
pin ◦ µi = VBi(idSi × Πj 6=ipjn−1 ◦ µj) ◦ ρi
= VBi(idSi × Πj 6=ipjn−1) ◦ VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iµj) ◦ ρi
= pin ◦ γi ◦ VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iµj) ◦ ρi.
By the uniqueness part of the universal property of the projective limit (the
statement for pi−1 is clear anyway), we get
µi = γi ◦ VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iµj) ◦ ρi,
which implies
δi ◦ µi = VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iµj) ◦ ρi.
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We have to show the uniqueness of the (µi)i∈I : Let, for j ∈ I,
µ˜j : U j → T j
be continuous, such that for every i ∈ I :
δi ◦ µ˜i = VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iµ˜j) ◦ ρi.
Since T i−1 is a singleton, we have pi−1 ◦ µ˜i = pi−1 ◦µi, for i ∈ I. Let m ∈ N∪ {−1}
and for all j ∈ I: pjm ◦ µ˜j = pjm ◦ µj. It follows that for i ∈ I :
pim+1 ◦ µ˜i = VBi(idSi × Πj 6=ipjm) ◦ δi ◦ µ˜i
= VBi(idSi × Πj 6=ipjm) ◦ VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iµ˜j) ◦ ρi
= VBi(idSi × Πj 6=ipjm ◦ µ˜j) ◦ ρi
= VBi(idSi × Πj 6=ipjm ◦ µj) ◦ ρi
= VBi(idSi × Πj 6=ipjm) ◦ δi ◦ µi
= pim+1 ◦ µi.
By the uniqueness property of the projective limit, it follows that µ˜i = µi, for
i ∈ I.
Now, it remains just to prove the second point of the theorem: If U i = T i
(resp. U i = Tˆ i) and ρi = δi (resp. ρi = δˆ
i
) for all i ∈ I, then µi := idT i (resp.
µˆi := idTˆ i), for all i ∈ I, makes the diagram for the property (∗) commutative,
because - by the definition - we have
VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iidT j) = idVBi (Si×Πj 6=iT j).
Now let µˆi : T i → Tˆ i and µi : Tˆ i → T i, for i ∈ I, be the continuous maps
with the property (∗). We have for i ∈ I :
δi ◦ µi ◦ µˆi = VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iµj) ◦ δˆi ◦ µˆi
= VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iµj) ◦ VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iµˆj) ◦ δi
= VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iµj ◦ µˆj) ◦ δi,
hence µi ◦ µˆi, for i ∈ I, makes the diagram with U i = T i and ρi = δi, for i ∈ I,
commutative. It follows that for i ∈ I : µi ◦ µˆi = idT i and in the same way
µˆi ◦ µi = idTˆ i . This implies that µi and µˆi are homeomorphisms, for i ∈ I.
Furthermore is
δˆ
i
= VBi(idSi × Πj 6=iµj)−1 ◦ δi ◦ µi, for i ∈ I.
Hence, since VBi(idSi ×Πj 6=iµj), δi and µi are a homeomorphisms, for i ∈ I, δˆi is
also a homeomorphism, for i ∈ I, and the theorem is proved.
The above theorem implies immediately:
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Corollary 4.1 Let I be a nonempty set with |I| > 1, and, for every i ∈ I, let Si
be a nonempty compactum and Bi be a set of nonempty clopen subsets of Si such
that Si ∈ Bi. Let T := 〈(T i)i∈I , (δi)i∈I〉 be the topological conditional possibility
structure on (Si,Bi)i∈I constructed in Theorem 4.1.
Then:
1. T is a universal topological conditional possibility structure on (Si,Bi)i∈I ,
2. T is - up to isomorphism of topological conditional possibility structures on
(Si,Bi)i∈I - the unique universal topological conditional possibility structure
on (Si,Bi)i∈I ,
3. T is beliefs complete.
4.4 Definable Completeness for ‘Neocompact’
Formulas
For the rest of this chapter, we fix a finite set N of at least two players and, for
every i ∈ N, a nonempty finite set Si, “i’s” space of states of nature, and a set
of nonempty subsets Bi of Si, observable events in Si, such that Si ∈ Bi.
In this section we define a language other than the one used by Brandenburger
and Keisler (1999), but similar to it, in order to produce a positive definably
beliefs completeness result.
4.4.1 Finitary Structures
In this subsection we define the finite-step structures An, for n ∈ N ∪ {−1} ,
which are “extended” conditional possibility structures. Each structure An, for
n ∈ N, contains (the inverse images of) the finite-step structures Am, for m < n.
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Definition 4.14 For i ∈ N define (inductively):
T i−1 := {i},
T in := Pow
Bi∅ (Si × Πj 6=iT jn−1), for n ∈ N,
qi−1,0 : T i0 → T i−1, such that
qi−1,0(ti0) := i, for ti0 ∈ T i0,
qin−1,n : T in → T in−1, such that
qin−1,n := Pow
Bi∅ (idSi × Πj 6=iqjn−2,n−1), for n ≥ 1,
qik,n := q
i
k,n−1 ◦ qin−1,n, for −1 ≤ k < n− 1,
Ri,nl ⊆ T in × Bi × Si × Πj 6=iT jn, such that
(tin, Bi, si, (t
j
n)j 6=i) ∈ Ri,nl iff
(
si, (q
j
l−1,n(tjn))j 6=i
) ∈ (qil,n(tin)) (Bi),
for 0 ≤ l < n,
Ri,nn ⊆ T in × Bi × Si × Πj 6=iT jn, such that
(tin, Bi, si, (t
j
n)j 6=i) ∈ Ri,nn iff
(
si, (q
j
n−1,n(tjn))j 6=i
) ∈ tin(Bi), for 0 ≤ n.
Definition 4.15 For integers n ∈ N ∪ {−1} define
An :=
〈
(Si)i∈N , (Bi)i∈N ,
(
T ik
)
i∈N,−1≤k≤n ,
(
Ri,nl
)
i∈N,0≤l≤n ,
(
qik,l
)
i∈N,−1≤k<l≤n
〉
.
Proposition 4.1 An has the following properties:
1. (tin, Bi, si, (t
j
n)j 6=i) ∈ Ri,nk iff (qin−1,n(tin), Bi, si, (qjn−1,n(tjn))j 6=i) ∈ Ri,n−1k ,
for i ∈ N and 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1.
2. T ik is nonempty and finite, for i ∈ N and −1 ≤ k ≤ n.
3. qik,l : T
i
l → T ik is onto, for i ∈ N and −1 ≤ k < l ≤ n.
4. qim,k ◦ qik,l = qim,l, for i ∈ N and −1 ≤ m < k < l ≤ n.
Proof 4. follows from the definition, 1. follows from 4. and the definition. 2:
That T ik is nonempty and finite, for k ∈ N∪{−1} , follows from the definition and
1. of Lemma 4.7. 3: qi−1,0 is onto, since T i0 is nonempty. That qik,l is onto follows
now inductively by 2. of Lemma 4.7.
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4.4.2 Finitary Languages
If not stated otherwise, let n be an integer in N ∪ {−1}. We define Ln, i.e. the
language induced by An. This is done in such a way that the language Ln, for
n ∈ N, contains the languages Lm, for m < n.
Definition 4.16 The language Ln has the following big sorts:
• Si, for i ∈ N ,
• T in, for i ∈ N .
Ln has the following small sorts:
• T ik, for i ∈ N , k = −1, 0, 1, . . . , n− 1.
Usually, one distinguishes between the sort Si (Tin, resp.) and the set Si
(T in, resp.) that interprets this sort in a structure corresponding to the language.
Since in all what follows, for each sort there will be just one fixed set interpreting
this sort, we will not make this distinction and we will denote a sort with the
same symbol as the corresponding set.
In the following, Z will be one of the sorts (resp. sets) Si, where i ∈ N, or
T ik, where i ∈ N and k = −1, 0, 1, . . . , n.
Definition 4.17 For a sort Z of Ln, we define
bign(Z) :=
{
Z, if Z is a big sort of Ln,
T in, if Z = T
i
k for a k < n and i ∈ N.
Definition 4.18 The alphabet of Ln contains the following symbols:
1. vZ0 , v
Z
1 , . . . , for each sort Z of Ln (variables of sort Z),
2. a constant z of sort Z, for each sort Z of Ln and each element z ∈ Z,
3. ¬,∨3 (not, or),
4. .= (equality symbol),
5. (,) (parentheses),
3∧,→,↔ are abbreviations defined in the usual way by ¬ and ∨.
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6. Bi, for Bi ∈ Bi and i ∈ N (Relation symbols (of sort Si)),
7. Rik, for i ∈ N and 0 ≤ k ≤ n (Relation symbols),
8. ∃, ∀ (existential and universal quantifier).
Note that the alphabet of Ln contains the alphabet of Lm, for −1 ≤ m < n.
Definition 4.19 Let Z be a sort of Ln. A term of sort Z is a variable of sort Z
or a constant of sort Z.
Definition 4.20 The set Ln of Ln-formulas is the least set such that:
1. If Z is a sort of Ln and if xZ and yZ are terms of sort Z, then xZ .= yZ is
a Ln-formula.
2. If −1 ≤ k < l ≤ n and i ∈ N, and if xT ik and yT il are terms of sort T ik and
T il , then x
T ikyT il is a Ln-formula.
3. If i ∈ N, and if xSi is a term of sort Si, then BixSi is a Ln-formula.
4. If 0 ≤ k ≤ n and i ∈ N, if xSi is a term of sort Si, and if xT jk is a term of
sort T jk , for j ∈ N , then Rik(xT ik , Bi, xSi , (xT jk )j 6=i) is a Ln-formula.
5. If ϕ is a Ln-formula, then ¬ϕ is a Ln-formula.
6. If ϕ and ψ are Ln-formulas, then (ϕ ∨ ψ)4 is a Ln-formula.
7. If Z is a sort of Ln, if ϕ is a Ln-formula, and if vZ is a variable of sort Z,
then ∃vZϕ and ∀vZϕ are Ln-formulas.
Note that Ln contains Lm, for −1 ≤ m < n.
Definition 4.21 For a term xZ of sort Z, where Z is a sort of Ln, define
var(xZ) :=
{ {xZ}, if xZ is a variable,
∅, if xZ is a constant.
4(ϕ ∧ ψ), (ϕ → ψ), (ϕ ↔ ψ) are defined by the use of ¬ and ∨ in the usual way. We omit
the parentheses whenever possible.
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Definition 4.22 We define now the set of free variables in a Ln-formula by
induction on the formation of the formulas in Ln :
free(xZ .= yZ) := var(xZ) ∪ var(yZ),
free(xT ikyT il ) := var(xT ik) ∪ var(yT il ),
free(Bix
Si) := var(xSi),
free(Rik(x
T ik , Bi, x
Si , (xT
j
k )j 6=i)) := var(xSi) ∪⋃j∈N var(xT jk ),
free(¬ϕ) := free(ϕ),
free(ϕ ∨ ψ) := free(ϕ) ∪ free(ψ),
free(∃vZnϕ) := free(ϕ) \ {vZn },
free(∀vZnϕ) := free(ϕ) \ {vZn }.
Definition 4.23 A Ln-assignment is a map
βn : {vZl | l ∈ N, Z is a sort of Ln} →
⋃
i∈N
(
Si ∪ T in ∪ Pow∅(T in)
)
such that
1. βn(vZl ) ∈ Z, if Z is a big sort of Ln, and
2. βn(v
T ik
l ) ∈ Pow∅(T in), where βn(vT
i
k
l ) = (q
i
k,n)
−1({tik}) for a tik ∈ T ik, if −1 ≤
k < n.
Definition 4.24 • If vZ′m is a variable of sort Z ′, where Z ′ is a big sort of Ln,
and if c ∈ Z ′, then we define
βn
c
vZ′m
(vZl ) :=
{
βn(vZl ), if v
Z′
m 6= vZl ,
c, if vZ′m = v
Z
l .
• If k < n, if vT ikm is a variable of sort T ik, and if tik ∈ T ik, then we define
βn
tik
v
Tik
m
(vZl ) :=
{
βn(vZl ), if v
T ik
m 6= vZl ,
(qik,n)
−1({tik}), if vT
i
k
m = vZl .
Definition 4.25 • We associate with every pair (An, βn) and every term xZ
of sort Z, where Z is a big sort of Ln, an element In(xZ) ∈ Z such that:
In(xZ) :=
{
βn(xZ), if xZ is a variable,
c, if xZ = c for a c ∈ Z.
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• We associate with every pair (An, βn) and every term xT ik of sort T ik, where−1 ≤ k < n, a nonempty subset In(xT ik) of T in such that:
In(xT ik) :=
{
βn(xT
i
k), if xT ik is a variable,
(qik,n)
−1({tik}), if xT ik = tik for a tik ∈ T ik.
Definition 4.26 We define the model relation “|=” by induction on the forma-
tion of the formulas in Ln:
(An, βn) |= xZ .= yZ iff In(xZ) = In(yZ),
(An, βn) |= xT ikyT im iff In(yT im) ⊆ In(xT ik),
for −1 ≤ k < m < n,
(An, βn) |= xT ikyT in iff In(yT in) ∈ In(xT ik),
for −1 ≤ k < n,
(An, βn) |= BixSi iff In(xSi) ∈ Bi,
(An, βn) |= Rik(xT ik , Bi, xSi , (xT jk )j 6=i) iff
In(xT ik)× {Bi} × {In(xSi)} × Πj 6=iIn(xT jk ) ⊆ Ri,nk , for 0 ≤ k < n,
(An, βn) |= Rin(xT in , Bi, xSi , (xT jn)j 6=i) iff
(In(xT in), Bi, In(xSi), (In(xT jn))j 6=i) ∈ Ri,nn , for 0 ≤ n,
(An, βn) |= ¬ϕ iff (An, βn) 6|= ϕ,
(An, βn) |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff (An, βn) |= ϕ or
(An, βn) |= ψ,
(An, βn) |= ∃vZl ϕ iff there is a c ∈ Z such
that (An, βn cvZl ) |= ϕ,
(An, βn) |= ∀vZl ϕ iff (An, βn) |= ¬∃vZl ¬ϕ.
Convention 4.2 If we write ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l ), for (not necessary different) sorts
Z1, . . . , Zl of Ln, we indicate that free(ϕ) ⊆ {vZ11 , . . . , vZll }.
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Definition 4.27 Let Z be a sort of Ln, let vZ be a variable of sort Z, and let
βn be a Ln-assignment. Define
βn(v
Z) :=
{
βn(vZ), if Z is a small sort of Ln,{βn(vZ)}, if Z is a big sort of Ln.
Definition 4.28 For m = 1, . . . , l let Zm be a sort of Ln and vZmm a variable of
sort Zm, and let βn be a Ln-assignment. Define
βn(v
Z1
1 , . . . , v
Zl
l ) := βn(v
Z1
1 )× . . .× βn(vZll ).
By definition, a straightforward check shows:
Lemma 4.9 Let n ∈ N ∪ {−1}, let βn, β′n be Ln-assignments and let ϕ ∈ Ln.
1. If βn  free(ϕ) = β′n  free(ϕ), then:
(An, βn) |= ϕ iff (An, β′n) |= ϕ.
2. Let Z1, . . . , Zl be sorts of Ln and vZmm be a variable of sort Zm, for m =
1, . . . , l, then:
βn(v
Z1
1 , . . . , v
Zl
l ) = β
′
n(v
Z1
1 , . . . , v
Zl
l ), iff
βn(vZmm ) = β
′
n(v
Zm
m ), for m = 1, . . . , l,
βn(v
Z1
1 , . . . , v
Zl
l ) ∩ β′n(vZ11 , . . . , vZll ) = ∅, else.
Definition 4.29 Let Z1, . . . , Zl be big sorts of Ln and let n ≥ k ≥ −1.
A subset A ⊆ Z1 × . . .× Zl is defined by ϕ(vZˆ11 , . . . , vZˆll ) ∈ Lk, iff
1. bign(Zˆm) = Zm, for m = 1, . . . , l,
2. A =
⋃{
βn(v
Zˆ1
1 , . . . , v
Zˆl
l )| βn Ln-assignment such that (An, βn) |= ϕ}.
A is Lk-definable, if there is a ϕ ∈ Lk such that A is defined by ϕ.
Notation 4.2 Let ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l ) ∈ Ln. Denote by [ϕ]An the subset of∏l
m=1 bign(Zm) that is defined by ϕ.
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Note that, by Lemma 4.9 and the fact that the possible values of a variable
of a small sort of Ln under Ln-assignments partition the corresponding big sort
of Ln, it follows that:
Remark 4.2 Let ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l ), ψ(v
Z1
1 , . . . , v
Zl
l ) ∈ Ln. Then:
[¬ϕ]An = (bign (Z1)× . . .× bign (Zl)) \ [ϕ]An
and
[ϕ ∨ ψ]An = [ϕ]An ∪ [ψ]An .
Note that all sorts of Ln are finite and for each element of each big sort of Ln
there is a constant symbol interpreted exactly by this element. It follows:
Remark 4.3 All subsets of all finite products of big sorts of Ln are Ln-definable.
Proof Let Z1, . . . , Zl be big sorts of Ln and ∅ 6= A ⊆ Z1 × . . . × Zl. (The case
A = ∅ is trivial).
ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l ) :=
∨
(c1,... ,cl)∈A
l∧
m=1
vZmm
.= cm
defines A.
Definition 4.30 1. Let n ≥ k ≥ −1 and Z1, . . . , Zl be big sorts of Ln. De-
note by
DefLk (Z1 × . . .× Zl)
the set of nonempty Lk-definable subsets of Z1 × . . .× Zl.
2. Let −1 ≤ k ≤ n, i ∈ N and Bi ∈ Bi. Denote by
DefLk
(
Bi × Πj 6=iT jn
)
the set of nonempty subsets
A ⊆ Bi × Πj 6=iT jn
such that there is a ϕ(vSi , (vZj)j 6=i) ∈ Lk with bign(Zj) = T jn, for j 6= i,
such that [ϕ]An = A.
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3. Let n ≥ k ≥ −1 and i ∈ N . Denote by
DefBiLk
(
Si × Πj 6=iT jn
)
the set of A-nice (B-nice) elements of∏
Bi∈Bi
DefLk
(
Bi × Πj 6=iT jn
)
in the A-version (in the B-version).
Note that if Ci, Di ∈ Bi, Ci ⊆ Di, −1 ≤ k ≤ n, and [ϕ]An ⊆ Di × Πj 6=iT jn, for
ϕ(vSi , (vZj)j 6=i) ∈ Lk, where bign(Zj) = T jn, for j 6= i, then
[ϕ]An ∩ (Ci × Πj 6=iT jn) = [ϕ(vSi , (vZj)j 6=i) ∧ C ivSi]An .
Note also that ϕ(vSi , (vZj)j 6=i) ∈ Lk implies that ϕ(vSi , (vZj)j 6=i) ∧ CivSi ∈ Lk.
Definition 4.31 Let −1 ≤ k < n and let Z be a sort of Lk. Define
piZk,n :=
{
qjk,n, if bigk(Z) = T
j
k , for a j ∈ N,
idSj , if bigk(Z) = Sj, for a j ∈ N.
Lemma 4.10 Let −1 ≤ k < n and let βn be a Ln-assignment. Define for j ∈ N :
(βn)k(vT
j
m) := (qjm,k)
−1({tjm}), for the unique tjm ∈ T jm such that
βn(vT
j
m) = (qjm,n)
−1({tjm}), if − 1 ≤ m < k,
(βn)k(vT
j
k ) := the unique tjk ∈ T jk such that βn(vT jk ) = (qjk,n)−1({tjk}),
(βn)k(vSj) := βn(v
Sj).
Then:
1. (βn)k is a Lk-assignment.
2. For every Lk-assignment βk, there is a Ln-assignment βn such that βk =
(βn)k.
3. If (βn)k = (β
′
n)k, then βn and β
′
n coincide on the variables of Lk-sorts.
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Proof The first and the third point are clear, for the second:
Define for j ∈ N :
βn(vT
j
m) := (qjk,n)
−1(βk(vT
j
m)), if − 1 ≤ m < k,
βn(vT
j
k ) := (qjk,n)
−1({βk(vT jk )}),
βn(vSj) := βk(vSj).
It is obvious that βn can be extended to a Ln-assignment.
Lemma 4.11 Let −1 ≤ k < n and ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , vZll ) ∈ Lk. Then:(
Πlm=1pi
Zm
k,n
)−1 (
[ϕ]Ak
)
= [ϕ]An .
Proof By Lemma 4.9 and Lemma 4.10 it is enough to show by induction on the
formation of the formulas ϕ ∈ Lk that for every Ln-assignment βn :
(Ak, (βn)k) |= ϕ iff (An, βn) |= ϕ.
Note that for terms In(xZ) = (piZk,n)−1 (Ik(xZ)) , if Z is a small sort of Lk or if
Z = Sj for a j ∈ N , and In(xZ) = (piZk,n)−1 ({Ik(xZ)}) , if Z = T jk for a j ∈ N .
• For atomic formulas ϕ (i.e. formulas as in 1., 2., 3. and 4. of Definition 4.20),
by the above observation, it is easily seen from (an iterated application of)
1. of Proposition 4.1 and from the definition of “|=” that
(Ak, (βn)k) |= ϕ iff (An, βn) |= ϕ.
• The cases “ϕ = ¬ψ” and “ϕ = ψ0∨ψ1” follow from Lemma 4.9, Lemma 4.10
and the fact that inverse images commute with unions and complements.
• Let ϕ = ∃vZψ, where Z is a sort of Lk: According to the induction hypoth-
esis, we have for c ∈ Z:(
Ak, (βn cvZ )k
)
|= ψ iff
(
An, βn cvZ
)
|= ψ.
The assertion follows now from the fact that (βn)k
c
vZ = (βn
c
vZ )k.
• The case ϕ = ∀vZψ, where Z is a sort of Lk follows from the “ ¬ ”-case
and the “ ∃ ”-case.
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Proposition 4.2 Let n ∈ N and i ∈ N.
1. Let
ϕBi(vSiBi , (v
T jk(j,Bi)
Bi )j 6=i) ∈ Ln−1, for Bi ∈ Bi,
such that (
[ϕBi ]An−1
)
Bi∈Bi ∈ PowBi∅ (Si × Πj 6=iT jn−1).
Then there is exactly one tin ∈ T in such that for all Bi ∈ Bi :[
Rin(t
i
n, Bi, v
Si
Bi , (v
T jn
Bi )j 6=i)
]An
= [ϕBi ]An .
2. For every tin ∈ T in there are ϕBi(vSiBi , (v
T jk(j,Bi)
Bi )j 6=i) ∈ Ln−1, for Bi ∈ Bi, such
that [
Rin(t
i
n, Bi, v
Si
Bi , (v
T jn
Bi )j 6=i)
]An
= [ϕBi ]An for all Bi ∈ Bi,
and such that (
[ϕBi ]An−1
)
Bi∈Bi ∈ PowBi∅ (Si × Πj 6=iT jn−1).
3. For every tin ∈ T in :([
Rin(t
i
n, Bi, v
Si
Bi , (v
T jn
Bi )j 6=i)
]An)
Bi∈Bi
∈ PowBi∅ (Si × Πj 6=iT jn).
Proof
1. By the definition is[
Rin
(
tin, Bi, v
Si
Bi , (v
T jn
Bi )j 6=i
)]An
=
(
idSi × Πj 6=iqjn−1,n
)−1 (
tin(Bi)
)
.
The existence of a tin like in the first point of the lemma follows now from
Lemma 4.11 and the definitions of T in and R
i,n
n . The uniqueness follows from
the above equation, the definition of T in and the fact that idSi ×Πj 6=iqjn−1,n
is onto.
2. Follows from the definition of T in and R
i,n
n , the above equation, and Remark
4.3 and Lemma 4.11.
3. Since idSi × Πj 6=iqjn−1,n is onto and since inverse images commute with
unions, intersections and complements, it follows (in the A-version and
in the B-version) that:((
idSi × Πj 6=iqjn−1,n
)−1 (
tin(Bi)
))
Bi∈Bi
∈ PowBi∅
(
Si × Πj 6=iT jn
)
.
Now apply the above equation.
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4.4.3 Limit Structure
We are now in a position to define the main object of our study in this section,
namely the limit structure A, which is also an “extended” conditional possibility
structure that contains (the inverse images of) the finite-step structures An.
Definition 4.32 For i ∈ N define:
T i ⊆ ∏−1≤n T in, such that
T i :=
{
(tin)−1≤n |qin,n+1(tin+1) = tin, for all n ≥ −1
}
,
pim : T
i → T im, such that
pim
(
(tin)−1≤n
)
:= tim, for m ≥ −1,
Rin ⊆ T i × Bi × Si × Πj 6=iT j, such that
(ti, Bi, si, (tj)j 6=i) ∈ Rin iff (pin(ti), Bi, si, (pjn(tj))j 6=i) ∈ Ri,nn , for n ∈ N,
Ri ⊆ T i × Bi × Si × Πj 6=iT j, such that
(ti, Bi, si, (tj)j 6=i) ∈ Ri iff for all n ∈ N : (ti, Bi, si, (tj)j 6=i) ∈ Rin,
i.e. Ri :=
⋂
n∈NRin .
Definition 4.33 Define A :=〈
(Si)i∈N , (Bi)i∈N ,
(
T i
)
i∈N ,
(
T im
)
i∈N,−1≤m ,
(
Ri
)
i∈N ,
(
Rin
)
i∈N,0≤n ,
(
pim
)
i∈N,−1≤m
〉
.
Proposition 4.3 A has the following properties:
1. T i is nonempty, for i ∈ N .
2. pim : T
i → T im is onto, for i ∈ N and m ∈ N ∪ {−1}.
3. qim,n ◦ pin = pim, for i ∈ N, n ∈ N and −1 ≤ m < n.
Proof For every i ∈ N and m ∈ N ∪ {−1} , endow Si and T im with the discrete
topology. Since each of these spaces is nonempty and finite, each of them is then
a nonempty compactum. By induction, it follows from Lemma 4.6 that for every
i ∈ N and every n ∈ N :
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1. T in = VBi
(
Si × Πj 6=iT jn−1
)
.
2. The topology of VBi (Si × Πj 6=iT jn−1) is the discrete topology, hence the
topologies on T in and VBi
(
Si × Πj 6=iT jn−1
)
are the same, and they are com-
pact and Hausdorff.
3. T i is the underlying set of the projective limit of the projective system(
T in, q
i
n,n+1
)
n∈N∪{−1} .
4. For every m ∈ N ∪ {−1} , the T im here is then the T im in the third point of
Theorem 4.1, the qim,m+1 here is the q
i
m+1 there and the T
i here is the T i
there.
The proposition follows now from Theorem 4.1.
4.4.4 Infinitary Languages
We define the languages L∗ and L−, which are needed to define the limit language
L. Each of the languages L∗, L−and L contains all the languages Ln, for n ∈
N∪{−1} . L∗ contains L− and L, and L− contains L.
Definition 4.34 The languages L∗, L− and L have the following big sorts:
• Si, for i ∈ N ,
• T i, for i ∈ N .
L∗, L− and L have the following small sorts:
• T ik, for i ∈ N , k ∈ N ∪ {−1}.
In the following, Z will be one of the sorts (resp. sets) Si, where i ∈ N , T i,
where i ∈ N, or T ik, where i ∈ N and k ∈ N ∪ {−1} .
Definition 4.35 For a sort Z of L∗, L− or L, we define
big(Z) :=
{
Z, if Z is a big sort of L∗,L− or L,
T i, if Z = T ik for a k ∈ N∪{−1} and i ∈ N.
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Definition 4.36 The alphabet of L∗, L− and L contains the following symbols:
1. vZ0 , v
Z
1 , . . . , for each sort Z of L∗, L− or L (variables of sort Z),
2. a constant z of sort Z, for each sort Z of L∗, L− or L and each element
z ∈ Z,
3. ¬,∨5 (not, or),
4.
∧
(conjunction),
5. .= (equality symbol),
6. (,) (parentheses),
7. Bi, for Bi ∈ Bi and i ∈ N (Relation symbols (of sort Si)),
8. Ri, for i ∈ N ,
9. Rik, for i ∈ N and k ∈ N (Relation symbols),
10. ∃, ∀ (existential and universal quantifier).
Note that the alphabet of L∗, L− and L contains the alphabet of Ln, for every
n ∈ N ∪ {−1}.
Definition 4.37 Let Z be a sort of L∗, L− or L. A term of sort Z is a variable
of sort Z or a constant of sort Z.
Definition 4.38 The class L∗ of L∗-formulas is the least class such that:
1. If ϕ ∈ ⋃n≥−1 Ln, then ϕ is a L∗-formula.
2. If i ∈ N, and if xT i and yT i are terms of sort T i, then xT i .= yT i is a
L∗-formula.
3. If k ∈ N ∪ {−1} and i ∈ N, and if xT ik and yT i are terms of sort T ik and T i,
then xT ikyT i is a L∗-formula.
4. If i ∈ N, if xSi is a term of sort Si, and if xT j is a term of sort T j, for j ∈ N ,
then Ri(xT i , Bi, x
Si , (xT j)j 6=i) is a L∗-formula.
5. If ϕ is a L∗-formula, then ¬ϕ is a L∗-formula.
5∧,→,↔ are abbreviations defined in the usual way by ¬ and ∨.
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6. If ϕ and ψ are L∗-formulas, then (ϕ ∨ ψ)6 is a L∗-formula.
7. If Φ is a set of formulas, then
∧
ϕ∈Φ ϕ is a L∗-formula.
8. If Z is a sort of L∗, if ϕ is a L∗-formula, and if vZ is a variable of sort Z,
then ∃vZϕ and ∀vZϕ are L∗-formulas.
Definition 4.39 For a term xZ of sort Z, where Z is a sort of L∗ (L− or L,
resp.), define
var(xZ) :=
{ {xZ}, if xZ is a variable,
∅, if xZ is a constant.
Definition 4.40 We define now the set of free variables in L∗-formulas (and
hence in L−-formulas and in L-formulas) by induction on the formation of the
formulas in L∗ :
If ϕ ∈ Ln for some n ∈ N ∪ {−1}, then, by Definition 4.22, free(ϕ) is already
defined.
free(xT i .= yT i) := var(xT i) ∪ var(yT i),
free(xT ikyT i) := var(xT ik) ∪ var(yT i),
free(Ri(xT
i , Bi, x
Si , (xT j)j 6=i)) := var(xSi) ∪⋃j∈N var(xT j),
free(¬ϕ) := free(ϕ),
free(ϕ ∨ ψ) := free(ϕ) ∪ free(ψ),
free(
∧
ϕ∈Φ ϕ) :=
⋃
ϕ∈Φ free (ϕ) ,
free(∃vZnϕ) := free(ϕ) \ {vZn },
free(∀vZnϕ) := free(ϕ) \ {vZn }.
Since the rules for “¬ϕ”, “ϕ∨ψ”, “∃vZnϕ”, and “∀vZnϕ” coincide in this definition
and in Definition 4.22, free(ϕ) is well-defined, for all ϕ ∈ L∗ (and hence for all
ϕ ∈ L− (for all ϕ ∈ L, resp.)).
Definition 4.41 The class L− of L−-formulas is the least class such that:
1. If ϕ ∈ ⋃n≥−1 Ln, then ϕ is a L−-formula.
2. If i ∈ N, and if xT i and yT i are terms of sort T i, then xT i .= yT i is a
L−-formula.
6Also in the languages L∗, L− and L, (ϕ ∧ ψ), (ϕ → ψ), (ϕ ↔ ψ) are defined by the use of
¬ and ∨ in the usual way. We omit the parentheses whenever possible.
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3. If k ∈ N ∪ {−1} and i ∈ N, and if xT ik and yT i are terms of sort T ik and T i,
then xT ikyT i is a L−-formula.
4. If i ∈ N, if xSi is a term of sort Si, and if xT j is a term of sort T j, for j ∈ N ,
then Ri(xT i , Bi, x
Si , (xT j)j 6=i) is a L−-formula.
5. If ϕ is a L−-formula, then ¬ϕ is a L−-formula.
6. If ϕ and ψ are L−-formulas, then (ϕ ∨ ψ) is a L−-formula.
7. If Φ is a set of formulas, and if there is a finite set V of variables of L− such
that for all ϕ ∈ Φ: free(ϕ) ⊆ V , then ∧ϕ∈Φ ϕ is a L−-formula.
8. If Z is a sort of L−, if ϕ is a L−-formula, and if vZ is a variable of sort Z,
then ∃vZϕ and ∀vZϕ are L−-formulas.
As already mentioned, L− is contained in L∗.
4.4.5 Limit Language
We define the “neocompact” language L induced by A. This language contains
all the languages Ln and can be viewed as the “projective limit” of the languages
Ln, n ∈ N∪{−1} . L is defined in the spirit of the neocompact language invented
by Keisler (1998). After some preparations, we prove that the limit structure
A is L-definably beliefs complete. Furthermore we show that the possibility
correspondence that sends ti ∈ T i to Ri (ti) , i.e. the ti-section of i’s possibil-
ity relation Ri, is a bijection from T i to DefBiL (Si × Πj 6=iT j) , i.e. the space of
nonempty L-definable conditional i-events.
Definition 4.42 The class L of L-formulas is the least class such that:
1. If ϕ ∈ ⋃n≥−1 Ln, then ϕ is a L-formula.
2. If i ∈ N, and if xT i and yT i are terms of sort T i, then xT i .= yT i is a
L-formula.
3. If k ∈ N ∪ {−1} and i ∈ N, and if xT ik and yT i are terms of sort T ik and T i,
then xT ikyT i is a L-formula.
4. If i ∈ N, if xSi is a term of sort Si, and if xT j is a term of sort T j, for j ∈ N ,
then Ri(xT i , Bi, x
Si , (xT j)j 6=i) is a L-formula.
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5. If ϕ and ψ are L-formulas, then (ϕ ∨ ψ) is a L-formula.
6. If Φ is a set of formulas, and if there is a finite set V of variables of L such
that for all ϕ ∈ Φ: free(ϕ) ⊆ V , then ∧ϕ∈Φ ϕ is a L-formula.
7. If Z is a sort of L, if ϕ is a L-formula, and if vZ is a variable of sort Z, then
∃vZϕ is a L-formula.
8. If ψ is a L−-formula such that free(ψ) ⊆
{
vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l
}
, where vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l
are variables of sorts Z1, . . . , Zl, and if ϕ is a L-formula, then
∀vZ11 . . .∀vZll (ψ → ϕ) 7 is a L-formula.
Note that L is contained in L− (and hence in L∗).
Definition 4.43 A L-assignment (or equivalently: a L−-assignment, resp. L∗-
assignment) is a map
β : {vZl | l ∈ N, Z sort of L} →
⋃
i∈N
(
Si ∪ T i ∪ Pow∅(T i))
such that
1. β(vZl ) ∈ Z, if Z is a big sort of L, and
2. β(vT
i
k
l ) ∈ Pow∅(T i), where β(vT
i
k
l ) = (p
i
k)
−1({tik}) for a tik ∈ T ik, if k ∈
N ∪ {−1}.
Definition 4.44 • If vZ′m is a variable of sort Z ′, where Z ′ is a big sort of L,
and if c ∈ Z ′, then we define
β c
vZ′m
(vZl ) :=
{
β(vZl ), if v
Z′
m 6= vZl ,
c, if vZ′m = v
Z
l .
• If k ∈ N∪{−1}, if vT ikm is a variable of sort T ik, and if tik ∈ T ik, then we define
β t
i
k
v
Tik
m
(vZl ) :=
{
β(vZl ), if v
T ik
m 6= vZl ,
(pik)
−1({tik}), if vT
i
k
m = vZl .
7(ψ → ϕ) stands for ((¬ψ) ∨ ϕ) .
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Definition 4.45 • We associate with every pair (A, β) and every term xZ
of sort Z, where Z is a big sort of L, an element I(xZ) ∈ Z such that:
I(xZ) :=
{
β(xZ), if xZ is a variable,
c, if xZ = c for a c ∈ Z.
• We associate with every pair (A, β) and every term xT ik of sort T ik, where
k ∈ N ∪ {−1}, a nonempty subset I(xT ik) of T i such that:
I(xT ik) :=
{
β(xT ik), if xT ik is a variable,
(pik)
−1({tik}), if xT ik = tik for a tik ∈ T ik.
Definition 4.46 We define the model relation “|=” by induction on the forma-
tion of the formulas in L∗ (and hence also in L− and in L):
(A, β) |= xZ .= yZ iff I(xZ) = I(yZ),
(A, β) |= xT ikyT im iff I(yT im) ⊆ I(xT ik),
for −1 ≤ k < m,
(A, β) |= xT ikyT i iff I(yT i) ∈ I(xT ik), for k ∈ N∪{−1} ,
(A, β) |= BixSi iff I(xSi) ∈ Bi,
(A, β) |= Rik(xT ik , Bi, xSi , (xT jk )j 6=i) iff
I(xT ik)× {Bi} × {I(xSi)} × Πj 6=iI(xT jk ) ⊆ Rik, for k ∈ N,
(A, β) |= Ri(xT i , Bi, xSi , (xT j)j 6=i) iff
(I(xT i), Bi, I(xSi), (I(xT j))j 6=i) ∈ Ri,
(A, β) |= ¬ϕ iff (A, β) 6|= ϕ,
(A, β) |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff (A, β) |= ϕ or (A, β) |= ψ,
(A, β) |= ∧ϕ∈Φ ϕ iff for all ϕ ∈ Φ: (A, β) |= ϕ,
(A, β) |= ∃vZnϕ iff there is a c ∈ Z such
that (A, β cvZn ) |= ϕ,
(A, β) |= ∀vZnϕ iff (A, β) |= ¬∃vZn¬ϕ.
Convention 4.3 If we write ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l ), for (not necessary different) sorts
Z1, . . . , Zl of L (L−, resp.), we indicate that free(ϕ) ⊆ {vZ11 , . . . , vZll }.
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Definition 4.47 Let Z be a sort of L (L−, resp.), let vZ be a variable of sort Z,
and let β be a L-assignment. Define
β(vZ) :=
{
β(vZ), if Z is a small sort of L,
{β(vZ)}, if Z is a big sort of L.
Definition 4.48 For m = 1, . . . , l let Zm be a sort of L and vZmm a variable of
sort Zm, and let β be a L-assignment. Define
β(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l ) := β(v
Z1
1 )× . . .× β(vZll ).
Again, by definition, a straightforward check shows:
Lemma 4.12 Let β, β′ be L-assignments and let ϕ ∈ L (ϕ ∈ L−, resp.).
1. If β  free(ϕ) = β′  free(ϕ), then:
(A, β) |= ϕ iff (A, β′) |= ϕ.
2. Let Z1, . . . , Zl be sorts of L and vZmm be a variable of sort Zm, for m =
1, . . . , l, then:
β(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l ) = β
′(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l ), iff
β(vZmm ) = β
′(vZmm ), for m = 1, . . . , l,
β(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l ) ∩ β′(vZ11 , . . . , vZll ) = ∅, else.
Definition 4.49 Let Z1, . . . , Zl be big sorts of L and let k ∈ N ∪ {−1}.
A subset A ⊆ Z1 × . . .× Zl is defined by ϕ(vZˆ11 , . . . , vZˆll ) ∈ L (ϕ(vZˆ11 , . . . , vZˆll ) ∈L−, resp.), iff
1. big(Zˆm) = Zm, for m = 1, . . . , l,
2. A =
⋃{
β(vZˆ11 , . . . , v
Zˆl
l )| β L-assignment such that (A, β) |= ϕ} .
A is L-definable (L−-definable, resp.), if there is a ϕ ∈ L (ϕ ∈ L−, resp.) such
that A is defined by ϕ.
A is Lk-definable, if there is a ϕ ∈ Lk such that A is defined by ϕ.
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Notation 4.3 Let ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l ) ∈ L (ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , vZll ) ∈ L−, resp.). Denote by
[ϕ]A the subset of
∏l
m=1 big(Zm) that is defined by ϕ.
Note that, by Lemma 4.12 and the fact that the possible values of a variable
of a small sort of L under L-assignments partition the corresponding big sort of
L, it follows that:
Remark 4.4 Let ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l ), ψ(v
Z1
1 , . . . , v
Zl
l ) ∈ L (ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , vZll ),
ψ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l ) ∈ L−, resp.), and let Φ ⊆ L (Φ ⊆ L−, resp.) such that there is a
finite set of variables V such that for all ϕ ∈ Φ : free(ϕ) ⊆ V. Then:
[¬ϕ]A = (big (Z1)× . . .× big (Zl) ) \ [ϕ]A,
[ϕ ∨ ψ]A = [ϕ]A ∪ [ψ]A,[∧
ϕ∈Φ ϕ
]A
=
⋂
ϕ∈Φ [ϕ]
A .
Definition 4.50 1. Let k ∈ N∪{−1} and Z1, . . . , Zl be big sorts of L. Denote
by
(a)
DefLk (Z1 × . . .× Zl)
the set of nonempty Lk-definable subsets of Z1 × . . .× Zl, and by
(b)
DefL (Z1 × . . .× Zl)
the set of nonempty L-definable subsets of Z1 × . . .× Zl.
2. Let k ∈ N ∪ {−1}, i ∈ N and Bi ∈ Bi. Denote by
(a)
DefLk
(
Bi × Πj 6=iT j)
the set of nonempty subsets
A ⊆ Bi × Πj 6=iT j
such that there is a ϕ(vSi , (vZj)j 6=i) ∈ Lk with big(Zj) = T j, for j 6= i,
such that [ϕ]A = A, and by
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(b)
DefL
(
Bi × Πj 6=iT j)
the set of nonempty subsets
A ⊆ Bi × Πj 6=iT j
such that there is a ϕ(vSi , (vZj)j 6=i) ∈ L with big(Zj) = T j, for j 6= i,
such that [ϕ]A = A.
3. Let k ∈ N ∪ {−1} and i ∈ N . Denote by
(a)
DefBiLk
(
Si × Πj 6=iT j)
the set of A-nice (B-nice) elements of∏
Bi∈Bi
DefLk
(
Bi × Πj 6=iT j)
in the A-version (in the B-version), and by
(b)
DefBiL
(
Si × Πj 6=iT j)
the set of A-nice (B-nice) elements of∏
Bi∈Bi
DefL
(
Bi × Πj 6=iT j)
in the A-version (in the B-version).
Note that if Ci, Di ∈ Bi, Ci ⊆ Di, k ∈ N ∪ {−1} , and [ϕ]A ⊆ Di × Πj 6=iT j, for
ϕ(vSi , (vZj)j 6=i) ∈ Lk (resp. ϕ(vSi , (vZj)j 6=i) ∈ L), where big(Zj) = T j, for j 6= i,
then
[ϕ]A ∩ (Ci × Πj 6=iT j) = [ϕ(vSi , (vZj)j 6=i) ∧ C ivSi]A .
Note furthermore that ϕ(vSi , (vZj)j 6=i) ∈ Lk (resp. ϕ(vSi , (vZj)j 6=i) ∈ L) implies
that ϕ(vSi , (vZj)j 6=i) ∧ C ivSi ∈ Lk (resp. ϕ(vSi , (vZj)j 6=i) ∧ C ivSi ∈ L).
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Definition 4.51 Let k ∈ N ∪ {−1} and let Z be a sort of Lk. Define
piZk :=
{
pjk, if bigk(Z) = T
j
k , for a j ∈ N,
idSj , if bigk(Z) = Sj, for a j ∈ N.
Lemma 4.13 Let k ∈ N∪{−1} and let β be a L-assignment. Define for j ∈ N :
(β)k(vT
j
m) := (qjm,k)
−1({tjm}), for the unique tjm ∈ T jm such that
β(vT
j
m) = (pjm)
−1({tjm}), if − 1 ≤ m < k,
(β)k(vT
j
k ) := the unique tjk ∈ T jk such that β(vT jk ) = (pjk)−1({tjk}),
(β)k(vSj) := β(vSj).
Then:
1. (β)k is a Lk-assignment.
2. For every Lk-assignment βk, there is a L-assignment β such that βk = (β)k.
3. If (β)k = (β′)k, then β and β′ coincide on the variables of Lk-sorts.
Proof The first and the third point are clear, for the second:
Define for j ∈ N :
β(vT
j
m) := (pjk)
−1(βk(vT
j
m)), if − 1 ≤ m < k,
β(vT
j
k ) := (pjk)
−1({βk(vT jk )}),
β(vSj) := βk(vSj).
It is obvious that β can be extended to a L-assignment.
Lemma 4.14 Let k ∈ N ∪ {−1} and ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , vZll ) ∈ Lk. Then:(
Πlm=1pi
Zm
k
)−1 (
[ϕ]Ak
)
= [ϕ]A.
Proof The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.11: Lemma 4.12 plays
now the role of Lemma 4.9 and Lemma 4.13 plays the role of Lemma 4.10.
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Proposition 4.4 Let n ∈ N and i ∈ N.
1. Let
ϕBi(vSiBi , (v
T jk(j,Bi)
Bi )j 6=i) ∈ Ln−1, for Bi ∈ Bi,
such that (
[ϕBi ]An−1
)
Bi∈Bi ∈ PowBi∅ (Si × Πj 6=iT jn−1).
Then there is exactly one tin ∈ T in such that for all Bi ∈ Bi :[
Rin(t
i
n, Bi, v
Si
Bi , (v
T jn
Bi )j 6=i)
]A
= [ϕBi ]A.
2. For every tin ∈ T in there are ϕBi(vSiBi , (v
T jk(j,Bi)
Bi )j 6=i) ∈ Ln−1, for Bi ∈ Bi, such
that [
Rin(t
i
n, Bi, v
Si
Bi , (v
T jn
Bi )j 6=i)
]A
= [ϕBi ]A for all Bi ∈ Bi,
and such that (
[ϕBi ]An−1
)
Bi∈Bi ∈ PowBi∅ (Si × Πj 6=iT jn−1).
3. For every tin ∈ T in :([
Rin(t
i
n, Bi, v
Si
Bi , (v
T jn
Bi )j 6=i)
]A)
Bi∈Bi
∈ PowBi∅ (Si × Πj 6=iT j).
Proof
1. The existence of such a tin follows from Lemma 4.14 and 1 of Proposition
4.2. The uniqueness follows from the uniqueness of the tin in 1 of Proposition
4.2, Lemma 4.14, and the fact that all the piZmn are onto (2 of Proposition
4.3).
2. Follows from Lemma 4.14 and 2 of Proposition 4.2.
3. Since all the piZmn are onto and since inverse images commute with unions,
intersections and complements, it follows (in the A-version and in the B-
version) for
(ABi)Bi∈Bi ∈ PowBi∅
(
Si × Πj 6=iT jn
)
that ((
idSi × Πj 6=ipjn
)−1 (ABi))
Bi∈Bi
∈ PowBi∅
(
Si × Πj 6=iT j) .
The result follows now from 3 of Proposition 4.2 and Lemma 4.14.
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Lemma 4.15 Let X and Y be compacta and let A ⊆ X × Y be closed in X × Y
with respect to the product topology. Then projX(A), the image of A under the
projection to X, is closed in X.
Proof The projection is continuous. Since A is closed and X×Y is compact, A is
compact (with respect to the relative topology). Therefore projX(A) is compact.
Since X is Hausdorff, projX(A) is closed in X.
Remark and Convention 4.1 As in the proof of Proposition 4.3, endow, for
every i ∈ N and m ∈ N ∪ {−1} , Si and T im with the discrete topology. Since
each of these spaces is nonempty and finite, each of them is then a nonempty
compactum. By induction, it follows from Lemma 4.6 that for every i ∈ N and
every n ∈ N :
1. T in = VBi
(
Si × Πj 6=iT jn−1
)
.
2. The topology of VBi (Si × Πj 6=iT jn−1) is the discrete topology, hence the topolo-
gies on T in and VBi
(
Si × Πj 6=iT jn−1
)
are the same, and they are compact and
Hausdorff.
3. T i is the underlying set of the projective limit of the projective system(
T in, q
i
n,n+1
)
n∈N∪{−1} .
4. For every m ∈ N ∪ {−1} , the T im here is then the T im in the third point of
Theorem 4.1, the qim,m+1 here is the q
i
m+1 there and the T
i here is the T i
there.
For the rest of this chapter, we consider T im, for i ∈ N and m ∈ N ∪ {−1} , as
topological space endowed with the discrete topology, and T i, for i ∈ N, as topo-
logical space endowed with the projective limit topology induced by the projective
system
(
T in, q
i
n,n+1
)
n∈N∪{−1} . This enables us to apply, in all what follows, Theo-
rem 4.1. In particular, the pim, for i ∈ N and m ∈ N∪{−1} , are then continuous
and onto, and the T i, for i ∈ N, are then nonempty compacta.
Lemma 4.16 Let Z1, . . . , Zl be sorts of L and consider each of the spaces
big (Z1) , . . . , big (Zl) as topological space endowed with the topology of Remark
and Convention 4.1.
Let ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l ) ∈ L− (∈ L, resp.) be such that [ϕ]A is closed in big (Z1)×. . .×
big (Zl) endowed with the product topology, and let cm ∈ Zm, for m = lˆ+1, . . . , l,
where lˆ < l. Set
ψ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zlˆ
lˆ
) := ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zlˆ
lˆ
, clˆ+1, . . . , cl).
Then [ψ]A is closed in big (Z1)× . . .×big (Zlˆ) endowed with the product topology.
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Proof We show the lemma for lˆ+1 = l, the rest follows immediately by induction.
By the definitions of assignments and of the relation “|=”, it follows that:
• If Zl is a big sort of L, then [ψ]A is the image of
[ϕ]A ∩ (big (Z1)× . . .× big (Zlˆ)× {cl})
under the projection to big (Z1)× . . .× big (Zlˆ).
• If Zl is a small sort of L, i.e. if Zl = T jk , for a k ∈ N ∪ {−1} and a j ∈ N ,
then [ψ]A is the image of
[ϕ]A ∩ (big (Z1)× . . .× big (Zlˆ)× (pjk)−1 ({cl}))
under the projection to big (Z1)× . . .× big (Zlˆ).
[ϕ]A ∩ (big (Z1)× . . .× big (Zlˆ)× {cl}) ,
respectively
[ϕ]A ∩ (big (Z1)× . . .× big (Zlˆ)× (pjk)−1 ({cl}))
is closed in big (Z1) × . . . × big (Zl). By the above lemma, it follows now that
[ψ]A is closed in big (Z1)× . . .× big (Zlˆ).
Notation 4.4 For i ∈ N, let δi be the homeomorphism defined in Theorem 4.1.
If
δi
(
ti
)
= (ABi)Bi∈Bi ∈ VBi(Si × Πj 6=iT j)
and Ci ∈ Bi, then define (
δi
(
ti
))
(Ci) := ACi .
Definition 4.52 For i ∈ N and ti ∈ T i define
posi
(
ti
)
:=
([
Ri(ti, Bi, v
Si
Bi , (v
T j
Bi )j 6=i)
]A)
Bi∈Bi
.
Now, we state and prove the main results of Section 4.4, Theorem 4.2, Corol-
lary 4.2, and Corollary 4.3.
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Theorem 4.2 For every i ∈ N :
•
posi : T
i → DefBiL
(
Si × Πj 6=iT j) ,
•
DefBiL
(
Si × Πj 6=iT j) = VBi (Si × Πj 6=iT j) ,
•
posi = δ
i,
where δi is the δi defined in Theorem 4.1.
Proof ot the theorem We apply Remark and Convention 4.1. In particular,
we endow Si, for i ∈ N , and T im, for i ∈ N and m ∈ N∪ {−1} , with the discrete
topology, and T i, for i ∈ N , with the projective limit topology. In all what follows
let δi be the δi defined in Theorem 4.1. By definition, we have for every ti ∈ T i :
δi(ti) ∈ ∏Bi∈Bi V (Bi × Πj 6=iT j) ⊆∏
Bi∈Bi Pow∅ (Bi × Πj 6=iT j) and([
Ri
(
ti, Bi, v
Si
Bi , (v
T j
Bi )j 6=i
)]A)
Bi∈Bi
∈ ∏Bi∈Bi DefL (Bi × Πj 6=iT j) ⊆∏
Bi∈Bi Pow∅ (Bi × Πj 6=iT j) .
We show:
Lemma 4.17 For every i ∈ N, ti ∈ T i, and Bi ∈ Bi :(
δi(ti)
)
(Bi) =
[
Ri
(
ti, Bi, v
Si
Bi , (v
T j
Bi )j 6=i
)]A
.
Proof of the lemma By the definitions:
(ti, Bi, si, (tj)j 6=i) ∈ Ri iff for all n ∈ N: (pin(ti), Bi, si, (pjn(tj))j 6=i) ∈ Ri,nn
iff for all n ∈ N: (si, (pjn−1(tj))j 6=i) ∈ (pin(ti))(Bi).
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This shows that⋂
n∈N
(
idSi × Πj 6=ipjn−1
)−1 (
(pin(t
i))(Bi)
)
=
[
Ri
(
ti, Bi, v
Si
Bi , (v
T j
Bi )j 6=i
)]A
.
We have to verify the following
Claim:
(δi(ti))(Bi) =
⋂
n∈N
(
idSi × Πj 6=ipjn−1
)−1 (
(pin(t
i))(Bi)
)
.
By the third point of Theorem 4.1, we have for n ∈ N:
VBi (idSi × Πj 6=ipjn−1) (δi(ti)) = pin(ti).
It follows that
(δi(ti))(Bi) ⊆ (idSi × Πj 6=ipjn−1)−1 ((pin(ti))(Bi)) ,
hence (δi(ti))(Bi) ⊆ ⋂m∈N (idSi × Πj 6=ipjm−1)−1 ((pim(ti))(Bi)) .
The right-hand-side above is closed, since each of the(
idSi × Πj 6=ipjm−1
)−1
((pim(t
i))(Bi)) is closed in Bi × Πj 6=iT j as an inverse image
of a closed set under a continuous map, and the left-hand-side is closed by the
definition of δi.
From the proof of Lemma 4.8 (the part “ γi is one-to-one”) follows for Bi ∈ Bi,
that, if ABi and KBi are closed in Bi × Πj 6=iT j and if for all m ∈ N ∪ {−1}(
idSi × Πj 6=ipjm
)
(ABi) =
(
idSi × Πj 6=ipjm
)
(KBi) ,
then ABi = KBi .
For n ∈ N ∪ {−1}, we have
(VBi (idSi × Πj 6=ipjn) (δi(ti))) (Bi)
= (idSi × Πj 6=ipjn)
(
(δi(ti))(Bi)
)
⊆ (idSi × Πj 6=ipjn)(⋂m∈N (idSi × Πj 6=ipjm−1)−1 ((pim(ti))(Bi)))
⊆ (pin+1(ti)) (Bi)
=
(VBi (idSi × Πj 6=ipjn) (δi(ti))) (Bi).
So, the Claim and therefore also the Lemma is proved.
4.4. DEFINABLE COMPLETENESS 187
We proceed with the proof of the theorem. We showed now that δi = posi,
for i ∈ N. Since, for i ∈ N and ti ∈ T i, δi (ti) is A-nice in the A-version (resp.
B-nice in the B-version), if follows that, for i ∈ N :
posi : T
i → DefBiL
(
Si × Πj 6=iT j) .
Since
δi : T i → VBi (Si × Πj 6=iT j)
is onto, for i ∈ N, it follows that, for i ∈ N :
VBi (Si × Πj 6=iT j) ⊆ DefBiL (Si × Πj 6=iT j) .
It remains to show that
DefBiL
(
Si × Πj 6=iT j) ⊆ VBi (Si × Πj 6=iT j) , for i ∈ N.
Since, by definition, for i ∈ N :
PowBi∅ (Si × Πj 6=iT j) ∩
∏
Bi∈Bi V (Bi × Πj 6=iT j) = VBi (Si × Πj 6=iT j) and
PowBi∅ (Si × Πj 6=iT j) ∩
∏
Bi∈Bi DefL (Bi × Πj 6=iT j) = DefBiL (Si × Πj 6=iT j) ,
it is enough to show (by an induction on the formation of formulas in L) that
all L-definable subsets of finite products of big sorts of L are closed (where the
topologies are the ones of Remark and Convention 4.1).
First we note a helpful observation:
Remark 4.5 Let free(ϕ) ⊆ {vZ11 , . . . , vZll } ( {vZ11 , . . . , vZll , vZl+1l+1 , . . . , vZmm }. If
we denote by [ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l )]
A the subset of big(Z1)× . . .× big(Zl) defined by ϕ
and by [ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zm
m )]
A the subset of big(Z1) × . . . × big(Zm) defined by ϕ, it
follows that
[ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l )]
A × big(Zl+1)× . . .× big(Zm) = [ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , vZmm )]A.
By the definition of the product topology, [ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l )]
A is closed in
big(Z1)× . . .×big(Zl) iff [ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , vZmm )]A is closed in big(Z1)× . . .×big(Zm).
Therefore, to show that a subset [ϕ]A defined by ϕ ∈ L is closed, it does not
matter which set {vZ11 , . . . , vZll } ⊇ free(ϕ) we consider.
We start with the induction on the formation of the formulas in L:
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1. If, ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l ) ∈ Ln, for a n ∈ N ∪ {−1}, then [ϕ]A is closed (even
clopen), since by Lemma 4.14, [ϕ]A is the inverse image of the clopen set
[ϕ]An under the continuous map Πlm=1piZmn .
2. Let i ∈ N and let vT im and vT il be variables of sort T i.
Case a: m 6= l:
[
vT im
.= vT il
]A
is the diagonal of T i × T i, which is closed,
since T i is Hausdorff.
Case b: m = l: Then,
[
vT im
.= vT il
]A
= T i.
The case ϕ = xT i .= yT i , where xT i and yT i are terms of sort T i, follows
now by Lemma 4.16. (If xT i = ti 6= t̂i = yT i , then
[
xT i .= yT i
]A
= ∅.)
3. Let i ∈ N and k ∈ N ∪ {−1}, and let vT ik be a variable of sort T ik and vT i
be a variable of sort T i.
Then it is easy to check that
[
vT ikvT i
]A
=
[
vT
i
k
m
.= vT
i
k
l
]A
, where m 6= l. But
vT
i
k
m
.= vT
i
k
l ∈ Lk, hence by 1., this set is closed.
The case ϕ = xT ikyT i , where xT ik is a term of sort T ik and y
T i is a term of
sort T i, follows again by Lemma 4.16.
4. Let i ∈ N, let vSi be a variable of sort Si and, for j ∈ N, let vT j be a
variable of sort T j. By the definition, we have[
Ri(vT i , Bi, v
Si , (vT j)j 6=i)
]A
=⋂
n≥0 (pin × idSi × Πj 6=ipjn)−1( {(tin, si, (tjn)j 6=i) | (tin, Bi, si, (tjn)j 6=i) ∈ Ri,nn } ).
For n ∈ N, the sets {(tin, si, (tjn)j 6=i) | (tin, Bi, si, (tjn)j 6=i) ∈ Ri,nn } are clopen,
the mappings pin × idSi × Πj 6=ipjn are continuous, hence[
Ri(vT
i , Bi, v
Si , (vT j)j 6=i)
]A
is closed in T i × Si × Πj 6=iT j.
The case ϕ = Ri(xT i , Bi, x
Si , (xT j)j 6=i), where xSi is a term of sort Si and
xT j is a term of sort T j, for j ∈ N , follows by Lemma 4.16.
5. Let ϕ = ψ0 ∨ ψ1. According to Remark 4.5, we can assume that ψ0 =
ψ0(v
Z1
1 , . . . , v
Zl
l ) and ψ1 = ψ1(v
Z1
1 , . . . , v
Zl
l ). By Remark 4.4, we have
[ϕ]A = [ψ0]A ∪ [ψ1]A, which is closed, since [ψ0]A and [ψ1]A are closed
by the induction assumption.
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6. Let ϕ =
∧
ψ∈Ψ ψ such that free(ψ) ⊆ {vZ11 , . . . , vZll }, for all ψ ∈ Ψ. We can
assume that ψ = ψ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l ), for all ψ ∈ Ψ. By Remark 4.4, we have
[ϕ]A =
⋂
ψ∈Ψ[ψ]A. Each [ψ]A is closed by the induction assumption, hence
[ϕ]A is closed, since the intersection of an arbitrary family of closed sets is
closed.
7. Let ϕ = ∃vZll ψ(vZ11 , . . . , vZll ).
Case a: Zl is a big sort of L. Then, [ϕ]A is the projection of [ψ]A to
big(Z1)× . . .×big(Zl−1). [ψ]A is closed by the induction assumption, hence
[ϕ]A is closed by Lemma 4.15.
Case b: Zl is a small sort of L. Then, Zl is finite and
[ϕ]A =
⋃
c∈Zl
[
ψ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl−1
l−1 , c)
]A
.
By the induction assumption, [ψ]A is closed, hence by Lemma 4.16, the
right-hand side is closed, since it is a finite union of closed sets.
8. Let χ be a L−-formula and free(χ) ⊆ {vZl+1l+1 , . . . , vZmm }, let ψ(vZ11 , . . . , vZmm )
be a L-formula and let
ϕ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l ) = ∀vZl+1l+1 . . .∀vZmm (χ(vZl+1l+1 , . . . , vZmm )→ ψ(vZ11 , . . . , vZmm )).
By the definition of “|=”, it follows that
[ϕ]A =
⋂
(cl+1,... ,cm)∈Zl+1×...×Zm:A|=χ(cl+1,... ,cm)
[
ψ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l , cl+1, . . . , cm)
]A
.
[ϕ]A is closed, since by the induction assumption and Lemma 4.16, each[
ψ(vZ11 , . . . , v
Zl
l , cl+1, . . . , cm)
]A
is closed in big(Z1)× . . .×big(Zl) and [ϕ]A is the intersection of these closed
sets,
and the theorem is proved.
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Corollary 4.2 For every i ∈ N, posi is one-to-one and onto.
Proof For every i ∈ N, δi is a homeomorphism.
The following corollary, a reformulation of the above Theorem 4.2, could be
viewed, in one sense, as a strong quantifier elimination theorem. In another sense,
it is weaker as it does not talk about definable subsets of all finite products of
sorts of L, although ordinary quantifier elimination can be shown easily. The
corollary says that all (A-nice in the A-version, resp. B-nice in the B-version)
L-definable conditional i-events are ti-sections of the relation Ri. Thus, we get
the desired L-definably beliefs completeness result.
Corollary 4.3 • For every i ∈ N and every ti ∈ T i :([
Ri(ti, Bi, v
Si
Bi , (v
T j
Bi )j 6=i)
]A)
Bi∈Bi
∈ DefBiL
(
Si × Πj 6=iT j) .
• Let i ∈ N and let, for every Bi ∈ Bi, ϕBi(vSiBi , (vZjBi )j 6=i) ∈ L such that
big(Zj) = T j, for j 6= i, and such that(
[ϕBi ]A
)
Bi∈Bi ∈ DefBiL
(
Si × Πj 6=iT j) .
Then there is exactly one ti ∈ T i such that for all Bi ∈ Bi :[
Ri(ti, Bi, v
Si
Bi , (v
T j
Bi )j 6=i)
]A
= [ϕBi ]A.
Proof Follows directly from Theorem 4.2 and Corollary 4.2.
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